The Iraqi Media Under the American Occupation: 2003 - 2008 by Abdullah, A.D.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Abdullah, A.D. (2011). The Iraqi Media Under the American Occupation: 2003 - 
2008. (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City University London) 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/11890/
Link to published version: 
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
 CITY UNIVERSITY 
Department of Journalism 
 
 
 
D Journalism 
The Iraqi Media Under the American 
Occupation: 2003 - 2008 
 
 
 
By Abdulrahman Dheyab Abdullah 
 
 
Submitted 
2011 
2 
Contents 
 
Acknowledgments         7 
Abstract          8 
Scope of Study         10 
Aims and Objectives        13 
The Rationale                                       14 
Research Questions        15 
Methodology                     15 
Field Work          21 
 
1. Chapter One: The American Psychological War on Iraq.   23 
1.1. The Alliance’s Representation of Saddam as an              24 
International Threat. 
1.2. The Technique of Embedding Journalists.                                  26 
1.3. The Use of Media as an Instrument of War.     29 
1.4. Attempts to Dominate Media through the use               30 
of Physical Attack. 
1.5. Portraying the Occupation in a Positive light.              32 
1.6. The Involvement of Private P.R. Companies.                              34 
1.7. The Alliance’s Public Diplomacy in the Lead Up to                     36 
                  2003 Invasion. 
1.8.The Relationship between the American Government and         40 
       Media Communications Companies. 
  
3 
1.9. Biased and Selective Reporting of Events.              41 
1.10.WikiLeaks Exposé.                 46 
1.10.1. Exploiting Information.                          50 
1.10.2 The Iraqi Media Network.                           53 
1.10.3.Information Operations.                           54 
 
2. Chapter Two: American Journalism in Japan and Germany              56 
after WWII. 
2.1. The American Occupation of Japan.                56 
2.1.1.Japan’s Post-Occupation Media.                          63 
2.2. German Press History Before the American Occupation.             65 
2.2. 1.The American Occupation of Germany.                         66 
2.2. 2. Germany’s Post–Occupation Media                                      72 
 
3. Chapter Three: The History of Iraqi Media before the 2003    73 
         Invasion. 
3.1. The initiation of Iraqi Media (1869-1914).               73 
3.1.1.Iraqi Media During WWI.                                     76 
3.1.2. The Press of the Twentieth Revolution.                         78 
3.2. Catalysts for the Development of the Iraqi Press.              80 
3.3. Iraqi Media during the Monarchic era (1921-1958).                      81 
3.4. The Iraqi Press during WWII.                 83 
3.5. The Iraqi Press after the 14th of July Revolution,1958.              84 
3.6. The Establishment of Television Broadcasting in Iraq.             86 
4 
3.7. Iraqi Television during the New Republic from 1958.                   88 
3.8. Iraqi Television after 17-30 July Revolution 1968.             89 
3.9. Iraqi Television under Saddam Hussein.                                 90 
3.9.1.Baghdad International Television.                                  93 
3.9.2.Al-Shabab Television.                         99 
 
4. Chapter Four: Al-Iraqiyah Television Channel.             103 
4.1.The US Administration’s Preplanning of the Post-War Stage.
 103 
4.2.The development of a New Media Landscape.                      105 
4.3. The Iraqi Media Network (IMN) in operation.                       108 
4.4. Iraqi Media during the Paul Bremer period.             109 
4.4.1.  Attempts to Protect the Media’s Integrity with Legislation       113    
4.4.1. Discord between the Americans and Arabic Satellite              116 
Channels.     
                4.4.3.  IMN’s Competition with the Arabic Satellite                       117 
Channels. 
4.4.4. The American’s Recruitment of Harris Corp.                       118 
4.4.5. Continuing the Legacy of Censorship.                       120 
4.5. Al-Iraqiyah under the Rule of the Provisional Prime           122 
Minister Ayad Alawi. 
4.6.Al-Iraqiya during Islamist Prime Minister Ibrahim             128 
Al-Jafari’s Tenure. 
4.7.Changes Made within Al-Iraqiyah under Prime.                           132 
Minister Nouri Al-maliki. 
  
5 
5. Chapter Five: Special Cases.                         140 
5.1.The Baghdad Club.                                               141 
5.1.1.The Baghdad Club Scandal.                                            141 
5.1.2.The Work Statement of the Baghdad Club.                            143 
5.1.3.The Baghdad Club’s Techniques.                                 146 
            5.2.Yathrib Newspaper.                                     150 
 
6. Chapter Six: Salah Ad Din Satellite Channel.              155 
           6.1.Salah Ad Din Province.                                  155 
           6.2.The Establishment of Salah Ad Din TV.                        115 
6.3.Statement of Purpose.                 160 
6.4.The Establishment of the Board of Directors.              162 
6.5.Main Programmes.                           167 
6.6. Salah Ad Din TV’s Ownership.               169 
6.6.1.Salah Ad Din TV’s Performance.                         170 
 
7. Chapter Seven: Personal Experience.                         175 
7.1. First Impressions.                 175 
7.2.The Gap between American Promises and Practices.            176 
7.3. Learning Media Practices from the Home of Journalism.           179 
7.4. The Death Squads.                 179 
7.5. Working for an Iraqi-Exiled Channel.                        188 
7.6. Back to International Standards.              188 
6 
7.7. Face-to-Face with Embedded Journalism.              189 
Conclusion: Summing up of Research Outcomes.             192 
Future study.                                                                                               198 
Endnotes                              200 
Working Bibliography                            232 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
7 
Acknowledgments. 
I would like to dedicate this work to my supervisor, Professor Howard Tumber, 
who was always available with ample patience, guidance and support, and 
without whom this thesis would not have been possible. His academic skills, 
deep journalistic knowledge and charismatic personality have guided and 
greatly inspired my efforts. 
I am warmly grateful to my wife Noura Saddon for her invaluable support and 
encouragement throughout years of research and hard work. 
I owe an endless debt to my mother, brothers and sisters for their support 
along the way. 
I would like to warmly remember my father, who passed away during my 
research, and thank him a lot for his sacrifice and encouragement. 
A lot of thanks goes to my previous supervisor, Adrian Monk, for his 
friendship, encouragement and supervision throughout the early stages of my 
research. 
This research would not have been possible without the selfless contribution 
and help of hundreds of Iraqi journalists working in television, radio, printed 
and online press. Some are mentioned throughout the thesis and many others 
have agreed to talk to me anonymously. I would like to take this opportunity to 
express my deep gratitude for all they have done for Iraq in their quest for a 
free press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
Abstract. 
The American war on Iraq in 2003 has unleashed tremendous changes to the 
Iraqi media. It has been changed from a draconian, state-run institution into a 
free-for-all one. However, the relative freedom the media enjoyed was marred 
by the US management of the press, as part of the military operation and the 
campaign to win the hearts and minds of Iraqis who were suspicious of 
America’s plans for ‘liberation and democracy’. The stages of this US policy of 
press management and its impact on the shaping of the Iraqi media are the 
core elements of this thesis. 
This study examines the relations between the media in Iraq and the 
American occupation military forces, including the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA). It focuses on how American practices formed the media in 
Iraq after the invasion, how these practices and policies have affected the 
freedom of press and whether they conform to the international standards of 
journalism. It argues that the American policies undermined their promises to 
create free, independent and professional journalism in Iraq, and call into 
question the sincerity of their intentions. It presents evidence that the Iraqi 
media has been a tool used for the benefit of the American forces and the 
established Iraqi government. 
To show the US dominance of the Iraqi media, the thesis studies the 
American policies and practices of building some of the Iraqi media 
institutions, and how they were used as part of US psychological warfare. The 
thesis also details how these media organisations developed through the 
years of the occupation; first serving the American agenda and tactical 
requirements, and then being handed to the Iraqi government to start a new 
era of state–run media in the name of democracy, or given as a gift to loyal 
individuals who served the Americans during the occupation. 
The various factors that have influenced the Iraqi media after the 2003 
invasion have been discussed at length. A qualitative methodology acted as a 
basis for an in-depth examination of the establishment and performance of the 
Iraqi media organisations, which were created by the American army. 
Unprofessional practices, unethical policies and negative influences on news 
  
9 
coverage riddled the Iraqi press throughout the period of military occupation. 
Figures in the American and Iraqi administrations and militaries, as well as 
influential members of the media organisations themselves, all had a hand in 
manipulating the press to propagate material that furthered their ideological 
and tactical goals. A severe lack of laws to protect journalists and their 
organisations and of a professional media greatly restricted the freedom of 
reporting, and stifled the growth of a free and independent media. 
In analysing the history of Iraqi media, it is clear that the development of 
journalism in Iraq was directly affected by frequent changes in the Iraqi 
political administration and military leadership. In the Middle East politicians 
and militaries often held dominating positions in their relationships with the 
national media. The unethical policies imposed upon media organisations by 
the powers that be had a detrimental effect on their human resources and on 
practices within the institutions, which has in turn led to the current distortion 
and inefficiencies in the performance and professionalism of Iraqi media. 
By close examination of American policies regarding the Iraqi media sector, 
similarities can be found between American practices in Germany and Japan 
after World War II. Here they made the fatal error of applying policies that 
were far more successful in Germany and Japan, directly to the situation in 
Iraq, without sufficient regard for the context of the situation in Iraq after the 
2003 invasion. A close study of US-established Iraqi media brings to the 
surface the particular tools used to control the press. This offers a valuable 
insight into the major influences on Iraqi news, aimed at improving the image 
of American forces and the Iraqi government, which was under American 
supervision. The study begins with the premise that media is recognised as 
one of the most powerful tools in highlighting problems within deeply divided 
societies, and that it can help shape and influence public attitudes towards 
overcoming such tensions in national communities. 
This thesis has been constructed empirically by approaching media 
organisations, journalists and newsrooms, as well as politicians and military 
figures from both the Iraqi and American administrations, in order to define the 
degree to which the quality of professionalism within media organisations was 
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influenced by the power of both the American and Iraqi governments and 
militaries. 
Finally, the study reveals how, in order to serve tactical aims, the American 
administration built up state media organisations disguised as professional 
and independent broadcasters. 
 
Scope of study. 
The United States’ claims of building a free, independent and professional 
media in Iraq are examined in this study, using methodology which allowed for 
historic cross-checking from both primary and secondary sources. The study 
was conducted in Iraq between 2003-2008. This included work in Baghdad 
and in Salah Ad Din Province, the home town of Saddam Hussein. These two 
cities witnessed dramatic changes after the invasion and experienced hard 
times and violence, especially against the US army.  These big challenges 
drove the US to put extraordinary effort into sorting out the political and 
security situation as anti-occupation powers threatened their project in Iraq. 
Although this thesis embraces universalism, it will be subject to a number of 
limitations.  The Iraqi media went through drastic changes which tossed it 
from the state-run media in the hands of Saddam’s regime into the hands of 
the Americans, and later into those of pro-American Iraqi governments. The 
thesis focuses on the American role in creating the Iraqi media and its 
aftermath, because the American contribution in the war was dominant, and 
the role of other countries which participated in the coalition that toppled 
Saddam Hussein was minimal. Moreover, the US had already set out plans 
on how to handle the post-Saddam media before the war, along with the 
psychological warfare it staged against the Iraqi regime. The post-war period 
saw key US players carry out these plans and develop new ones to deal with 
unexpected problems that arose during the occupation. 
The thesis concentrates on a set of media outlets, such as Al-Iraqiya TV 
Channel, Baghdad Club, Salah Ad Din TV Channel and Yathrab newspaper, 
for a number of reasons. Al-Iraqiyah, the semi-official TV channel, was the 
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mainstay for US planners who promised to turn it into a BBC or PBS-style 
outlet.  It was also the main target on which US efforts were centred to create 
a channel engaging the Iraqi audience all over the country. Illustrating the 
transformation of Al-Iraqiyah highlights the current challenges facing Iraqi 
media outlets. In addition, the contractors who established it were American 
companies, so all in all Aliraqiyah Channel reflects the real American intention 
behind it. Since it was based at the same buildings and facilities as Saddam’s 
media, Iraqi audiences gave it special attention, and examined the changes 
brought about by the Americans, including the diffrences and similarities in the 
professional standards, policies and its performance. 
The Baghdad Press Club was selected as a case study within this thesis 
because it exposes newer American techniques to buy off journalists and 
media institutions for their purposes during the war in Iraq. Baghdad Club was 
a choreographed effort by the US army in Iraq to portray their presence and 
work in the country in a positive light, even when this portrayal was 
inaccurate. It gives the reader the opportunity to better understand what 
happened and the implications of such experiences. There were allegations 
that the US army was buying positive coverage in the Iraqi media using the 
Baghdad Press Club. This club was founded and financed by the US military. 
Although the Americans were offering reporters fees for coverage, along with 
digital cameras, laptops etc., they insisted that they did not ask for favourable 
coverage. I therefore decided that this case study would help illustrate the 
Americans’ intentions for the new era of the Iraqi media after the long period 
of dictatorship. However, it was one of the hardest missions in my research, 
because there was not enough information about it available to the public or 
the media. So I decided to investigate this secretive press club, and most 
importantly to reach the classified documents which can show the aims of this 
club. I worked very hard for more than a year and a half, by which time I had 
accessed all the documents and interviews which I wanted to see. The 
process made me feel like I was working on an investigative piece rather than 
an academic research thesis. 
Salah Ad Din TV Channel broadcasts from Tikrit City, the hometown of 
Saddam Hussein, where it is also based. The US army chose to establish this 
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channel because their presence was not welcomed in Iraq and they had an 
uphill challenge to win the hearts and minds of people there. In my opinion, it 
is a glaring example of using the media as a tool of persuasion and warfare. It 
also reflects a different technique based on using locals to launch a TV 
channel which then serves the occupying army by delivering positive 
coverage about American policies and military operations. Such a channel 
could also go further and justify deadly mistakes of the American army, as we 
will see in the main chapter. 
But again, how could I reach classified documents and secretive people who 
worked on the project? I paid about ten visits from London to the province of 
Salah Ad Din, in spite of the real danger as the province was under the control 
of the insurgency  for years. Truthfully, I can say that any mistake could have 
cost me my life. Through the visit I learned that the Americans dealt with 
uneducated people who were unaware of the importance of the documents 
and information. So I started working to reach them until I found highly 
classified documents about the Salah AD Din Channel project. This was great 
help to me in writing a chapter about Salah Ad Din TV. 
Yathrab was a newspaper which the US army established in Yathrab town, 75 
km north of Baghdad, in the proximity of the biggest US army base in Iraq - 
Anaconda. The US army chose to use this newspaper, with a limited 
circulation of 10,000 in a rural community, in order to convince the townsfolk, 
who were doubtful about America’s plans for their country and about the US’s  
good will. The American’s experience with Yathrib newspaper also shows how 
the US army went on to use various means, in media and psychological war, 
to reach the different classes of the community, limit attacks and win the 
hearts and minds. This case was important because it shows the Americans’ 
priorities in their psychological war. Working on this chapter I noticed the 
importance of the contacts in the research, as my personal contact with the 
team helped me to receive the information I needed from the people who 
were cooperating with the American troops in running the newspaper. 
These media outlets have been selected for discussion because of style, and 
also each of them provides some insight into a major aspect of the US army’s 
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role in shaping the current Iraqi media. The selected outlets exemplify the US 
intention behind creating these types of media. They register and reveal the 
US manipulation of media for military ends. Other media outlets are not less 
important but will be left for future research. 
 
Aims & Objectives. 
The core aim of this thesis is to study the American creation of Iraqi media 
institutions, and their development under the joint efforts of the American 
administration and the Iraqi National Government. The backdrop of the Iraqi 
media’s development before America’s presence within the country is 
presented in order to contextualise the developments under observation. 
It features a strong focus on whether the Americans succeeded in 
establishing truly independent media organisations, as well as the sincerity of 
such efforts. This will lead to questions being raised relating to any conflict 
between restrictions imposed and protective journalistic law, versus the ability 
of members of the press to maintain integrity and professionalism in their 
reporting. 
The study also looks at shedding light on US practices which were either 
ignored or marginalised because of cover-up or a lack of interests. The aim of 
the research is to find out whether the American promises reflected their 
policies and practices on the ground. It analyses the path of their practices 
and policies in the media sector to discover their true perspective regarding 
the media’s role in developing countries, or ‘developing democracies’. And it 
is important to highlight the final results of their media project and the state 
which it was left in. The study aims at highlighting US’s practices as a focus 
for academic research so that they may receive their due attention. Such 
experiences are important for field journalists and social science researchers 
who study the link between journalism and society. 
Ultimately, a study such as this is not intended to offer radical new solutions to 
the current media landscape in Iraq. Rather, its objective is to offer a broader 
and deeper understanding of the use of the media as a tool for dominating 
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powers to further their own goals to the detriment of the Iraqi nation. The 
researcher hopes that with a more extensive understanding of the 
development and manipulation of Iraqi media, people will be more equipped 
to influence a future Iraq of healthier ethics and with an emphasis on freedom 
of speech. 
 
The Rationale. 
The Iraqis need professional, independent, impartial and free media to build 
up a open society and democratic state, especially as intellectual Iraqis are 
trying to establish democracy and a new state after decades of dictatorship. 
However, the creation of these new media outlets was in the hands of the 
Americans, who promised to establish a democratic state in Iraq. The study 
attempts to analyse American policy within the media sector in Iraq, highlight 
its strengths and weaknesses and look at how it affected the future of the Iraqi 
media. This study aims to provide a better understanding of the media sector 
in Iraq under the American occupation, so that the country is helped to get on 
the right track for the future. 
The conflict between Iraq's sectarian and ethnic communities needs to be 
addressed in the mainstream media, in order to serve as a safety valve for the 
stability of the nation. A key for the future of Iraq's wellbeing is the 
transformation of this debate into a constructive one. This thesis is an attempt 
to offer insight into commonly faced issues, in order that they may be avoided 
in the future. Despite the emergence of over 180 daily newspapers and 15 
satellite channels in the nation since 2003, the literature widely available on 
emerging media in Iraq is scarce. The thesis presents further analyses of the 
history of key institutions. Such study will be of great importance for Iraqi 
journalists and academics who wish to learn lessons and monitor the 
development of their country’s media. 
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Research Questions. 
 How did the Americans handle the Iraqi media in the post-invasion 
period? 
 What steps did the Americans take to establish the new Iraqi media? 
 Did the American administration build a truly independent and 
professional media? 
 Did the Americans’ policy aim to use the New Iraqi media as a tool to 
improve their image after the invasion of Iraq? 
 How did the various Iraqi Governments deal with the media 
institutions? 
 Did the Iraqi Governments use the media to serve the agendas of the 
ruling parties? 
 Did the media institutions advocate their ethnic and sectarian values, 
instead of representing professional independent journalism? If so, 
how was this done? 
 
Methodology. 
Decisive stages and shifts in media outlets in Iraq during the period 2003-
2008 are examined qualitatively. The qualitative research is used by social 
science researchers to observe and analyse key events or phenomena within 
a limited frame of time and place. It seeks to provide an in depth 
understanding of human behaviour and the motives that govern such 
behaviour. “Qualitative research ... involve[s] an interpretive, naturalistic 
approach to its subject matter.  This means that qualitative researchers study 
things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret 
phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.  Qualitative 
research involves the studied use and collection of a variety of empirical 
materials – case study, personal experience, introspective, life story, 
interview, observational, historical, interactional and visual texts – that 
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describe routine and problematic moments and meanings in individuals’ 
lives.”1  There is good variety in qualitative approaches, all of which share 
these features. 
A qualitative analysis method is adopted in this study to put the qualitative 
data that have been gathered into a structure of explanation, understanding 
and interpretation as explained by Catherine Marshall and Gretchen Rossman 
in their book Designing Qualitative Research.2  A phenomenological approach 
is applied to illustrate the major themes of the thesis. 
A case study method is used in this research, which identifies multiple cases 
which go on to reveal an extraordinary development and reinforce the 
conclusion drawn from a review of the literature. These case studies are 
selected because they are powerful enough to show the reality of the 
Americans’ perspective and intentions for the media in Iraq during the 
occupation. 
As Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson explain in Ethnography, the case 
study involves “the analysis of date [and] involves interpretation of the 
meanings, functions and consequence of human actions and institutional 
practices, and how these are implicated in local, and perhaps also wider 
context.”3 
The case study information is taken by date, gathered from news reports, 
documents, books, interviews and academic studies. The information was 
verified by conducting in-depth interviews. The interviews were not only 
gathered for information, but also to draw consensus on the validity of the 
literature and case study information. 
The advantages of using a case study: 
1. It helps to develop an analytic approach. 
2. It gives enough space for exploration of complex issues. 
The disadvantage of using a case study: 
1. Insufficient information can lead to inaccurate results. 
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The in-depth interview technique is applied in the research to conducting 
interviews with key figures and individuals to explore their perspectives on 
particular events, policies and practices; both local Iraqi and international 
experts and staff who were involved in rebuilding the new Iraqi media with the 
Americans (see the appendix). 
In-depth interviews have been useful in this research to explore new issues in 
great detail. It helped the study provide a better, more complete picture of 
what happened within the Iraqi media sector during the American invasion 
and administration. The semi-structured interview techniques used gave the 
respondents the opportunity to highlight what they thought were important 
features of their experiences and knowledge. These interviews were then 
carefully examined and checked accurately both against other interviews and 
against data and information which were collected from books, documents, 
contemporary media reports and other sources. 
The advantage of using this technique is that it yields far more detail and 
information than what is available through other sources. The relaxed 
atmosphere during the interviews helped the interviewees to feel more 
comfortable and speak more openly, which in turn helped the collection of 
exclusive and detailed information about the topic. 
Besides the advantages, there are limitations to the in-depth interview 
technique, such as collecting biased information. People who were involved in 
the projects that I am trying to conduct in my study might attempt to show that 
US policies and practices were good for personal reasons; for example to 
protect their reputation, as some interviewees were involved with the 
Americans in these media projects. So one has to prepare very well before 
conducting interviews if one hopes to avoid biased information. 
Also, the researchers could be subject to time constraints, because interviews 
take time to conduct, write out and analyse. This project had in particular had 
time constraints, as it was conducted in Iraq, an example of a dangerous 
environment where instability can interrupt interview appointments. It was a 
tall order for me to fix meetings with people while I was in the UK and travel to 
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Iraq and interview people in a limited time. So interviews had to be pre-
planned so that I could complete my interviews and meet my deadlines. 
An investigative approach was adopted to check certain allegations which 
were difficult to verify. In particular there were many claims against the 
American policies and practices in the media field. For instance there were 
allegations that the Americans were paying Iraqi journalists to include positive 
stories, using their new propaganda tool, the Baghdad Club. This will 
obviously not have been easy to confirm using other research approaches, so 
I decided to adopt an investigative approach to gather well-documented and 
detailed data about it. Therefore the investigation was conducted by direct 
observation and supported with information from news reports, articles and 
academic literature studies. Finally I got exclusive documents which have 
never been used previously by anyone. They are classified US documents 
which show the background, aims and objectives of the Baghdad Club. 
Salah Ad Din TV channel was a very big challenge as there are many 
allegations about the contract and intention of Sallah Ad Din TV channel. 
People accused the US of paying non-professionals to launch the channel so 
that it could be used for propaganda purposes. It was an extremely difficult 
area to look into, especially when I started to carry out my research and I 
could not find even one written word about the channel in any source, even on  
the internet. The channel does not have a website either. With these 
difficulties in mind, an investigative approach was adopted to prove or 
disprove the allegations. This time I conducted some very successful 
interviews, but still the interviews needed to be examined against detailed 
official documents which were in the American Military Base. However, 
through the research and the interviews I knew that copies of these 
documents are also held by a few Iraqi people who were involved in the Salah 
Ad Din Channel project. I launched investigations and found out their names. 
Then I started making contact and meeting some of them. Finally, one of them 
agreed to give these undisclosed documents to me. 
The investigative approach became essential in my research because I 
worked on two projects to turn Wikileaks documents into two films, one of 
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them for Channel 4 and the other one for Aljazeera. These projects gave me a 
great opportunity to launch investigations into these secret documents and 
examine the data which I collected against them. This was a difficult and time-
consuming exercise, but the investigation into these secret documents 
enabled me to obtain important documentation which exposes the US’s 
intentions behind the creation and the usage of the new Iraqi media 
organisations. 
Finally, I analysed the overall process to give an explanation for the outcomes 
of the research. The analysis began with the reconstruction of individual 
cases and, as a second step, summarised or contrasted these cases from a 
comparative and generalising viewpoint. 
The study falls into seven chapters and a conclusion sums up the outcome of 
the research. Chapter 1 is a literature review which sheds light on the 
American experiences in Japan and Germany post World War II. It also 
includes a literature review of the psychological warfare waged by the United 
States in the preparations for the third Gulf war in 2003. The chapter 
introduces the reader to the techniques employed by US officials to justify the 
war, and win hearts and minds about the legitimacy of their actions. A 
qualitative data analysis method is adopted in this chapter to explain the data 
gathered about the US experience in Germany and Japan and their 
experience of psychological warfare, and to provide a structure of explanation, 
understanding and interpretation of their policies and practices. 
The second chapter of the research chronicles the history of Iraqi television 
and print journalism from its inauguration to 2003. It attempts to point out the 
key stages of its development and the challenges faced by its staff and the 
viewership. The chapter places special focus on the history of Iraqi TV during 
the Saddam Hussein era, 1979-2003. It tries to explain the impact of the iron-
fisted policy used by this regime on the performance of the media and its staff. 
A qualitative analysis method is applied in this chapter to explain the 
qualitative data that has been gathered about the history of the Iraqi media 
before the 2003 invasion and to provide a structure of explanation, 
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understanding and interpretation of impact of the Iraqi political system on the 
media. 
Chapter 3 aims to explain US policy and practice after the ousting of 
Saddam’s regime and during the rule of the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA). Its focus is the role of the US administration, as it was the governing 
authority and therefore the main hand in shaping Iraqi media. It also details 
the consequent results, which have been reflected in Iraqi media practices. It 
shows how this poses a challenge for other Iraqi media organisations, which 
seek to reflect the developments in Iraqi society according to international 
journalistic standards.  It points out how the US, represented by the CPA, 
administered the scene after toppling the former regime, establishing its 
legislation to control media outlets. The researcher plans to hold interviews 
with journalists, politicians and media specialists to support the account of 
events, and their later impact on Iraqi media and conflicts. The researcher will 
also collect evidence, searching through articles, books and studies. The 
chapter sheds light on the development of the Al-Iraqiyah TV station. It also 
addresses whether this institution has become a mouthpiece for the 
occupying or domestic governments. In this chapter the case study method is 
used by identifying a case which reveals an extraordinary development and 
witnesses dramatic changes in the Iraqi media platform. This case study was 
selected because it shows the reality of the US’s perspective and intentions 
toward the usage of the media in Iraq during the occupation. In particular the 
Al-Iraqiyah TV station was considered by the United States as the main and 
central media project for the capital of Baghdad, and the US described Al-
Iraqiyah to be like the BBC in the UK or CBS in the United States. So it was 
their official media project and they promised the world and the Iraqis that it 
would be an independent, free and professional media. This is why I chose it 
as the first case study: so that I could examine the US’s promises against 
their policies and practices. 
Chapter 4 is dedicated to studying the Baghdad Club, the press umbrella 
used by the American military to buy positive media coverage. It highlights the 
purpose of the establishment of the Baghdad Club, which was to enlist 
journalists onto its payroll, in order to gain the ability to issue directives to the 
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reporters in the field. It also focuses on the way in which the United States 
adopted the founding of Yathrib newspaper, which was distributed to the north 
of Baghdad, to influence locals in a small town. In this chapter the case study 
method is used by identifying two cases which reveal a new techniques which 
the Americans used to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqis in different 
environments and areas. The case study of the Baghdad Club was chosen to 
illustrate how the United States established a press club in the name of the 
free media in order that they could buy positive coverage in the Iraqi media, 
and is a great example of the US’s point of view of the media in Iraq. 
Yathrib newspaper is another case study in this chapter, chosen because it 
shows how the US were selective in creating the new Iraqi media 
organisations, and that they built new media outlets wherever they needed 
them as a part of their psychological warfare. 
Chapter 5 features another case study which examines the reasons behind 
the establishment of Salah Ad Din television station founded by US troops in 
the hometown of Saddam Hussain. It also illustrates the attempts made by the 
Americans to polish their image in the minds of members of Saddam’s 
community, who had been affected by the war. The chapter depicts how 
alterations in the US management affected the role and coverage of this local 
TV station. It also examines the impact of its behind-the-scene activities on 
this TV channel’s spin and treatment of news. The chapter underscores the 
ensuing problems regarding ownership of the channel when the US troops 
transferred authority to the Iraqi administration in this province. 
The conclusion sums up the findings of the research. 
 
Field Work. 
There are inherent dangers in conducting such research in Iraq on a full-time 
basis. I received verbal threats from the head of an Iraqi media TV channel, 
who told me to try another channel. The media head went very far in his 
threats, telling me that I “would pay the price” if I did not stop analysing this 
channel. I continued in spite of his unwelcome remarks. 
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Conducting interviews with US media officials at US bases was a huge 
challenge. I was kept waiting for hours for interviews and appointments with 
US media staff. Many times I was left waiting with no reply at the military base 
gate, in a community which took anyone approaching the US base for a spy, 
and thus become a potential target for killing later on. 
I therefore intended to use my residences in London, Amman and Syria while 
conducting occasional research visits to Iraq. I used my contacts with Iraqi 
media organisations, collected data from the Iraqi dailies and transcripts, read 
books, researched papers and articles, and conducted interviews with 
politicians, military figures, journalists, editors and producers, all in order to 
supplement the textual analysis. 
Such interviews were necessary in order to determine the interests and 
attitudes of the parties who may have influenced Iraqi media, and how they 
viewed the role of the national media. Furthermore, such contact can help to 
extrapolate suggestions for developing a strategy of cooperation, and 
elucidate policy recommendations towards an impartial Iraqi media. 
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1. Chapter One: The American Psychological War on Iraq. 
Introduction. 
A large body of analyses has been generated about the Iraqi media and the 
media operations that took place during the period up until 9 April 2003, the 
date Saddam’s statue in central Baghdad was toppled. This date is seen as a 
mark of the end of the war and the defeat of the former Iraqi regime. Although 
former US President Bush declared the end of the war on 1st May 2003, the 
Iraqi regime had practically collapsed by 9th April 2003, and it is believed that 
everything after this date could therefore fall within the ongoing occupation 
period of Iraq.4 
Despite the fact that attention was concentrated on the post-war emergence 
of hundreds of newspapers and several satellite channels, (in stark contrast to 
the five state-owned dailies and single satellite channel that existed during the 
Ba’ath era),  these media were still used for psychological warfare post the 
occupation period.5  There are many studies which examine the use of 
psychological warfare before the 2003 war, identify its methods and assessed 
its overall impact. This research aims to clarify and provide further analyses of 
the methods which were used in the war of 2003. However, the main difficulty 
facing researchers is the confusion that engulfed the scene preceding the 
ousting of Saddam’s regime in April 2003. A historical timeline and a sketch of 
the techniques used can touch upon what was happening during that critical 
period of time. While the world was wrangling about an agreed international 
resolution to legitimise toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein in March 
2003,6 a fierce psychological war was raging. The weapons being used in this 
pre-war attack are not the conventional military hardware everybody knows 
about, but rather “a barrage of selected visual, auditory and even electronic 
information used with the aim of demoralising the Iraqi military”.7 
Unlike previous wars that witnessed the waging of conventional media wars, 
the Iraq War saga in 2003 marked a new situation in which war and media 
technologies directly affected the conduct of war. Various techniques and 
methods were implemented during this conflict to promote effective media 
strategies that could control information and manage news and images. 
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However, the main concerns for the United States and United Kingdom were 
how to fully establish the main motivation to launch the war on Iraq. They 
found the capability of Saddam’s regime to produce weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs) the most concrete motive to take this fateful decision. 
 
1.1. The Alliance’s Representation of Saddam as an International Threat. 
The United States, having been unable to pass a UN resolution legalising the 
war against the Iraqi regime, cited the possession of WMDs as the primary 
motivation to launch the war on Iraq.8 To build up the media war to this effect, 
it mounted a propaganda campaign led by a number of key US and UK media 
organisations. The New York Times published a number of articles claiming to 
prove that Iraq possessed WMDs. One story written by its eminent journalist 
Judith Miller helped to persuade the US public that the Iraqi regime had the 
capability to possess such destructive weapons.9 
The story was followed up by top US officials pointing to the New York Times 
reports as a reason for going to war against Iraq. For instance, on 30th May 
2003, Paul Wolfowitz stated in an interview with Vanity Fair magazine that the 
WMD issue was the main uniting point amongst the Bush team instigating the 
removal of Saddam Hussein from power. He said “the truth is that for reasons 
that have a lot to do with the US government bureaucracy, we settled on the 
one issue that everyone could agree on, which was the weapons of mass 
destruction as the core reason, but, there have always been three 
fundamental concerns. One is weapons of mass destruction, the second is 
support for terrorism, the third is the criminal treatment of the Iraqi people. 
Actually I guess you could say there’s a fourth overriding one which is the 
connection between the first two”.10 
US inspector Charles Duelfer, deputy chief of the UN inspection team, said in 
an interview that “the United States brought pressure on inspectors to prolong 
the UN sanctions on Iraq and have the time to create the environment to 
launch war against this country”.11  To this end, The New York Times also 
shed light on alleged links between Saddam Hussein and a 9/11 attacks 
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ringleader. It cited the Czech interior minister in a report that an Iraqi 
intelligence officer met with Mohammad Atta, one of the ringleaders of the 
September 11th attacks on the United States, just five months before the 
synchronized hijackings and mass killings were carried out.12 
It was only after 2003 that US officials and media organisations acknowledged 
that their statements and reports about the WMDs were misleading. On 26th 
May 2004, the New York Times published an editorial in which it stated that its 
journalism in the build up to the war had sometimes been flawed. It admitted 
that the writers of stories on the WMDs were either ignorant about the real 
status of Iraq’s WMDs or being lied to by Iraqi exiles who were bent on regime 
change in Iraq. The editorial regretted that “information that was controversial 
then, and seems questionable now, was insufficiently qualified or allowed to 
stand unchallenged”.13 Former US President George W. Bush, who staunchly 
claimed that the Saddam regime was developing WMDs, said in a speech 
before the World Affairs Council of Charlotte, NC, on 7th April 2006, that he 
“fully understood that the intelligence was wrong, and he [was] just as 
disappointed as everybody else” when US troops failed to find WMDs.14 
The United States experienced the same quandary as its allies in lacking the 
international legitimacy to launch the war on the Iraqi regime. It provided an 
arsenal of legal and political justifications to convince the world about the 
war.15 For example, to the UN Security Council 1441, which adopted a 
compromise resolution stipulating the resumption of weapons inspections and 
promised ‘serious consequences’ for non-compliance16. Its then UN 
ambassador, Jeremy Greenstock, said that the resolution provided no 
“automaticity or hidden triggers for an invasion without further consultation of 
the Security Council”.17 Yet the most controversial case was that of the Dodgy 
Dossier, which was a briefing used by the Tony Blair government to persuade 
the British public about the war.18 The briefing was presented by Alastair 
Campbell, Blair’s Director of Communications and Strategy, to journalists on 
3rd February 2003. The dossier documents detailed reasons for British 
involvement in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It created controversy when British 
Channel 4 News highlighted Glen Rangwala’s discovery19 that the bulk of the 
dossier was plagiarised from various unattributed sources. The most notable 
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source was an article by American-Iraqi researcher Ibrahim al-Marashi, 
entitled Iraq’s Security & Intelligence network: A Guide and Analysis, which 
was published in the September issue of the Middle East Review of 
International Affairs.20 The day after the Channel 4 revelation, Blair’s office 
issued a statement that a mistake was made in not crediting the sources, 
however, this did raise questions about the credibility of the information 
mentioned in the report.21 
The nature of the dossier’s contents became the debating issue for the Blair 
government’s conflict with the BBC, particularly its former journalist Andrew 
Gilligan. The latter claimed that the government ‘sexed up’ the ‘dodgy 
dossier’, which stated that Iraq could deploy biological weapons within 45 
minutes, in order to strengthen the argument for going to war against the Iraqi 
regime.22 However, Gilligan was dealt a blow when David Kelly, whom he 
cited as his only source for the filed report on Iraqi weapons, was found 
dead.23 The Hutton Inquiry, which was set up by the Blair government to 
investigate the circumstances surrounding the death of David Kelly, a 
biological weapons expert and former UN weapons inspector in Iraq, cleared 
the government of wrongdoing and criticised the BBC, precipitating the 
resignation of Andrew Gilligan from the organisation.24 
 
1.2. The Technique of Embedding Journalists. 
Using unattributed sources and unconfirmed details was not the only 
controversial method deployed by the US in the media war against Iraq. Other 
techniques were used to incriminate the Saddam regime and divert attention 
from the international outcry against launching a war which in the eyes of 
many was not justified. One of the outstanding techniques used was the 
embedding policy.25 The term ‘embedded journalism’ refers to the attachment 
of news reporters to military units in armed conflict.26 Looking at the history of 
the policy has revealed that it is not a new policy, as it has been used by the 
US military before. The strategy had replaced the pool system, which has 
been adopted by the US media since the Vietnam War, but used mainly 
during the 1991 Gulf War.27 With the embedded policy, journalists had been 
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grouped and led by the military, which consequently “affected the media 
coverage through censorship and restricted movement of journalists in the 
actual fighting”.28 
By using this policy, the US military sought to meet two ends. First, it aimed at 
avoiding the criticism of the Western press, which was disappointed by the 
level of military censorship imposed upon them during the 1991 Gulf War and 
in the 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan29. The military command also aimed 
at promoting good public relations for the army. Vaughan Smith, founder of 
the Frontline News Agency and a veteran of conflict as a soldier and as a 
journalist, considers embedding journalism as “a tainted compact that 
generates more public relations value to the military than democratic value to 
the public”. Embedding, he says, serves the military objective of “effective 
media operation”.30 
Schechter argued that the embedding practice has become necessary 
following the bitter experience during the Afghan War, where there were 
conflicts between journalists who wanted access to the story on the ground 
and the military units who physically tried to restrict access to places of 
interest.31 However, the resort to the strategy in the 2003 war is considered 
the brainchild of central command's military base in Tampa, Florida, which 
took a strategic decision to ease media pressure on Washington, where US 
military command lay.  Instead, the Pentagon offered the media the chance 
during the war on Iraq to embed their reporters in designated military units, 
but only journalists approved by the Pentagon were able to join the main 
invasion force.32 
This practice requires a mandatory level of basic training from journalists, so 
that they can be prepared for the conditions of the battlefield. As stated by 
Rutherford, embedded journalists also had to “sign contracts to signify their 
willingness to self-censor, so that information deemed vital to the ongoing 
military operations would not be released in their reports”.33 Close-ups of 
dead or wounded soldiers, for example, were banned, at least until next of kin 
were notified. In return, the Pentagon and the military would make sure these 
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embedded reporters could send their stories and images back to their news 
outlets.34 
The policy of manipulating news reporting was criticised by media researchers 
and specialists. According to Kumar, embedded reporters were telling the 
story both physically and ideologically from the perspective of the US and 
British troops; “they ate with them, they slept together, and they even wore the 
same clothes”.35 BBC reporter Ben Brown highlighted the problem with this 
situation in the following statement: “There was an Iraqi who...jumped up with 
an RPG and he was about to fire it at us because we were just standing there, 
and this other warrior just shot him with their big machine gun and there was a 
big hole in his chest. That was the closest I felt to being almost too close to 
the troops...because if he had not been there he would have killed us 
and...afterwards I sought out the gunner who had done that and shook his 
hand”.36 
Walid Shmait suggested that embedded journalism introduced a new 
challenge to journalism. He said that embedded journalism had witnessed the 
militarisation of the media due to the amount of reports coming from the 
battlefields which paid attention to the vocabulary and the technicality of the 
military rather than critically questioning the events and the incidents37. This, 
according to Shmait, dominated the coverage of the war and provided a 
partial view of it.  For Orville Schell, embedding reporting “is a good idea, but 
it should not be the only food item on the menu”: “Getting coverage only from 
embedded reporters is like looking only into a microscope. What we need is 
something of the broader picture, and the chance to show other aspects of the 
whole enterprise”.38 Moreover, the US did not hide their motives in using this 
policy. When asked why the military decided to embed journalists with the 
troops, Lt. Col. Rick Long of the US Marine Corps replied, "Frankly, our job is 
to win the war. Part of that is information warfare. So we are going to attempt 
to dominate the information environment”.39 
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1.3. The Use of Media as an Instrument of War. 
According to Miller, the experience of embedded journalism in Iraq showed 
that the US has turned the media into an instrument of combat. It also showed 
the increased role of the private sector in information dominance, a role that 
reflected key changes in US and UK military information strategy, as the two 
had previously assigned its sole responsibility to the public sector. Miller 
argued that applying the concept of information dominance to media 
management’s activities would also allow “the US and UK’s strategists to 
tolerate dissent in the media and alternative accounts on the Internet”.40 For 
Winter and Griffin, the military plan that the US used in the Iraq War included 
two major components: first, building up and protecting friendly information; 
and second, degrading information received by the adversary. Both of these 
referred not simply to military information systems but also to propaganda and 
the news media.41  Therefore, Miller has a favourable view towards 
embedding policy as “a valuable means of shaping and making friendly 
information, in addition to giving journalists better access to the fighting than 
that given in any conflict since Vietnam”.42 Unlike Miller, Martin Bell regarded 
the embedding policy as a controversial experiment which has produced a 
negative response. He claimed that “it would muzzle the press, and deliver 
only news that pleased the Pentagon, [arguing] that it created confusion 
among journalists who decided to embed with the military about their role in 
covering the battles”.43 “Not only the younger embedded journalists, but also 
some of the older hands as well failed to grasp the difference between being 
with an army, or being of an army,” he added.44 Bill Katovsky examined the 
issue from a different perspective when he likened the embedding policy to 
public relations, noting the policy was a “slick new public-relations concept”.45 
For Katovsky, the introduction of this representation was due to the need for 
war planners, in the build-up to the new Iraqi campaign, to ward off all bad 
assumptions about dealing with the media.46 Howard Tumber and Frank 
Webster highlighted that the US military adopted a number of strategies to 
ensure that they got appropriate reportage and tailored coverage about their 
activities. They maintained long-term encouragement of contacts in the 
media, and allowed special access to favoured reporters in order to exclude 
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the journalists whose approach or perspective was at odds with what the 
military wanted.47 
Philip Seib pointed out that Pentagon officials tried to bring pressure on 
members of the press by differentiating between embedded and un-
embedded journalists. The Pentagon made it clear that the embedded 
journalists would receive better treatment than the officially un-embedded 
journalists, of whom there were approximately 1,800.48 When Kuwait blocked 
some ‘un-embedded’ reporters from entering Iraq, Pentagon spokesperson 
Bryan Whitman tried to justify the measures, citing security as a major 
concern.49 He said that “We are going to control the battle space. Reporters 
that are not embedded are going to be treated like any other civilian, 
approached with a certain amount of caution, especially for many journalists 
proving their identity can sometimes be problematic”.50 Pentagon 
spokesperson Whitman noted that this precautionary approach was pursued 
due to security concerns that the Iraqis might have “individuals pose as 
journalists”.51 Nevertheless, Katovsky stated that in the early days of the war, 
venturing journalists were too close to the fighting areas. Two other journalists 
were killed whilst being embedded.52 
1.4. Attempts to Dominate Media Through the Use of Physical Attack. 
The impact of the use of advanced war technology during the Iraq conflict was 
clear through the scope of materialistic devastation and human loss it left on 
civilians, as well as on journalists. According to the International Press 
Institute, “at least fourteen journalists were killed during the six-week 
campaign; with two others missing and believed dead”.53 However, the 
hostilities did not end after President Bush declared on 1st May 2003 that 
“major operations in Iraq had ended”. The death toll was to rise to nineteen by 
the end of 2003. More still, according to a report by Reporters Without 
Borders (RSF), on the journalists who were killed in Iraq between 20th March 
2003 and 20th March 2006.54 
The press organisation stated that the war on Iraq had proved to be the 
deadliest for journalists since World War II. A total of eighty-six journalists and 
media assistants have been killed in Iraq since the war began. This number, 
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according to RSF, is more than the number killed in Vietnam or even the civil 
war in Algeria. Around sixty-three journalists were killed in Vietnam during the 
twenty years from 1955 to 1975, and seventy-seven journalists and media 
assistants were killed during the civil war in Algeria from 1993 to 1996.55 On 
the other hand, Kari Lydersen argued that attacks on alternative media outlets 
were carried out on purpose. He claimed that one aspect of this approach is 
to hold domination over news reporting and to wield control and manipulation 
of viewpoints, through reducing the news sources to the information coming 
from the US government’s side. This, according to Lydersen, was an 
explanation of why attacking the alternative media on certain occasions had 
its own strategic justifications.56 
“The Bush administration had also been hard at work on limiting and, ideally, 
silencing, opposing or challenging viewpoints and factual narratives coming 
from other sources”. The administration has attacked Al-Jazeera, the Qatar-
based and state-funded media outlet that has been the unrivalled news 
source for much of the Arab world up to 2003.57 John Simpson raised the 
issue saying that whether the attack on Al-Jazeera's office in Baghdad was 
deliberate or not, it was upsetting that the channel's offices had been hit twice 
in two consecutive wars - in Kabul in 2001 and in Baghdad in 2003 - and that 
“on each occasion American command had complained that Al-Jazeera was 
supporting the enemy.”58 
According to the International Press Institute (IPI) Report for 2003 Death 
Watch, Tariq Ayoub, a cameraman and correspondent for Al-Jazeera, was 
killed during a US air raid on Baghdad. Ayoub, a Jordanian citizen, died in 
hospital after he was wounded in the strike, which set ablaze Al-Jazeera’s 
office near the Information Ministry.59 The attack on Al-Jazeera was not only 
against its reporters, but also extended to its websites. On 28th March 2003, 
the Al-Jazeera website became a target of computer hackers who called 
themselves the “Freedom Cyberforce Militia”. When opening the station 
website, visitors were directed to other websites with various content, 
including one showing the American flag and messages such as “God bless 
our troops”.60 
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The report by the IPI also stated that on the same day (8th April 2003), Taras 
Protsyuk, a Reuter’s cameraman, and Jose Couso, a cameraman for the 
Spanish television channel Tel 5, were killed when a US tank fired a shell at 
the Palestine Hotel, the base for many foreign media in Baghdad. Prostsyuk, 
a Ukrainian based in Warsaw, was immediately killed while Couso sustained 
wounds, dying later on.61 Similarly, the justification for bombing the Iraqi state 
television station in March 2003, by joint US/UK operations, which resulted in 
many civilians being killed, was that the station was 'part of a command and 
control centre' and it was housed in 'a key telecommunications vault' for 
satellite communications.62 The IPI pointed out that “the inevitable result of 
these attacks is to blur the distinction between civilian and military activities 
during conflict.” 63 
1.5. Portraying the Occupation in a Positive Light. 
The US administration did not only monopolise the reporting and production of 
news, but it also affected its dissemination to the world. As indicated by Lewis 
et al., the messages sent in 2003 by the coalition's media operations in Iraq 
were carefully run and presented to the global public by teams of 
professionals skilled in the art of perception management.64 The teams, who 
were aware that the war lacked legal grounds, and had generated waves of 
protest and anger across the globe, stressed the need to launch a media 
campaign and send the message on a daily basis in a bid to win the public's 
support.65 
This could explain why the media at the White House defined the Iraq 
invasion as “a war of liberation” and exerted their utmost efforts to support the 
idea. The Pentagon’s official theme was 'Iraq: from Fear to Freedom', and the 
news media were given ‘liberation updates' and heard 'voices of freedom’ 
from Iraqis who appreciated Saddam Hussein's ouster.66 
According to Tumber and Palmer, information planning by the US government 
before the war was based on a twenty-four hour news cycle. It is a kind of 
global PR network that was activated from different parts of the world; from 
the Pentagon and from Qatar, as well as from embedded journalists.67 The 
strategy adopted was clearly outlined by Suzy Defrancis, President Bush's 
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deputy assistant for Communications, when she said that the media relations 
introduced were made in a certain way, that “when the Americans wake up in 
the morning, they will first hear from the (Persian Gulf) region, maybe from 
General Tommy Franks, then later in the day, they will hear from the 
Pentagon, then the State Department, then later on the White House will 
brief.”68 
Tumber and Palmer noted that Ari Fleischer, the White House press 
secretary, used to set the day’s message with an early morning conference 
call to Alastair Campbell (Tony Blair’s then Director of Communications and 
Strategy), a conference call to White House Communications Director Dan 
Barnett, and then State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher, 
Pentagon spokesperson Victoria Clarke, and the White House Office of 
Global Communications (OGC) Director, Tucker Eskew. This routine was 
similar in many of its aspects to the procedures introduced during the 
Afghanistan War in 2001.69 
The UK pursued a similar media strategy by consolidating its existing media 
staff in the MoD headquarters and despatching a huge public relations team 
to the Middle East. Colonel Angus Taverner, the director of news media 
operations policy, was in charge of coordinating the military and the civilian 
press functions within the MoD.70  The MoD also set up a core press office of 
24 people in London headed by Director of News Pam Teare with, according 
to reports, more than a hundred media reservists called up with secondary 
roles to act as media operators when needed for deployment in the UK and 
the Middle East.71 Moreover, Angus Taverner claimed the role of MoD teams 
was to keep the British public informed, and to maintain that issues of national 
security were closely guarded. The US/UK military learned lessons from 
previous experiences in the 1991 Gulf War and in Kosovo, when at war 
against former Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic.72 
Nonetheless, Steven Tatham, who served as the Royal Navy's public 
spokesman during the Iraq War, stated that while the world's media waited for 
the conflict to begin, both the UK and US had already begun their media-
handling strategies months before.73 Tatham indicated that the US military 
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had a dedicated uniformed public affairs organisation, which provided an 
entire military career structure from private to general for public affairs officers 
(PAOs). The briefing notes range from press releases to updated versions of 
lines on particular issues.74 Paul Rutherford points out that the main drive for 
the special management of the Iraq War was the Pentagon's desire for the 
total control of information, extending well beyond Iraq into the living rooms 
and bedrooms of America and around the world.75 
 
1.6. The Involvement of Private Public Relations Companies. 
Moreover, the war preplanning included a new use of language and 
terminologies, along with the participation of Public Relations (PR) firms to 
influence the performance of the media and the spread of information during 
the war. War planners also strongly relied on the effectiveness of 
communication using advanced technology, in order to efficiently shape public 
opinion and win its support.76 
The overwhelming use of scientific developments led researchers to believe 
that the war was the most sophisticated so far. As stated by Martin Bell, major 
changes have occurred since the 1991 Gulf War in terms of technology and 
the military. The most striking element is the use of information technology, at 
greater levels than the conventional use of such technology for war 
reporting.77 
In other words, the technology introduced new methods of reporting with the 
aim of managing and controlling information, so that the media become a 
machine for war mongering.78  According to Robin Brown, there are three 
influential communication tools used by the US ‘in waging war on terrorism’. 
These are ‘military concepts of information warfare, foreign policy concepts of 
public diplomacy, and approaches to media management drawn from 
domestic politics.’79 
The main aim of using advanced technology was to convert the military war 
into normal information operations. Brown highlighted that such warfare can 
be seen as “a systematic attempt to make sense of warfare as an exercise in 
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information processing.”80 Computers were used to gather, process, and 
disseminate information, so that they could include any related details with 
regard to attacks or protection of information necessary for military operations. 
However, the military took the idea of information warfare a step further, 
providing a system by which to bring together existing activities, 
‘psychological operations’ (PSYOPS), deception and public affairs – that is 
‘the military-press interface and civil military affairs with computer network 
operations’.81 The information was used in a choreographed effort to show 
American policy in the best light, in order to assist another important concept, 
that of public diplomacy. However, WikiLeaks documents revealed that the 
US military did not differentiate between psychological operations and public 
affairs, both prior to and after the war.82 The information provided by the US 
military to private contractors demonstrates that most of the psychological 
operations were aimed at, and concerned with, the American public.83 
The private sector involvement in the psychological warfare gives the war on 
Iraq a new aspect. The US Administration used new techniques to propagate 
the war in Iraq by using familiar PR companies, which helped to sustain their 
work. In July 2002, the White House created its Office of Global 
Communications (OGC) to coordinate the administration’s work in foreign 
policy offices and its messages, and in showing America in the best light. 
Later on, it was declared that the OGC would supervise a PR-blitz to 
persuade key groups that Saddam Hussein should be thrown out.84 
According to Miller, other efforts contributed to advance the campaign, such 
as the media training of Iraqi dissidents by the state department, to “help 
make the Bush administration’s argument for the removal of Saddam”. 85 To 
reach this end, the US administration hired Pit Group to shape the whole 
campaign. Miller pointed out that this action revealed the US government’s 
determination to connect with firms that had well-known expertise in 
propaganda operations.86 
The US administration had also worked with the Rendon Group, which had 
worked in a number of countries, providing discreet and confidential strategic 
guidance to clients in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe and the Middle East. 
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Their website also states that their clients are ‘government agencies, private 
sector enterprises and non-governmental organisations that face the 
challenge of achieving information superiority in order to impact on public 
opinion and outcomes.’87 
However, Rendon Group was not a new player to the Iraqi theatre of events. It 
had been hired by the CIA in May 1991 to encourage efforts to overthrow 
Saddam Hussein. The American administration, under Former President 
George H.W. Bush, was hoping to create the environment for a coup in which 
members of the Iraqi army would turn on Saddam Hussein and put an end to 
his regime.88 
In February 1998, a report by Peter Jennings cited records obtained by ABC 
which showed that the Rendon Group had spent, in the first year of its 
contract with the CIA, more than $23 million dollars. The group also set up the 
Iraqi National Congress (INC), an umbrella for 19 Iraqi Arab and Kurdish 
opposition groups. The INC groups were required to "gather information, 
distribute propaganda and recruit dissidents of Hussein’s regime".89 
“ClandestineRadio.com, a website which monitors underground and anti-
government radio stations in countries throughout the world, credits the 
Rendon Group with "designing and supervising" the Iraqi Broadcasting 
Corporation (IBC) and Radio Hurriah [Freedom], which began broadcasting 
Iraqi opposition propaganda in January 1992 from a US government 
transmitter in Kuwait”.90 In 1996 the IBC was supervised by six CIA case 
officers in the City of Arbil, Northern Iraq, including 11 hours of daily 
programming and Iraqi National Congress activities.91 
 
1.7. The Alliance’s Public Diplomacy leading up to the 2003 Invasion. 
The United States faced a political deadlock following international outcry 
about its plan to topple the Iraqi regime. Major countries, such as Russia and 
France, opposed the US proposal submitted by the United States, Britain and 
Spain, to get UN backing for military action against the Iraqi regime.92 The US 
saw that it had to try a new appraoch, by moving public diplomacy from the 
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inner circles of politicians to the general public. Joseph Duffey, former director 
of the United States Information Agency, said that public diplomacy is “an 
attempt to get over the heads or around diplomats and official spokesmen of 
countries, and sometimes around the press, to speak directly to the public in 
other countries and provide an interpretation, [or] explanation, of US values 
and policies”.93 
Speaking in October 2002, US president George Bush said that “the stated 
policy of the United States is regime change…however, if [Saddam] Hussein 
were to meet all the conditions of the United Nations, the conditions that I 
have described very clearly in terms that everybody can understand, that in 
itself will signal the regime has changed”. 94 
On 31st January 2003, Bush reiterated that the failure of the Iraqi regime to 
disarm would lead to multi-national action to force it to comply with the UN 
resolution in this respect. He said that “Saddam Hussein must understand that 
if he does not disarm, for the sake of peace, we, along with others, will go 
disarm Saddam Hussein”. 95 Apart from the Iraqi weapons, the United States 
and United Kingdom used additional justifications at various times. They 
talked about the Iraq regime’s violation of UN resolutions, and that the Iraqi 
government repressed its citizens.96 According to Steve Schifferes of the 
BBC, on 15th March 2003 the US named thirty countries that had decided to 
associate their efforts with the US action in Iraq, though few of the countries 
were providing a major, military presence in the Gulf. (This was most notably 
provided by Britain and Australia.) In addition there were fifteen countries 
providing assistance, such as over-flight rights, but which did not want to 
declare their support.97 
Nevertheless, as noted by Laura McClure, in order to build this collaboration, 
the US administration offered large amounts of foreign aid in exchange for 
support for the Iraq War. This strategy was described by McClure as ‘the US 
brandishing its wallet as a weapon’, and it is clear that the US used money to 
buy off countries. 98 Turkey, for instance, was offered $6 billion in direct aid, 
plus billions more in loans, if it would allow the Americans to base their troops 
there in advance of the invasion. Other nations like Guinea, Mexico, Chile, 
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Angola, Cameroon and Pakistan, which were the six undecided countries of 
the fifteen members of the UN Security Council, faced the dilemma of whether 
to pay no attention to the ‘mounting opposition to war at home, or face the 
wrath of Washington.’99 
The controversial military action against the Iraqi regime prompted the United 
States to manage the news in order to keep it in tune with its political 
interests. Brown argues that the US used spin to develop elaborate 
mechanisms to secure and control media coverage. He added that the 
strategy focussed on short-term media coverage and a strategic 
communications that developed proactive communications strategies.100 In 
other words, ‘the aim of Spinning’ was to persuade the media that one version 
of reality, the version propagated by the US-led coalition, was correct.101 
To achieve this goal the United States pursued a verbal strategy to win 
international support for invading Iraq. The significance of this strategy was to 
portray the war against the Iraqi regime as not just an American war, and to 
convince people that it was the will of the international community to remove 
Saddam Hussein.102 
A classic example is the speech by State Secretary Colin Powell at the United 
Nations Security Council about Iraqi mobile chemical laboratories. US 
Secretary of State Powell appeared before the UN Security Council on 5th 
February 2003, and presented what he characterised as “compelling evidence 
of the existence of WMDs in Iraq and of links between al-Qa’ida and Saddam 
Hussein’s regime”. The second reason was that there were proven links 
between the Iraqi government and members of the Al-Qa’ida network, 
perhaps even implicating Iraq in the terrorist attacks on US targets on 
September 11th, 2001.103 
US officials were not the only pioneers of this approach; UK Prime Minister 
Tony Blair was also involved in war propaganda. For Miller, Blair was “very 
careful in his use of language that exploited the media thirst for dramatic 
threats”.104 In a key address to the House of Commons Liaison Committee, 
Blair stated, “I think it is important that we do everything we can to try to show 
people the link between the issue of weapons of mass destruction and these 
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international terrorist groups, mainly linked to al-Qaida.”105 Rutherford states 
that the US and UK administrations used a selected style of language to 
convince the public about the legality of going to war. According to him, the 
Pentagon struggled to convince reporters and get them using their preferred 
terminology, such as, ‘collateral damage’ (civilian deaths) and ‘friendly fire’ 
(killing your own).106 
Douglas Kellner criticised the US administration for using language which 
promoted its policies towards war on Iraq, and lying about Iraq and other 
political issues. Kellner stated that “the Bush administration has practiced the 
Goebbels-Hider strategy of the Big Lie. Assuming that if you repeat a slogan 
or idea enough times, the public would come to believe it – the words would 
turn into reality.” He added that they resorted to the repetition of simplistic 
slogans with the aim of mobilising conservative support, without regard for the 
truth.107 
Although the manner of waging psychological war has changed, propaganda 
expert Nancy Snow said it has not changed in terms of its purpose.108 For 
Randall Bytwerk, the primary change is the technology rather than the 
method, due to the fact that “It is now possible to spread much more 
information, much faster”.109 Therefore, various techniques were adopted and 
used by strategists to manipulate the media, in order to sell the war and to 
control the message. Danny Schechter highlights that the newly additional 
element in the war on Iraq was the sophisticated way in which the public 
relations companies hired by the Bush administration “made the media sell 
the US government propaganda news to reporters, who, then [sold] it to 
politicians and to the public”.110 
According to Deepa Kumar, the mechanisms used for information control 
were successful due to two main factors: the development and testing of 
government information control strategies over the last three decades; and 
the emergence of a commercial conglomerate media system that lends its 
services of propaganda to customers.111 Douglas Kellner noted that the media 
had turned into the “arms of conservative and corporate interests due to the 
concentration of ownership”. 112 He pointed out that media was used to 
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advance the interests of political and economic elites instead of acting in the 
interests of the public.113 
The Cardiff School of Journalism study of coverage of the Iraq War noted that 
the way of presenting news raised questions about the information provided 
by military sources.114 As Kari Lydersen points out, one of the major 
casualties of the media’s unquestioning dependence on government sources 
as the truth.115 According to Kumar, a large part of psychological operations 
was the spread of misinformation. She argues that “this strategy took into 
consideration the twenty-four hour news channels’ constant demand for new 
information, therefore, would official sources meant that military claims would 
often be relayed with no one taking the time to check the facts”.116 This could 
explain the contradictions in news reports based on US-led coalition and Iraqi 
sources. For instance, a British Forces spokesman, Group Captain AI 
Lockwood, gave a statement about a ‘popular uprising’ in Basra, which was 
denied by the Iraqi forces. Similarly, the southern Iraqi port of Umm Qasr was 
reported as being ‘taken’ nine times.117 
Furthermore, BBC journalist Richard Sambrook admitted that “it was proving 
difficult for journalists in Iraq to distinguish truth from false reports, and that 
the pressure facing reporters on twenty-four hour news channels had led to 
premature and inaccurate stories”.118 One senior BBC news source 
complained that “we are absolutely sick and tired of putting things out and 
finding out they are not true”.119 The misinformation in this war is far worse 
than in any conflict I have personally covered, including the first Gulf War and 
in Kosovo. 
 
1.8 The Relations between the American Government and the Media 
Communications Companies. 
The Iraqi war shed light on new links between media and communication 
companies and the government. It unveiled the scale of cronyism involving 
media moguls and top brass politicians. Solomon raises the point that media-
owning corporations could also be significant weapons merchants. In a 
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combined study with Martin A. Lee, he discovered in 1991 the stake one 
major company had invested in the latest war. “NBC's owner, General 
Electric, designed, manufactured or supplied parts or maintenance for nearly 
every major weapon system used by the US during the Gulf War; including 
the Patriot and Tomahawk cruise missiles, the Stealth bomber, the B-S2 
bomber, the AWACS plane, and the NAVSTAR spy satellite system”.120 
Additionally, Solomon revealed that during one year, 1989, General Electric 
had about $2 billion in military contracts related to systems that were sooner 
or later being utilised in the Gulf War.121 
Kumar attributed this development to the aftermath of the Vietnam War, when 
a section of political elites came to believe that “it was media coverage of the 
war that led to the US defeat”.122 Along with other things, they argued that 
showing graphic images of the dead on television misrepresented the war and 
turned Americans against it.123 Therefore, as Kumar points out, the media and 
government shared economic and political interests in war propaganda. This, 
consequently, cements a relationship between the media and the military 
industrial complex. This convergence, and search for increased profit by giant 
media conglomerates, has changed the circumstances of journalists working 
in these companies and could lead to methods of operation that have 
compromised journalists’ ethics.124 
 
1.9. Biased and Selective Reporting of Events. 
US Psychological operations focused on the media but it still used different 
methods and means according to the nature of the targeted community. At the 
end of the day, it aimed at creating an environment of fear, instability, desire, 
reason, or other factors; to encourage certain attitudes, drive certain feelings 
or behaviours, and support specific ideas, which are sympathetic to US 
interests.125 
The use of psychological operations, or ‘psyops’, is a common practice of the 
American army. In World War II, the United States used leaflets and radio 
broadcasts, to control the “emotion, motives, objective reasoning, and 
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ultimately the behaviour of foreign governments, organisations, groups, and 
individuals”. It was proven to be a useful tactic of persuasion on enemy 
forces. The United States has previous experience in a conflict environment 
with Iraq. For instance, during the weeks leading up to the 1991 Gulf War, the 
US used leaflets, radio and television broadcasts, in addition to loudspeakers, 
to propagate messages focusing on the Iraqi isolation by their Arab 
brotherhood, and the power of the allied air forces. Around 29 million leaflets 
were dropped on the Iraqi military forces during a period of seven weeks, 
reaching around 98% of the 300,000 Iraqi soldiers.126 
In Iraq again in March 2003, psychological operations planning started before 
US entry into the war. The psychological war against Iraq had actually started 
on 3rd October 2002, when 120,000 leaflets were dropped by an American 
A10 fighter-bomber, with warnings to the Iraqi troops and Government against 
continuing to fire at American and British jets in the ’no-fly’ zone over 
Southern Iraq. ”The leaflets carried a drawing of a warplane firing missiles at a 
Radar site and anti-aircraft battery on the ground with the Arabic text: ‘Iraqi 
ADA beware! Do not track or fire on Coalition aircraft!’ The back of the leaflet 
says “Attention Iraqi Air Defence. The destruction experienced by your 
colleagues in other air defence locations is a response to your continuing 
aggression toward planes of the coalition forces. No tracking or firing on these 
aircraft will be tolerated. You could be next”.127 
Another leaflet carried the text: “Before you engage coalition aircraft, think 
about the consequences.” The back of this leaflet showed the face of an Iraqi 
soldier surrounded by smoke and the picture of a woman holding her crying 
child. It reads: “Think about your family. Do what you must to survive.”128 The 
Coalition air forces dropped thousands of leaflets listing the five frequencies 
on which Iraqis could reach Coalition broadcasts and listen to their 
programmes. The programmes were carrying anti-Saddam Hussein 
messages mixed with a collection of Iraqi and American Pop music. The 
following are transcripts from radio broadcasts:129 “History has shown that 
appeasement of brutal domineering regimes only brings greater tragedy. 
Saddam too (like Stalin) has a lust for power, and the world will stand up and 
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put an end to the terror he imposes on others, before he destroys Iraq and 
crushes the hopes of its proud people.”130 
“Saddam has built palace after palace for himself and has purchased a fleet of 
luxury cars all at the expense of the Iraqi people. This money would be much 
better suited to build libraries and schools. This money would have gone a 
long way to provide better food and medicine for the people of Iraq. The 
amount of money Saddam spends on himself in one day would be more than 
enough to feed a family for a year.”131 “Do not let Saddam tarnish the 
reputation of soldiers any longer,” advised another broadcast. “Saddam uses 
the military to persecute those who don’t agree with his unjust agenda. Make 
the decision.”132 
As Iraqi high officials and military leaders had been given mobile phones (with 
UAE-owned satellite operator Thurayas) and e-mail addresses to enable them 
to be in touch with central Iraqi headquarters in Baghdad, they had been 
flooded with messages from the American side, urging them to break with the 
regime and not to defend Saddam Hussein. One e-mail message reads: “Iraqi 
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons violate Iraq’s commitment to 
agreements and United Nations resolutions. Iraq has been isolated because 
of this behaviour. The United States and its allies want to liberate the Iraqi 
people from Saddam’s injustice, and for Iraq to become a respected member 
of the international community. Iraq's future depends on you.”133 
During the first Gulf War, ‘Desert Storm’, the successful use of PSYOPs 
directly contributed to the surrender of thousands of Iraqi soldiers.134 In the 
invasion of 2003, the objectives behind PSYOPs, including all the leaflets, 
radio broadcasts, e-mails and mobile phone messages, were slightly different. 
The Americans’ desire was to encourage disloyalty and the betrayal of 
Saddam, and to persuade the Iraqis that their lives would be better off without 
Saddam in power.135 However, as concluded by David Zuchchino, The Times 
staff writer, in a piece about an exhaustive Army study, the “efforts by 
psychological operations units to persuade Iraqi forces to surrender largely 
failed.”136 
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The US and the UK sought to apply the maximum impact of information 
dominance during the war on Iraq, which was the key strategy in the US and 
UK to influence public opinion both domestically and worldwide, to support the 
war effort and government policies. Justin Lewis et al point out that “the use of 
information as a weapon is becoming a dominant feature of modem warfare in 
an age that abounds with increasingly sophisticated digital and satellite 
communications. Information management is also an increasingly important 
part of global government and foreign policy.”137 According to David Miller, the 
concept of information dominance is “the key to understanding the US and 
UK’s respective propaganda strategies, as it redefines our notions of spin and 
propaganda and the role of the media in capitalist societies.”138 
In his analysis, Miller highlights two new elements seen in information 
dominance when compared to traditional conceptions of propaganda. The first 
is the integration of propaganda and psychological operations into a much 
wider concept of information war. The second is the integration of information 
war into the core of military strategy.139 Miller noted that the traditional 
concepts of propaganda consist of shaping the message and distributing it via 
government media or independent media outlets. Current conceptions of 
information war go much further and incorporate the gathering, processing 
and disseminating of information by way of computers, intelligence and 
military information systems of command and control.140 
Modern psychological operations have advanced thanks to the computer 
revolution that has ushered in a revolution in military affairs. In other words, 
propaganda and psychological operations have become an essential weapon 
in the information war arsenal. As Colonel Kenneth wrote, the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq “will be remembered as a conflict in which information took its place as 
a weapon of war.”141 The findings of the Cardiff School Study of the Iraq War 
coverage highlight that the most remembered images of the conflict was the 
image of toppling Saddam’s statue at Al-Firdous Square in central Baghdad, 
and the Hollywood-like rescue operation of Jessica Lynch.142 The study also 
indicated that the toppling of Saddam’s statue was widely referred to in focus 
groups, although reactions to it were divided. Some of the participants saw it 
as an accurate reflection of Iraqi joy at being liberated, while others felt there 
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was a degree of overacting for the cameras.143 The focus of the camera and 
the arrangement that followed the incident made researchers suspect that the 
whole scene was staged to give such an impression. Rampton and Stauber 
question as to whether the toppling of Saddam’s statue was as spontaneous 
as it was made to appear, or if there was a reason the scene was a bit too 
picture-perfect, hinting at the role of the PR machine in constructing it, an 
inaccurate picture of Baghdad, and of Iraq as a whole.144 
Another case that raises awareness about the US use of media was the story 
of Jessica Lynch. Jessica Lynch was a Private First Class in the US Army 
Quartermaster Corps. Lynch served in Iraq during the 2003 invasion by the 
US-led Coalition. On 23rd March 2003, she was injured and captured by Iraqi 
forces but recovered on April 1st by US special operation forces, with the 
incident subsequently receiving considerable news coverage.145 Lynch spent 
a little time in the custody of an Iraqi army unit that had captured her. She was 
then reinstated to a hospital in the city of Nassiriya. The US forces were told 
about Lynch’s location by an Iraqi, who said that she had been tortured, but 
was still alive.146 On 1st April 2003, the US Special Forces launched a night-
time raid on the hospital, rescuing Lynch and recovered the bodies of eight 
other American soldiers.147 
On 2nd April 2003, the Pentagon released a five-minute video of the rescue 
and claimed that “Lynch has stab and bullet wounds, and that she had been 
slapped about on her [stay in] hospital, and interrogated”.148 The Iraqi medical 
staff (doctors and nurses), including Dr Harith al-Hassuna, a doctor in the 
Nassirya hospital who was later interviewed about the accident, disproved the 
US claims. Al-Hassuna described Lynch’s injuries as a “broken arm, a broken 
thigh, and dislocated ankle”. According to al-Hassuna’s statement, there was 
no sign of gun blast or stab wounds, and Lynch’s injuries were like those that 
would be suffered in a car accident.149 Al-Hassuna’s story was later confirmed 
as correct in the US Army report on 10th July 2003.150 Moreover, Pentagon 
officials disputed a report that appeared in the Washington Post that Lynch 
had fought back. The first official report of Lynch's actions during her capture 
released by the Pentagon weeks later, said that the US military in fact 
“overdramatized” the story of her rescue, denying information about Lynch 
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fighting back against her captors.151 
When Lynch spoke to the public, her statements were more critical of the 
original story that was reported by the Washington Post, saying, “That wasn't 
me. I'm not about to take credit for something I didn't do...I'm just a 
survivor.”152 She pointed out that she fought until being wounded, reporting 
that her weapon jammed immediately, and that she could not have done 
anything anyway.153 When she was asked about the Pentagon footage, she 
said “They used me to symbolize all this stuff. It’s wrong. I don’t know why 
they filmed [my rescue] or why they say these things.”154 She also stated, “I 
did not shoot, not a round, nothing. I went down praying to my knees. And 
that's the last I remember.” 155 She reported that she was not mistreated in the 
Iraqi hospital and that she refused amputation surgery to her leg.156 
Lynch, along with other major media outlets, has accused the US government 
of embellishing the story as part of the Pentagon’s propaganda effort.157 On 
24th April 2007, Lynch gave congressional testimony before the United States 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, that the Pentagon had 
erroneously portrayed her as a “Rambo”, and expressed her astonishment at 
why the military “lied” and tried to make her a legend.158 
 
1.10. WikiLeaks Exposé. 
I had unrestricted access to uncensored, classified documents leaked by 
WikiLeaks, amounting to almost 400,000 SIGACT (Significant Action) cables 
written by American troops, while I was working for the Bureau of investigative 
Journalism based at City university.  These documents revealed the reality of 
five years of the US war in Iraq.159 The US military used different tactics and 
closely integrated Information Operations (IO) as part of its war machine. The 
American public relations officers systematically tried to control local Iraqi 
media to provide pro-coalition media spin, attempting to influence the hearts 
and minds of the people.160 
The point of contact for both the media and the US military will often be a 
Public Affairs officer (PAO), a specialist trained in military public relations. 
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Public Affairs (PA) is defined in an American military document as a “related 
activity” to Information Operations, “in the sense that the effects they achieve 
may be similar to some aspects of IO, particularly PSYOPS.”161 
While PSYOPS and PA may have similar effects, according to US military 
doctrine, their methods are distinct. The manual for Public Affairs emphasises 
that, “propaganda has no place in DOD (Department of Defence) PA 
programs.”162 One of the principles of PA is to “Tell the Truth. JFC PA 
personnel will only release truthful information. The long-term success of PA 
operations depends on maintaining the integrity and credibility of officially 
released information. Deceiving the public undermines trust in, and support 
for, the Armed Forces and PA activities. Accurate, balanced, credible 
presentation of information leads to confidence in the Armed Forces and the 
legitimacy of operations.”163 
The WikiLeaks material shows a more nuanced tactic used by US Public 
Affairs officers. The PAOs are often deliberately passive in their dealings with 
Western media while paying close attention to their coverage. At the same 
time, they actively seek to influence Iraqi media and to propagate the PSYOP 
‘message’. 
A report dated 29th May 2009 describes an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) 
attack in Diyala that killed an Iraqi city councillor. The PAO attached to the unit 
started tracking “open source intelligence (OSINT) and western media” for 
any reporting. The PAO then assessed that the “incident will garner minimal 
coverage in Western media”, and decided to “conduct passive respond [sic] to 
query only.”164 
However, the PAOs were more proactive when dealing with Iraqi media. In the 
same report, the officer states: “Local media will request information from Iraqi 
sources. Coordination will be conducted with DOC Media Officer to see their 
message to the public.”165 
The Iraqi sources referenced in that particular report are not identified. But 
another report, dated 2nd February 2009, suggests that high ranking Iraqi 
commanders and politicians were used by the US to engage with Iraqi 
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media.166 
The report describes an attack by insurgents, involving IEDs, grenades and 
machine guns, against a US patrol in Mosul. A US armoured vehicle collided 
with an Iraqi truck in the confusion, killing both its occupants, who were a 
young boy and his uncle. The IO officer acted to temper local criticism by 
drafting a list of “Talking Points”: 
1) We regret there was an unfortunate incident that caused civilian  casualties. 
2) CF [Coalition Forces] and the ISF [Iraqi Security Forces] take all 
reasonable measures to ensure the safety of innocent civilians. 
3) By allowing AQI/ISI [Al Qaeda Iraq/Islamic State of Iraq] into your 
homes and neighbourhoods you are inviting only death and destruction. 
4) Do not give these terrorists and criminals refuge in your homes. 
They only place your family at risk.167 
 
The ranking US officer then met with brigade and division commanders 
of the National Police to “discuss rapid response of the Coalition Forces 
to that area and express sympathy over the loss of innocent Iraqi lives. 
[As well as] influence them to make statements to the press with 
embedded IO Talking Points.”168 
There are numerous other examples of this kind of occurrence regarding the 
relationship between American IO officers, Iraqi officials and the US-funded 
Iraqi media. In Mosul on 19th January 2009, a US engineering brigade was 
conducting repairs to a damaged berm next to a major gas pipeline.169 They 
struck and ruptured the gas line that provided heat to all of western Mosul. 
Sensing the potential damage to the Coalition’s public image, the IO officer 
responds with detailed instructions: 
“The below message has been sent to Al Mosullia TV and Radio, 
as well as Ashur TV and Radio: 
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Earlier today; 19th January 2009, Coalition Forces struck and 
ruptured a gas line while conducting critical repairs on the Riyadh 
line in Western Iraq. There were no injuries; however, the gas line 
is significant because it is a feeder line that provides heat to all of 
western Mosul. The Coalition Forces have secured the site and are 
working with Iraqi city officials, engineers, and the Provincial 
Reconstruction Team to assess and begin repairs immediately. 
Recommended Talking Points: 
1. The Coalition Force members were conducting much needed 
repairs to the berms on the Riyadh line. 
2. Coalition Forces understand the importance of this pipeline and 
are working as quickly as possible to repair the damage with the 
assistance of Iraqi city engineers. 
3. The damaged area is secure and will remain secured while 
repairs are being made. 
4. Coalition Forces immediately notified the Provincial 
Reconstruction Team upon receiving news of this incident. 
Recommended Engagements: 
1. 84th ENG CDR can speak to the Mayor as to the purpose of the 
mission that his unit was conducting when the accident happened. 
2. Mayor of Mosul can speak of the positive relationship between 
CF and the engineering projects that have been built and repaired 
for the people of Mosul. CF Engineers have conducted numerous 
operations and positive projects in and around Mosul that have 
benefited the people. 
COL Volesky’s translator has already contacted the Mayor of Mosul 
concerning the issue.”170 
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The IO officer then lists media outlets, consisting of the Iraqi Media Network 
Station in Tal Afar and Mosul, along with Al Mosullia Satellite TV, while also 
including the names and telephone numbers of the stations’ managers.171 
Similar ‘talking points’ appeared in hundreds of reports. Repetition is a key 
tactic of Public Affairs, as the manual points out: “Repetition of the information 
being provided...is a factor in information retention. For information to be 
effectively processed, individuals must receive the information in a timely 
fashion, multiple times and from multiple sources.”172 
 
1.10.1. Exploiting Information. 
Another tool of the IO officer is the use of prepared templates, allowing for a 
rapid and consistent reaction to events. Any event that could be seen as 
‘good news’ was systematically exploited. One report includes the “Good 
News Stories Radio Exploitation Template”, which formulates the script to be 
broadcast on a local radio station.173 
On 14th February 2009, an Iraqi army squad discovered a cache of weapons 
in Ninewa province. The IO response included the following: 
“Good News Stories Radio Exploitation Template: 
1) When – When the good news took place. Date, time and group. 
 2) Who – Who was involved with the good news and who it will               
             benefit. Who deserves the credit. 
 3) What – What the good news was about. 
 4) Where – Where the good news happened. 
 5) Why – Why this is good news for Maslawis [people from Mosul]
            and the Ninewa province as a whole. 
PSYOP message: The Ninewa provincial government and the city of Mosul 
 are working hard to make good things happen for all Maslawis and the 
 citizens of the Ninewa province as a whole.”174 
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As with any public relations worker, the PAO’s main task is to advise leaders 
on the expected PR consequences of operations and activities. They monitor 
the ‘public understanding’ of the US military’s actions and act to influence the 
“perceptions and attitudes of decision-makers, leaders and other 
individuals.”175 
An example of this can be found in a report dated 18th December 2008. After 
an IED attack in Diyala, the public affairs officer notes that: 
“This IED attack has already received attention in the local Iraqi, as 
well as by Baghdad, media (Iraqi and western)...Unfortunately, any 
time an IED explodes or an SVEST is mentioned anywhere in 
Diyala, it reinforces long-standing terminology used to describe 
Diyala as restive or volatile.”176 
The officer then pledges to: 
“continue to aggressively promote any/all ISF/CF successes in 
degrading this threat in the province, IOT [in order to] counter this 
and improve public perception.”177 
 
Another example of aggressive pressure to improve perceptions is found in an 
incidence report from 21st July 2009, this time describing an Iraqi police officer 
in the Ninawa province, who finds a suicide vest after being tipped off by a 
local source. The US intelligence officer attached to the unit states that: 
“The details, motivations, and informants involved with the 
discovery of the suicide vest are extremely questionable...It is 
assessed that these vests are most likely being built and turned in 
to CF by a source and his informants in order to build rapport, gain 
respect and earn monetary reward.”178 
However, the IO officer is quick to see the propaganda potential and 
comments: 
“This event bolsters our IO themes of IP [Iraqi Police] supremacy. 
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This is another good news story we can exploit to further the 
positive image of the IP and give the people a feeling of security.”179 
The PAO also drafts a press release saying: 
“The Sharqat IP have once again proved that they are a 
professional and competent force.  On Wednesday morning, the IP 
recovered a suicide vest in Sharqat. This is one more weapon 
which would have been used to kill the Iraqi people that is now off 
the streets thanks to your local police.”180 
 
From 30th June 2009, US combat troops withdrew from Iraqi cities. The 
soldiers that remained were designated to coordinate, train and advise Iraqi 
security forces.181 
A report from 11th July 2009 suggests part of their role was to mentor Iraqis on 
how to deal with the media after large attacks. The report expresses how a 
suicide car-bomb shocked a district in east Mosul, killing five people. The PAO 
supervised the media reaction and directed the National Oil Company (NOC) 
on what to do: 
“July 11th, 2009 
PAO:  
Multiple western media sources have accurately reported the 
number of casualties killed in this attack which indicate that these 
media outlets are obtaining information from a reliable source. 
However, we continue to mentor and advise the NOC to use these 
attacks as opportunities to engage the media and put out a 
command message condemning these attacks.”182 
 
There is also proof that Iraqi authorities purposefully covered up incidents of 
propaganda use. In February 2009, an explosion in the holy city of Karbala 
killed 9 people and wounded 54 others. The local Iraqi Army, who was at that 
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time in charge of security of the country with American supervision, was the 
first on the scene. When questioned by the US forces about what caused the 
explosion, they “acknowledged that it was likely a suicide vest, but chose to 
report it as a propane explosion for IO purposes.”183 
 
1.10.2. The Iraqi Media Network. 
One of the first acts of the Pentagon's Office for Reconstruction and 
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) was to award the US consultancy firm, 
Scientific Applications International Corporation (SAIC), a no-bid contract to 
“establish a free and independent indigenous media network” called the Iraqi 
Media Network (IMN), in March 2003.184 The cost of the project ballooned 
from $15 million to $82.3 million, and the contracting process was plagued by 
poor planning and inadequate government oversight.185 A review by the US 
Department of Defence Inspector General of two dozen contracts in Iraq, 
including the SAIC contract, was issued in the months after US troops moved 
into Baghdad. The review found that in 22 cases, “supplies and services were 
quickly acquired, and contracting rules were either circumvented or liberally 
interpreted”, while at the same time, “officials performed little or no 
Government surveillance on awarded contracts.”186 
The US military used IMN reporters to selectively cover events that provided 
Coalition Forces with propaganda benefits. A report from May 2006 describes 
a weapons store being found in the city of Mosul. The reporter notes that, 
“Both ComCam and IMN crew on-site, conducting IO site exploitation.”187 
‘ComCam’ refers to ‘Combat Camera’; another kind of support to IO, helping 
acquire and use still and motion imagery for PSYOPS, military deception, 
public affairs and civil-military purposes.188 
The IMN was not just in the right place at the right time; they were often 
informed and transported to events by the US military. When Iraqi Police killed 
two suspected insurgents in Ninewa province in August 2006, the IO 
coordinating officer “contacted IMN for local media coverage.”189 In October 
2004, an American patrol came under attack while investigating a car bomb, 
54 
which then exploded. The report mentioned that, “PAO has been notified and 
is sending IMN to the scene.”190 
There are multiple examples of IMN reporters being escorted to sites for IO 
exploitation. One from April 2007 involved the discovery of a large weapons 
cache by the Iraq Army in Mosul, to which “3/C/2-7 CAV responded by 
transporting several reporters from IMN to the scene.”191 When a rocket 
propelled grenade, meant for an Iraqi police station, damaged a mosque in 
Mosul in December 2004, the first unit on the scene started “photographing 
the minaret in order to exploit the incident through IO”, then states, “IMN 
responded to the scene. IO is exploiting the incident.”192In contrast, when Iraqi 
police found the remains of a decapitated interpreter in Mosul in October 
2004, “IMN was not notified”.193 
 
1.10.3. Information Operations. 
A secret Pentagon report from October 2003, titled ‘Information Operations 
Roadmap’, recognises “the likelihood that PSYOP messages will be replayed 
to a much broader audience, including the American public.”194 Despite 
“recognising the legal conundrum presented by the use of overseas 
propaganda in the information age and the need for boundaries (referred to as 
‘lanes’) between US public diplomacy and foreign propaganda, it fails to 
provide any such limits.”195 The document explains the goal of escalating and 
coordinating the Pentagon's PSYOP and public diplomacy operations, and it 
was approved by Donald Rumsfeld personally. It very clearly called for 
psychological operations to be launched over radio, television, cell phones 
and “emerging technologies”.196  In July 2009, a report by the Department of 
Defence Inspector General recommended cancelling four IO contracts 
awarded in September 2008, as “the contract language did not differentiate 
between the audiences for PSYOP and PA in accordance with established 
doctrine, creating the appearance that PSYOP was associated with a US 
audience.”197 While the Inspector did not find proof that the American 
audiences were targeted with PSYOPS, they quoted the statement of work 
(SOW), which stated that “it is essential to the success of the new Iraqi 
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Government and the Coalition mission, that both communicate effectively with 
our strategic audiences (i.e. Iraqi, pan-Arabic, international and US 
audiences) to gain widespread acceptance of their core themes and 
messages.”198 
Conclusion. 
The US launched an extraordinary variety of psychological warfare techniques 
in Iraq during the 2003 invasion and pre-occupation time to win the hearts and 
minds of the Iraqis. They used multiple and varied techniques to reinforce or 
encourage sympathetic behaviour towards US objectives in military, 
diplomatic, political and economical policies. The US deployed what they 
called a “weapon of mass persuasion” in the battlefield and employed it in the 
post-invasion time. It could have been effective in the battlefield because of 
their status as a superpower, but actually it was not in the post-invasion era, 
as their messages were always coming against or in contrast with their 
policies and practices on the ground. So in spite of the huge effort and the 
new techniques which they applied in Iraq as a part of their psychological 
warfare, they could not win the hearts and minds or even achieve a minimal 
persuasion of the Iraqi people. It is obvious that the media played a vital role 
in the US war via visual, audio and audio-visual media and print journalism to 
communicate with local and foreign audiences and influence their motives and 
emotions. Besides this, the media worked to navigate the behaviour of foreign 
governments, groups, organisations, institutions and individuals. In reality the 
open nature of the satellite channels and the internet embarrassed the US in 
many instances, especially when they tried to twist the truth to suit their own 
agenda. Many made-up stories were broadcast by the US media, but then 
other media broadcast the true stories in response. This was one of the 
challenges which faced  American warfare in Iraq. 
 
 
 
 
56 
2. Chapter Two: American Journalism in Japan and Germany after WWII. 
Introduction. 
In military campaign terms, there are four phases for a joint forces 
commander’s (JFC’s) plan: deter/engage, seize initiative, decisive operations 
and transition. “Once a victory is accomplished, there is a ‘transitional’ phase 
whereby the military may function as an instrument of national power in 
environments quite foreign in culture, climate and character…that requires 
balancing…offence, defence, stability and support.”199 
The American occupied forces’ experience In Iraq during and after 2003 
resonates with their experience in Germany and Japan after WWII. The US 
Army has tried to follow a certain strategy; one with a historical precedent in 
their World War II operations including post-war occupations of Japan and 
Germany. The success of such transitional operations depends upon whether 
the occupying force has a sound understanding of the history of the country’s 
forms of government; relationships between military and government; state of 
economy; influence of native religious practices; active relations with the 
international community; status of civil support infrastructures; impact of social 
factors on the stability of operations; and last but not least, the influence of the 
media on the people and government. Today, US military advisors 
recommend that when building democracies in transition phases, there should 
be no censorship by the military. Despite this, there have been some rare 
cases where it was deemed necessary to break the ‘no censorship’ rule in the 
interest of national security.200 
 
2.1. The American Occupation of Japan. 
From 1871 through to 1945, a period spanning Japan’s Meiji, Taisho and 
Showa eras, under the country’s pre-war constitution, the media in Japan 
faced significant legal regulations that restricted press freedoms.201 At the end 
of the Second World War, a defeated Japan faced what would become a six-
year occupation by the Americans. The Allied Powers demanded Japan’s 
unconditional surrender and defined two goals for the American occupation: 
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1) Complete demilitarisation of the Japanese military complex. 
2) The democratisation of Japanese society.202 
With the end of combat operations in the Pacific and Emperor Hirohito’s 
surrender, the American forces found themselves facing a need for an almost 
instantaneous shift in acting as an invasion force to peaceful occupier. The 
Americans had already had some transferable experience from their 
occupation of Germany immediately after the Nazi surrender, but in the 
previous situation America acted as one of four occupying nations who shared 
administrative responsibility for a small percentage of the country only. In 
Japan’s case, the United States, working through General Douglas MacArthur 
and his staff as the “Supreme Command of the Allied Powers” (SCAP), 
assumed the sole responsibility of implementing the surrender        
requirements, stabilising the country and turning Japan into a modern 
democracy. Almost a quarter of a million Japanese were removed from public 
office, including military officers, police chiefs, government officials, 
bureaucrats, teachers, university professors and even people working in the 
arts.203 
After almost a decade of military rule and war, and the bombing of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, the Japanese economy was a shambles. There was not 
enough food to feed the surviving population within the country, which was 
due to swell with the imminent return of Japanese civilians from overseas. 
Japan had not been self-sufficient in food production since 1912. For many, 
starvation was a real possibility.  Raw materials for rebuilding the cities were 
scarce following the war, and to all intents and purposes Japan’s merchant 
fleet no longer existed. Overall industrial production was at 19th century levels, 
and the living situation for many was comparable to periods of history much 
earlier. These were extremely poor conditions in which to see wide-ranging 
social, political and economic reforms take place, least of all in the hands of 
the enemy, who was seen as responsible for putting Japan in its dire situation. 
So how did Japan make such a rapid turnaround? It began with “Operation 
Blacklist”; an occupation plan that would be used across approximately 14 
geographical areas in Japan, and three to six in Korea. Critical to the plan’s 
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success was the recognition that “the most efficient means of administering 
an occupied Japan was through its existing administrative and government 
infrastructure.”204 
Language barriers, cultural awareness limitations and other obstacles meant 
that SCAP had a central need for a partner within the Japanese government. 
In the eyes of Japan’s citizens, this would legitimise the government and 
make any behind the scenes manipulation much easier to conduct. MacArthur 
arrived in Japan on 30th August 1945. Judging by his monologues en route 
from Australia, he appeared to feel that he was on a mission, “guided by 
George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Jesus Christ… [to] deliver this 
benighted Oriental nation from slavery and feudalism, and transform its 
people into pacific democrats.”205 Like Commodore Perry, MacArthur thought 
he would “bring light to Japanese darkness.”206 He regarded the Japanese as 
childlike and, furthermore, incapable of achieving progress independently of 
active western guidance. MacArthur firmly believed that the Japanese had 
stumbled into militarism because they “didn’t know any better”. For MacArthur 
(who, considering the nature of his role, knew very little about Japan) the idea 
was to create a link between pre-war, wartime and post-war Japan. He saw 
himself as “a reformer of the Japanese soul” and intended to “overhaul” 
thousands of years of Japanese culture.207 He set himself up as the exclusive 
executive authority, much as the emperor had always been, believing that in 
this way a people set on display and ceremony would more readily accept his 
authority. In fact, the Japanese saw MacArthur much as their “second 
emperor”, though most were too afraid to voice it. Later SCAP was to become 
known as the “MacArthur Shogunate”.208 
In April 1946, SCAP was informed that an entertainer in Tokyo was singing 
subversive songs. Investigators attending a performance heard lyrics like: 
“Seducing Japanese women is easy, with chocolate and chewing gum”, and 
“Everybody is talking about democracy, but how can we have democracy with 
two emperors?” The banning of the show was the beginning of a Japanese 
self-censorship that was carefully monitored and enforced by the offices of 
SCAP, and the inviolability of MacArthur was brought home to writers and 
editors in what became known as the “hero worship” incident of October 
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1946.209 The occupation forces hoped to control of Japan’s media sector, so 
SCAP encouraged Japanese newspapers to re-establish themselves. SCAP 
saw the media as a tool to convey its own policies for democratisation and, 
later, the revitalisation of the capitalist state. Ironically, given the zeal with 
which it abolished the Japanese military’s censorship apparatus, “the 
occupation did not hesitate to institute measures of its own to thwart criticism 
of its policies, officials and troops.”210 
“Already in 1944, ahead of the occupation, a subcommittee of the State-War-
Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) had concerned itself with the 
question of how to deal with Japanese mass media following the country’s 
defeat. The subcommittee completed its work on 10th August 1945, and 
issued a paper entitled ‘Control of Media of Public Information and Expression 
in Japan’. In it, the subcommittee suggested that during the initial phase of the 
occupation “all Japanese media activities should be suspended, while the 
remaining facilities should be brought under the direct control of the military 
authorities.”211 “Only the press organs most closely associated with the 
wartime authorities were abolished. The first to go was Domei Tsushinsha.” 
On 24th September of the same year, President Furuno Inosuke notified the 
Allied Headquarters that his agency had been dissolved. Earlier that day, the 
Allied Headquarters had issued a memorandum in which it set forth a range of 
measures including the breakup of press cartels. One of the organisations 
with the greatest responsibility for the disreputable role that the Japanese 
Press had come to play during the war had already ceased to exist some five 
months before Japan’s capitulation. On 1st March 1945, Ogata Taketora, who 
recently exchanged his presidency of the Tokyo edition of the Asahi Shinbun 
for his role within the Cabinet information bureau, dissolved the Japanese 
Newspaper Society, explaining that it had “fully accomplished its 
objectives.”212 
The subsequent Japanese Newspaper Publishers’ and Editors’ Association, 
the Shimbun Kyokai, was a directive backed by SCAP who wanted to support 
publishers attempting to reassert their right to determine editorial policy and 
the direction of their businesses. This had the advantage of keeping leftists 
from taking over the media landscape. It also helped foster a Japanese 
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tendency to organise for collective decision-making. The result was the 
“Canons of Journalism”, which stated: “The press should enjoy complete 
freedom in reporting news and in making editorial comments, unless such 
activities interfere with public interests or are explicitly forbidden by law, 
including the freedom to comment on the wisdom of any restrictive statute. 
The right of the press should be defended as a vital right of mankind.”213 
Article 21 of Japan’s Post War Constitution stated: “Freedom of...speech, 
press, and all other forms of expression are guaranteed. No censorship shall 
be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication be 
violated.” Article 12 stated that, while such rights are guaranteed, the people 
“shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights, and shall always 
be responsible for utilising them for public welfare.”214 But while SCAP officials 
preached free speech, they punished anyone who criticised occupation 
policies. They banned the production of satirical cartoons featuring SCAP, 
and even literary works such as American author John Steinbeck’s famous 
novel, The Grapes of Wrath, which dissects American poverty. Books about 
the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were also embargoed. In fact, any 
material that might have portrayed the Americans in a bad light, or as 
anything less than  “models of virtue and probity” was banned by SCAP 
officials.215 
The Allies formed a unit called Press, Publications and Broadcasting (PPB), 
which was responsible for preventing media organisations from publishing 
material harmful to the aim of the demilitarisation and democratisation. The 
PPB office expanded and updated the list of prohibitions. The PPB deleted 
material from newspapers, wire service copy, films, plays, slides and lantern 
shows, paintings, cartoons, magazines and books.216 Publishers had to 
submit two copies of all galleys to the censors and wait for their decision, just 
as they did under previous Japanese governments’ control. In addition, strict 
measures were taken to keep the occupation’s continued censorship 
concealed from the Japanese public, including banning all written references 
to the process, and proscribing the use of telltale ellipse marks for deleted 
items or passages. Of course, Japanese authors, editors and publishers were 
fully aware of the process, as were foreign correspondents.217 
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By the spring of 1946, SCAP authorities in Japan had set in place a policy 
designed to exclude unions and their workers from the management and 
editorial policy-making of newspapers. This policy helped establish in Japan 
the concept of “editorial right” (hensūken), which became institutionalised as 
the “Declaration on Safeguarding Newspapers’ Editorial Rights”, announced 
by the Japan Newspapers’ Association on 16th March 1948. In effect, it meant 
that no one but management would be allowed to participate in the process of 
editing, and no criticism would be allowed concerning the newspapers’ 
statements and content. The Americans then shifted to use a softer, but highly 
effective, approach. SCAP instructors offered “unofficial and thus voluntary 
history lessons.”218 Japanese reformers and leftists were thrilled with their 
new freedom, which by October 1945 also included the removal of restrictions 
on civil liberties and free speech. In this new atmosphere, a documentary 
called The Japanese Tragedy was made which included several images of 
Hirohito as a war criminal, but out of fear that the film’s ‘radical treatment’ 
might ‘provoke riots and disturbances’, SCAP banned it nonetheless. 
MacArthur wanted to use the emperor “as a symbolic presence; a kind of 
shrine” to legitimise his own authority.219 To use this symbol of national unity, 
he first had to destroy the extremist belief that the Emperor was a divine 
priest-king. In September 1947 an initial, highly effective step toward this goal 
was the strategic distribution throughout the press of a photo with MacArthur 
and Hirohito standing side-by-side at the US Embassy. The photo showed 
MacArthur in an open-necked shirt, his hands lodged easily in his hip pockets, 
towering over the diminutive monarch, who was standing stiffly to attention in 
his formal morning coat, his mouth slightly open.220 During the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East, modelled after The Court at Nuremburg, 
SCAP determined that the Emperor was innocent of war crimes. Ironically, the 
Emperor himself was kept from the trial, even as a witness. The trial was then 
broadcast on Japanese radio and repeated in the press. General Tojo, who 
was prime minister at the start of the war, took personal responsibility, but 
during his trial he insisted that no-one would have dared go against the 
Emperor. The press coverage and the cross-examination of Tojo were cut 
short to prevent this truth from becoming widely known. Eventually, Tojo was 
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pressured to change this stance and say that the emperor “had always loved 
and wanted peace.” Depicted in the press with round tortoiseshell glasses, a 
shaved head and buck teeth, Tojo became America’s favourite caricature of 
the “evil Japanese”.221 
With the emperor exempt, and therefore seen to be distanced from any war 
crime, the Japanese showed no sympathy for the military war criminals, and 
came to believe that they were responsible for the destruction of Japan. The 
effect of the Tribunal was to persuade the Japanese that they were no longer 
the ‘pawns’ who had previously been led astray. However, they also 
understood that if atrocities such as the Nanking massacre were terrible and 
wrong, then so too was the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. One of the 
censorship policies of the time that had the greatest consequences was 
concerning terms used for events. The Japanese were forbidden to call their 
war in Asia “The Great East Asia War” (Dai Tōa Sensō). Instead, they were 
required to use the term “Pacific War” (Taiheiyō Sensō). SCAP introduced this 
change in mid-December 1945, as part of a larger directive aimed at 
eliminating religious and nationalistic indoctrination. This resulted in an 
unexpected outcome: Whereas the Japanese phrase had centred on the war 
in China and Southeast Asia, the new term re-centred it in the Pacific. This 
psychologically indicated the dominance of the United States there. Instead of 
instilling a sense of guilt in the Japanese for the war, the initiative diminished 
the nation’s memories of what Japan had done to their neighbouring Asian 
countries. Sometimes SCAP’s censorship was plainly ridiculous. Files contain 
records of one incident where an order was issued to delete a small dog from 
a photograph of US forces on parade because it lessened the dignity of the 
troops. But it was more common for the troops, jeeps, English-language signs 
and the like to be removed from visual record, in attempts to remove any 
signs of the occupation from films and photographs, helping the Japanese to 
forget their defeat. For example, a cartoon about how quickly and easily the 
GIs took over Tokyo, captioned “the power of chewing gum is awesome”, was 
banned from broadcast and never reached the public.222 
From 1946 through to 1948, the public media had been saturated with 
coverage of war crime trials, and of publicity regarding Japanese atrocities in 
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the Pacific War and Chinese theatre.223 “There were a number of dead and 
wounded [Japanese], it is said, but because of the American censorship, 
there was nothing about the indictment in the papers. The Americans talk 
about freedom, but they conceal what is to their disadvantage.”224 The SCAP 
censorship officially began to decrease in 1947. Traditional theatre was 
removed from pre-performance censorship in mid-1947, with classic feudal 
loyalty and revenge-type dramas, such as Forty-Seven Loyal Retainers, 
returning to the Kabuki stage. All major newspapers and news services were 
removed from pre-publication inspection by the end of July 1948. In October 
of 1949, SCAP officially terminated the censorship, citing the US State 
Department’s recognition that it only ever had “the effect of continuing the 
authoritarian tradition in Japan.”225 
The post-war economy had started to improve, but when MacArthur began to 
make suggestions about continuing to fight China, President Truman 
dismissed him. The Japanese responded in an extraordinary way. The liberal 
newspaper, Asabi, thanked MacArthur for teaching the Japanese “the merits 
of democracy and pacifism”, and for “guiding them with kindness along this 
bright path.”226 The Emperor also thanked him for everything he had done for 
his people. All along MacArthur’s route to Haneda airport, hundreds of 
thousands of Japanese citizens, including children who were pardoned from 
school for the occasion, stood crying and waving little paper flags. NHK radio 
played “Auld Lang Syne” as Prime Minister Yoshida waved goodbye. It was 
the same plane that brought MacArthur to Japan in 1945 that flew him away 
again for the last time.227 
 
2.1.1. Japan’s Post-Occupation Media. 
Books, press, theatre, radio and films were used by SCAP to change the 
intellectual and political atmosphere of Japan. This was achieved by 
continuously promoting the concept and practice of peace and democracy 
through various information programmes, campaigns and exhibitions. One 
benefit of this was that it helped create a positive image for the Americans in 
modern Japanese literature.228 However, since World War II, Japanese 
64 
newspapers have developed to meet the level of quality papers in Europe. 
The five nationally distributed newspapers competed not just among 
themselves but with the local Japanese newspapers across the country, 
allowing local newspapers to publish more than 120 editions.229 
Until shortly after 1951, when Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru signed the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty ending the American Occupation, the world saw 
Japan as a country facing poverty and humiliation. The Japanese struggled 
for daily survival as they put their broken lives back together and tried to 
recover economically. To face this struggle, the Japanese looked mostly to 
their own cultural history; to a time of national pride that gave them a sense of 
national destiny. These were the Meiji years, which witnessed military and 
economical advances on the international stage. As the Japanese began to 
rebuild their lives after World War II, they looked to the West for technology. In 
1956 they were enraptured by a new slogan: “The Post-War is Over.” This 
slogan set the tone for one of the most phenomenally rapid growths of an 
economy in world history. 230 
To conclude, during World War II all aspects of the press were placed under 
national control. This form of control deprived the press of virtually any 
freedom to attempt to contradict or condemn the state’s objectives and the 
invasion of neighbouring Asian countries. It was only during the end of the 
post-war period that the Japanese press gained the levels of freedom of 
speech and expression seen in the more industrialised Western Nations. 
More precisely, this occurred within the time Japan was again recognised as 
an independent member of the international community, several years after 
the enactment of the country’s new constitution.231 
With regard to lasting legacies on the Japanese press, it could be said that 
there was some success achieved. It survived the Occupation with its 90 
years of tradition largely intact. Having never known true independence, 
Japan’s press fumbled a bit during the years of defeat and recovery, but 
eventually resumed its function as the “communications instrument of the 
national leadership.”232 Press reporters and journalists began to travel abroad 
and become educated at American universities. At the same time, some of 
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the great Japanese business corporations expanded to broadcast 
internationally. These specific actions were proof enough that the economy 
was on the rise. The international press, especially corps of foreign 
correspondents in the world’s largest cities, cheered them on. Yet 
confrontational news stories about foreigners in Japan were becoming more 
popular. For example, the arrival of a branch of a foreign company in Japan 
was generally characterised as a “landing” (jōriku); the same term used in 
earlier times for military invasions. If a foreign firm closed down part of its 
operations in Japan, it was referred to as a “withdrawal in defeat.”233 Except 
for a brief period in 1950, in which the “Declaration on Safeguarding 
Newspapers’ Editorial Rights” was announced by the Japan Newspapers 
Association on 16th March 1948, the principles have not been abused and 
have instead functioned to regulate the activities of the newspaper workers 
since. It has been quoted as the standard in relation to the establishment of 
editorial policies on important social and political problems.234 
 
2.2. German Press History Before the American Occupation. 
On 30th January 1933, President Paul von Hindenburg named Adolf Hitler as 
Chancellor of Germany, with Franz von Papen as Vice-Chancellor. Alfred von 
Hugenburg, a former Krupp executive who owned the Telegraphen Union 
News Agency and several other media concerns, was included in the Cabinet, 
along with two members of the Nazi party; Hermann Goering and Wilhelm 
Frick. Hitler refused to compromise with the leaders of the still-strong Centre 
party, bringing about the dissolution of the Reichstag with fresh elections set 
for March of that year. Those elections gave the Nazi group added power, 
with legislation being passed in the following weeks giving legal authority, 
including over the media, to what later amounted to a Nazi dictatorship. On 3rd 
February 1933, President Hindenburg signed a Nazi-drafted document called 
the “Decree for the Protection of the German People”. It professed to have a 
high moral purpose, and explained that it was necessary to prevent the 
publication of “false news” and “malicious” reports. But within a month, it 
resulted in the suppression of more than 200 newspapers and periodicals. 
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One official in Berlin at the time said, “This is not a matter of right. It is a 
matter of force.”235 
Foreign correspondents, who had worked under favourable conditions 
between 1920 and the first month of the Nazi regime in 1933, reported the 
growing signs of trouble within the country. It came as no surprise to them 
when they were informed late in February 1933, that the parliamentary 
democratic time in Germany had passed. A day or two later, the press was 
informed that further action would be taken against correspondents whose 
dispatches “maliciously oppose the government”.236 It was Goebbels who 
said, “The mission of the press should be not merely to inform, but also to 
instruct. The press of Germany should be a piano upon which the government 
might play. The press must therefore cooperate with the Government and the 
Government with the press.”237 Christopher Bollyn wrote in his article, 
Germany 58 Years of US Occupation, that “The Allied occupation of 
Germany, begun 58 years ago, in the eye of many Germans, has not yet 
ended. Foreign armies are still based on German soil and Europe's largest 
and most prosperous ‘democracy’ still lacks a constitution and peace treaty 
putting a formal end to the Second World War.”238 Similarly, the stated goal of 
the Anglo-American forces in Iraq is “to liberate the Iraqi people and establish 
democracy. However, if the US and British Occupation of Iraq follows the 
pattern set by the Allied Occupation of Germany, a sovereign democracy in 
Iraq is not likely to appear in the near future.”239 From an early date in the 
occupation it was realised, by at least some officials in the United States, that 
one of the most constructive services to the German people would be various 
types of information programmes.240 
2.2. 1. The American Occupation of Germany. 
At the Potsdam Conference of August 1945, after Germany's unconditional 8th 
May surrender, the Allies divided Germany into four military occupation zones: 
the French in the southwest, the British in the northwest, the United States in 
the south, and the Soviets in the east. The commanders-in-chief exercised 
supreme authority in their respective zones and initially acted together on 
questions affecting the whole country. In 1951, MacArthur, comparing 
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Germany to Japan, had predicted it would be easier to rehabilitate Germany 
by simply removing the “German perversion.” Yet history was to prove that the 
occupation, demilitarisation and democratisation of the Germans was perhaps 
more difficult. Mary Beard, comparing MacArthur’s success in Japan to that of 
the US Occupiers in Germany, said that the occupation plan in Japan was “so 
superior in intelligence…that General MacArthur’s leadership shines with 
brilliant illumination.”241 
According to the “Special Report of the Military Governor”, dated November 
1948, “Democratically-minded and trustworthy German editors and publishers 
have established a solid core of independent and democratic newspapers in 
the US area of occupation. Newspapers had been encouraged towards 
independence and objectivity no matter what.”242 But more recently, historians 
examining this period point to it as being generally chaotic, especially 
concerning America’s role in planning Germany’s occupation. The consensus 
is that problems began at the highest level, with President Roosevelt’s delay 
in planning for the occupation until after the war.243 As a child, Roosevelt had 
received part of his education in Germany, and was therefore uniquely 
prejudiced against the German militarists. But as his health diminished, so did 
his focus on planning for the occupation. This resulted in several government 
agencies taking widely differing views ranging from a “re-constructionist policy 
at the State Department to a punitive, destabilising scheme at Henry 
Morgenthau’s Treasury Department.” Consequently, the War Department did 
not consistently support anyone, and US forces entered Germany without a 
coherent national policy. Eventually, the War and State Departments decided 
the best solution would be to have civilian agencies with military capabilities 
that would take responsibility for a long-range occupation policy, “but that 
these agencies should not interfere with War Department operations in the 
war zones.”244 
In May 1945, when the allies forced a German admission of defeat, they 
rightfully concluded that German newspapers, radio and film were thoroughly 
“coordinated” and had been contaminated by Nazi ideals of kunstpolitik - the 
goal “to make art serve politics and to make politics serve art”. But they also 
incorrectly believed that pre-Nazi German press traditions reflected a press 
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subservient to political and nationalist interests.245 Initially, scarce materials, 
supplies and equipment necessitated imposing some restrictions, but the 
controls were also placed in order to train editors, publishers and journalists in 
the American democratic, free-press tradition. The controls were lifted after 
about a year and the US Military Government took steps to ensure tenure of 
five to eight years for newspaper publishers, during which time it was believed 
that the publishers would be able to acquire their own plants or make 
otherwise satisfactory long-term lease arrangements. Democracy was a 
foreign concept with no precedent in Germany, so there was a perception that 
the American ideal would be too alien to the German public to be accepted 
through Die Neue Zeitung Kultur, which was often described as “the antithesis 
of democracy.”246 “A spiritual change in Germany needed to take place in the 
public arena, as well as in every citizen’s mind. Germans were to be 
subjected to a thorough process of re-education that would familiarise them 
with the values, rules and institutions of a modern democracy similar to the 
American model.”247 
“The key agency for the re-education of the German mind became the 
Psychological Warfare Division (PWD), a subdivision of the War Department. 
PWD was the innovation of the strategic services (OSS).”248 The task of 
reorienting the German news fell first to the Psychological Warfare Division of 
the US War Department and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary 
Force (SHAEF). Before German unconditional surrender, the Psychological 
Warfare Division worked to demoralise German soldiers and civilians, and 
inform inhabitants in occupied regions of the US military rules, regulations and 
intentions. At this time, Psychological Warfare had four tasks: to ‘wage 
psychological warfare against the enemy’; to improve morale in friendly 
nations occupied by the Axis and influence compliance in these nations 
following Allied liberation; to coordinate the press in the liberated nations; and 
to control information services in occupied Germany. Besides using 
loudspeakers and radios for delivering Allied propaganda including 
demoralising messages to German troops and civilians, many other tactics 
were employed.249 The programme planned for the German media before VE 
Day was based on the fact that the Nazis had flattened the opposition press, 
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having forced democratic editors, journalists and publishers into exile and 
retirement or concentration camps, acquired financial control of newspapers 
and press facilities, dictated the make-up and content of papers, and 
channelled all news through governmental or semi-official press agencies.250 
What would soon unfold would be the PWD taking control of the press and 
radio stations in the occupied area and using them to prepare the ground for a 
new democratic post-war media system, central to the Allies’ re-education 
strategy. It used a three-step plan based on the application of the German 
press as an essential component of re-education; one of the very few points 
upon which all four Allies agreed. First the entire Nazi press and propaganda 
system was to be completely dismantled. Each power would then distribute 
press licenses to German anti-Nazis, and when German editors were deemed 
to be “democratic enough”, the press market would finally be opened to free 
competition.251 
The first step in their mission was to wipe out the propaganda press that the 
Nazis had set up and to suspend and abolish the approximately 1,500 Nazi 
newspapers still being published up to VE Day. This was done through 
Military Government Law 191, which closed down existing German 
information services as the Allies advanced into Germany in March and April 
of 1945.252 The second step was to fill the gap left by the elimination of the 
newspapers and news agencies with progressive establishments of allied 
army publications, enabling Military Government instructions and information 
to be communicated to the German people.253 The initial press policies were 
the product of four directives issued between May and September of 1945. In 
the wake of Military Government Law 191, which prohibited all public 
expression in Germany, on 22nd May 1945 SHAEF issued “Directive No 1 for 
Propaganda Policy of Overt Allied Information Services”. This law further 
obliged the dissolution of the Nazi press, but also urged the publication of 
materials to highlight the need for food production amongst Germans, 
stressed “re-education” by printing messages of collective responsibility for 
German crimes and printed facts which exposed the fatal consequences of 
Nazi and militaristic leadership.254 
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The first Information Control Division (ICD) enforced the Potsdam Agreement 
as well as Directives No 4 and No 40 of the Allied Control Council, which 
forbade any criticism of the occupying powers.255 Directive No 3 of 28th June 
1945 established the policies by which individual Germans might receive 
licenses to publish newspapers.256 As a peacetime successor of the PWD, the 
Information Control Division (ICD) was supposed to lead the media effort in 
the US Zone under the guidance of Robert A McClure, formerly head of the 
PWD. The task of the ICD was to control cultural affairs, including literature, 
theatre, music, film, radio and all print media.257 The military government 
banned any publication from publishing any information which might 
jeopardise the lives and well being of troops or encourage resistance against 
them.258  Directive No 3 also stated that “dissemination of any type of news 
information or editorial, which constitutes a malicious attack upon policies or 
personnel of [the] Military Government, aims to disrupt unity amongst the 
Allies, or seeks to evoke the distrust and hostility of German people against 
any occupying power, is prohibited.”259 
In comparison to the British Zone’s decidedly more liberal press policies, the 
Americans had stricter regulation on who could and who could not publish 
newspapers. Ideally, the Americans only licensed those they saw as 
committed to a democratic future and judged to be free from the taint of 
Nazism.260 More than the other occupation powers, US press officers 
opposed the revival of German local newspapers, party publications and 
sensational journalism. No one who had published in Germany after 1932 was 
to be granted permission to write for a democratic daily. Each newspaper had 
to keep two licensees, an editor and a publisher, in order to guarantee the 
separation of news and opinion. Through inspection and censorship, 
exchange programmes and journalistic schools, the ICD hoped to organise 
the democratic reform of the German press.261 Furthermore, according to 
Directive No 4 of the Military Government, only people who had openly 
opposed the Hitler regime were to be employed in the post-war press.262 With 
this rule in place, editors, publishers and key personnel were sought, 
screened, and selected on the basis of a positive and concrete record of 
opposition to Nazism.263 Primarily in the interest of establishing papers that 
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would not be subservient to government or special political or economic 
interests, but also because of a shortage of printing facilities and supplies, the 
Military Government banned the licensing of political party newspapers, at 
least until a concrete foundation of an independent press could be 
established.264 
Unquestionably, there were plenty of Central and Eastern Europeans, such as 
Hans Habe, who were less than desirable to the Western Allies’ vision of 
Germany. Very few were given the opportunity to work with the Psychological 
Warfare Division and the information Control Division, but Habe was given the 
opportunity to set up the first Allied Government newspaper in Berlin; the 
Allgemeine Zeitung. He also convinced OMGUS to allow him to establish and 
operate the US-controlled newspaper, Die Neue Zeitung. As its sub-title 
claimed, Die Neue Zeitung was “the American newspaper for the German 
population.” ICD published the first issue relatively soon after the war, on 18th 
October 1945.265 Continuously being published was the main army paper, Die 
Nueu Zeitung, which was being produced solely in the American zone.266 
Moreover, in 1947 Die Neue Zeitung was the only Amazon newspaper 
allowed to travel across internal Amazon borders. Ultimately, in June 1947, 
the Allied Control Authority allowed the internal exchange of press 
materials.267 
It was Marshall Knappen, however, who noted that press coverage of the 
occupation was lacking due to inexpert reporters having replaced seasoned 
veterans, or pressure from respective Home Offices to write domestic 
stereotypes of the Germans as “sullen [and] recalcitrant, who learned nothing 
and forgot nothing.”268 Throughout the winter of 1946-47, both the Soviets and 
the Americans levelled accusations at each other claiming violations of 
Directives No 4 and No 40 of the Potsdam Agreement, as well as the doctrine 
of inter-Allied harmony. The Soviets claimed Die Neue Zeitung had multiplied 
the number of German POWs in their sphere of influence, downplayed the de-
Nazification endeavour of the Russian forces and was spreading rumours of 
kidnappings and starvation in the Eastern Zone.269 It was these disputes 
between Soviet and American representatives that led to a change in the 
development of Die Neue Zeitng. Until August 1946 the paper had mostly 
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been a concern of ICD, but as tension worsened over reparations, the 
dismantlement of Berlin and the exchange of information, US officials such as 
H. Freeman Matthews, the Chief of Division for West European Affairs in the 
State Department, began to consider using Die Neue Zeitng as a propaganda 
instrument against the Soviet Union.270 
2.2. 2. Germany’s Post-Occupation Media. 
In a letter of support to the Director of Military Government of Wuerttemberg-
Baden in March 1948, General Clay said: “If the newspapers of the US Zone 
fail to carry out what is a major task of any newspaper, and fail to report fully 
on what their governments are doing, as well as what their governments are 
not doing, they cease to be quasi-public institutions and betray their trust.”271 
Although press freedom and democracy were essential for Germany’s future, 
Die Neue Zeitung's poorly conceived messages on democracy seemed 
overtly American and unsuitable given Germany’s culture and history. 
Perhaps journalistic homogeneity represents a link between the national 
socialist and occupation eras. After all, occupation era policies and events 
prevented the formation of a highly partisan or anti-governmental press in 
ways similar to the experiences of the controlled press under the Nazis.272 
The attempt to democratise Germany in the American image through the 
process of re-education began as an idealistic, naïve and disorganised plan to 
combine de-Nazification, the restructuring of the school system, university 
reform and cultural exchange. There was a notable gap between America’s 
aims (as expressed in the Military Government’s documents) and what they 
actually achieved, as expressed through criticism from the new German and 
International press. Perhaps surprising to many, there were more changes in 
German society during the occupation than had occurred under Hitler and the 
Nazis. Identifying the successes and failures of the occupation and the 
educational reform has been problematic. More than 30 years after the war, 
historians and educators are still having difficulty discussing them. It may 
have been easy to see where failures occurred, but it has not been as simple 
to clearly identify the successes. Attempts to create comprehensive schools, 
to alter university governance, or to impose other changes in educational 
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institutions were snubbed. But none could deny that the influence on the 
media was very real. One problem in analysing the situation, as previously 
noted, is that the official policy is contradictory, vague and uncertain. In fact, 
according to the Cold War historian Geir Lundestad, and others including 
German historian Anjana Buckow, American policy towards Eastern Europe 
during the 1940s was fundamentally a “non policy”.273 
Conclusion. 
During the Allied occupation, the German media were subject to censorship 
by the American and Allied forces. Criticism of the occupational forces and of 
the emerging government were not allowed. Publications which were 
expected to have contain negative messages or coverage were prohibited. 
Licenses were required to print any publication, and permission was essential 
to perform any visual art. There were two kinds of censorship: one before and 
the other after publication of journalistic work. Also It is obvious that the 
American occupation administration in Iraq 2003 applied almost the same 
policies as were adopted in Germany and Japan during World War II in the 
media sector. And they did not take into consideration Iraq’s cultural, 
geographical, or religious differences. So although it may have worked in 
Germany and Japan it did not work in Iraq because of those differences. It 
was a big shock to see the US administration applying the same policies 
which they had used seven decades ago. 
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3. Chapter Three: The History of the Iraqi Media before the 2003 
 Invasion. 
3.1. The Initiation of Iraqi Media (1869-1914). 
Introduction: 
In Chapter 2 the study examined the American experience in Germany and 
Japan to give a wider view of the US’s experiences in other occupied 
countries and to help to provide a better understanding of what happened in 
Iraq. This chapter will focus on the history of the Iraqi media, to provide 
additional background on that history and the impact of politics and the 
military on the media in Iraq. The story of the Iraqi media started on the 15th  
June 1869, when Medhat Basha, the Ottoman ruler of Baghdad, published the 
first Iraqi newspaper, Alzawra, with eight pages and in two languages: Arabic 
and English. In 1908, the Ruler, Najim Aldin, published it solely in the Turkish 
language. However, on 11th March 1913, the Ruler Mohammed Basha 
published it in both Arabic and English. It continued for another 49 issues and 
stopped on 12th July 1917, when the British army occupied Baghdad. Alzawra 
focused on internal and external issues, and covered politics, culture and 
health. In addition, it criticised the governmental administrations during that 
time, so it is considered a historical source of information to gauge the political 
and cultural situation during that period.274 
After Alzawra, the Ottomans published The Mosel newspaper, in Mosel on 
25th June 1885, and, ten years later, the Albasra newspaper in Basra 
emerged. It was the mouthpiece of the Ottoman government, who 
monopolised the media of the time.275 
Akleel Alward (A Wreath of Roses) was the first Iraqi magazine, published in 
1902 by the Dominican Friars in the City of Mosel, to be the mouthpiece of 
Syriac Catholics; it was therefore outside the monopoly of the Ottoman rulers. 
It consisted of ten pages that covered scientific, literary, historical and 
religious issues until it closed in 1908.276 
1908 was a turning point in the history of the Iraqi media. The Ottoman 
constitutions during this year allowed Iraqi intellectuals to publicise their 
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thoughts and hopes. There were calls for the liberation of the populations, and 
reconstruction of education systems. 277 
The Baghdadi’s published their first newspaper in 1908, called Baghdad, 
written in both Arabic and English. It focused on the politics, science and 
literature of that period, and was the brainchild of the Alatihad Waltaraqi 
society, but it ceased to exist after only one year. After the Baghdad 
newspaper, there were many newspapers that were published in Iraq, 
because of the freedom which was given by the Ottoman constitution under 
the Rule of Sultan Abdulhameed Althani (Abdullhameed the Second). But this 
freedom enjoyed by the press did not last long; when the Alatihad Waltaraqi 
society came to power in Turkey in 1911, they closed many newspapers and 
disturbed the freedoms which were previously given by the constitution. 278 
In 1910 the Iraqi newspapers called for the Arabic language to become the 
official language of the state and the media. They also called for the Ottomans 
to stop disturbing the Iraqi press and demanded a better independent Iraqi 
newspaper. Since then, Iraqi newspapers had started to abandon the old style 
of writing, implementing the use of metaphors, for example, and the 
sophistication of the words used noticeably dropped. Thus, a simple and easy 
to understand style of writing was administered and used by all. It was like a 
starting point for using a journalistic style of language rather than one of rich 
literary style.279 Alalim (The Science) magazine was the first Arabic 
publication in the city of Najaf of a religious, political, philosophical, and 
scientific nature. The publisher was the famous Iraqi poet, Alhaj Abdulhusein 
Alazarli. Its first issue was published on 1st May 1910, with 48 pages. It was 
printed in Baghdad because there was no publishing house in the city of Najaf 
at the time. Alalim was a very popular magazine, but production stopped 
during the First World War.280 Lugat Alarab (The Arab Language) was one of 
the magazines published after the Ottoman Constitution in the City of Mosel. 
The founder, Inistafis Marri Alkaramli, published it in July 1911. It was one of 
the best cultural and intellectual magazines of the time.281 There was a 
newspaper in the centre of each state of the Ottoman Empire under the 
monopoly of a governmental employee. Most of its pages contained 
appreciation for the Ottoman Sultan (or ‘ruler’) and prayers for him. The front 
 76 
pages were also used to offer prayers to the Sultan. During this time, it was 
impossible to get permission to publish an independent newspaper. Disturbing 
the press was not just preventing the people from publishing and narrowing 
the freedom of the press, but also preventing foreign press from coming into 
the country.282 
3.1.1. Iraqi Media during WWI. 
The newspaper industry suffered during the First World War (1914-1918) as it 
was not allowed to distribute in Iraq. Both Ottoman and non-Ottoman 
journalists were also excluded from the country. The war environment also 
controlled the content of newspapers, which were focusing on war related 
news. There is no doubt that the first city which was affected by the British 
occupation was Basra. It was there that the British took their first footsteps 
into the country. The British troops sponsored the publishing of a newspaper 
to create propaganda for them. It was Alawqat Albasriah (The Basra Times) 
newspaper, which was published on 24th November 1914 in four languages: 
Arabic, English, Persian and Turkish. It is obvious that this newspaper was 
published to serve the occupiers and promote the Alliance’s policy by 
publicising their ideas. Its pages were full of news of the war from the front 
lines. In addition to the newspaper, they also published a weekly magazine 
called Aliraq fi Zaman Alharb (Iraq in the Time of War).283 
When the British troops invaded Baghdad and occupied it, they did so after 
very strong resistance from the Ottomans. This was apparent from the first 
moment the British started the war propaganda, circulating information by 
initiating rumours and issuing statements. The best known of these was G. 
Mood’s statement: “we came as liberators not occupiers”. They also helped to 
widely distribute books, magazines, newspapers and bulletins, which speak of 
Britain’s exploits and its attitudes regarding human rights, stressing a stance 
against injustice. On 4th July 1917, they published Alarab (The Arabs) 
newspaper, which featured on its front pages that, “it is [a] daily political, 
historical, literature rebuilder. Arabian in its principle and aim.” Unfortunately, 
the name was all that it got from the Arab world. There were some Iraqi 
writers working for the newspaper with very high wages. The name of the 
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newspaper was a part of the name of Britain’s declared policy, which 
announced that they were in harmony with the Arabs’ intentions and aims. 
Miss Bell (Gertrude Bell), the Civil Secretary with the British military troops, 
took an active hand in developing the publishing industry and translating 
literature. She established Dar Alsalam (The House of Peace) publishing 
house in August 1919, to distribute these publications widely at cheap 
prices.284 
Even though the Turks had left Iraq, Ottoman publication law was still valid. 
Still, the British administration did not follow Ottoman law in its relations with 
the Iraqi media. They closed the newspapers which were owned by Iraqis, 
and used various methods to strangle freedom of speech and liberal thought. 
It was clear that there was no difference between the two occupations in their 
control of the Iraqi media.285 
In spite of the disruptions of British occupation and Ottoman law, the Iraqis 
published Alsahifa (The Newspaper) on 1st December 1924. It was the first 
Marxist newspaper published in Iraq, and it criticised some of the common 
Iraqi social customs of the time.286 The First World War was a difficult period 
for Iraq, as on the one side the Ottomans had a very deep sense of fear of a 
public revolution that may have arisen in support of the Alliances. They were, 
therefore, very hard with the Iraqis and the Iraqi press. On the other side, the 
British had the same fear of a public revolution supported by the Ottomans, so 
they monopolised the rights of publications.287 
The British administration published Najmat Kirkuk (Kirkuk Star). The first 
issue was published on 1st December 1918 in the Arabic Language. The 
newspaper became the mouthpiece of the government after its independence. 
In Sulaimaniah, they published a weekly political newspaper, Sulaimaniah 
Beshkoween (The Development), on 29th April 1920 in Kurdish languages.288 
As previously mentioned, the British authorities had published Alarab 
newspaper in Baghdad. Issue number 872, dated 31st May 1920, surprised 
the Iraqis with a piece stating that, “Tomorrow, the first issue of Aliraq (Iraq) 
newspaper will be published; it is a daily newspaper focused on politics, 
literature and economy. Mr. Razooq Afandi Dawad is the sole owner. This is 
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the last issue of Alarab newspaper, so we would like to say goodbye to our 
readers, and we would like to say thanks for your help and support for the 
newspaper since the very beginning.”289 
It was not easy to find a publishing house for Aliraq, but the British authorities 
helped Razooq Afandi Dawad to print his newspaper in Alarab publishing 
house, which was Alzihoor publishing house before its confiscation by the 
British army. Dawad was working in the management and editing staff of 
Alarab newspaper. He was a nationalist during the Ottoman era, so the 
Ottomans exiled him during the war. Aliraq newspaper’s first issue was 
published on 1st June 1920 in standard Arabic language.290 
3.1.2. The Press of the Twentieth Revolution. 
Freedom and independence were the intentions of nationalistic Iraqis; those 
who believed that the Iraqis should live with dignity. The Iraqi journalist 
suffered from the British monopoly of the press, but the British administration 
did not disable educated Iraqis from publishing an Iraqi political newspaper. 
After the Paris Treaty between the Allies and the Ottomans, intellectual Iraqis 
looked for a way to lead the Iraqi community toward a better future. They 
gained permission to publish a monthly historical, literary and social 
magazine. The fact that it had political content worked for the Arab 
Renaissance in a literary way. They named it Allisan (The Tongue); it was the 
tongue of the Arabs, like Allisan newspaper which was published in Istanbul 
by the same publisher; Ahmed Azat Alaadami. Alaadami registered the 
magazine under two names; Ali Ridah and Antone Sadiq, in order to hide 
himself from the British authorities. The first issue of the magazine was 
published in July 1919. The bureau of the magazine was a meeting centre for 
those who worked against the occupation, seeking the freedom of their 
nations. Some of those who participated in the Arab Revolution returned to 
Iraq; and, along with nationalists and those who came back from exile and 
prison, donated to the magazine to help it survive. It called the Iraqis to rise in 
revolution against the British occupation. The newspaper suffered financially 
and continued for four months until its closure by the British Authorities in Iraq, 
because the publisher had participated in the revolution.291 
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The twentieth revolution emerged from the City of Romaitha, when Sheik 
Shallan Abu Aljoon lit the revolution’s fuse. The movement then became wider 
and wider, and revolutionaries felt that they needed the press to inform them 
about what was happening on the different frontlines. The Alfurat (Euphrates) 
newspaper was published by Mohammed Baker Alshabibi in the City of Najaf. 
Its first issue was published in July 1920, and it was a weekly political and 
historical newspaper. It was the mouthpiece of the revolution, publishing daily 
bulletins about battles with British troops. It was published by Alhaidariah 
publishing house in the city of Alanajaf. 292 
Alfurat called for war against the British troops, but it also established an 
ethical guide for that war. The publisher, Sheik Baker, wrote its most famous 
article, the title of which was Commandment for the Fighters. He asked 
warriors to follow prescribed ethics of war saying, “it is not a war to revenge, 
but to regain our freedom and dignity.” He asked fighters to protect the roads, 
saying, “do not loot and assault.” He called on them to take care of British 
prisoners of war. The British army closed Alfurat newspaper to control the 
revolution. The publisher wrote one last letter to the British administrator, 
promising that “We will stand against each other in front of the court of history 
and [it is] history who would judge us, and decide who is the criminal and who 
did kill the innocent without mercy or kindness. Agony [upon] those who 
painted the land by the blood of the innocents.” The revolution dealt with the 
British through the newspaper, so when the British called the revolution’s 
leadership for negotiation, leaders sent three conditions to cite with each 
other. These were: 
1) Withdraw the British troops from Iraq. 
2) Return the exiled Iraqis to Iraq. 
3) The attendance of the other countries’ representatives in the negotiation. 
Iraqi historians, such as Kamal Modhaher, considered Alfurat newspaper as 
the national Iraqi mouthpiece, which shouted in a loud voice against the 
occupiers.293 After this, leaders of the revolution published Alistiqlal (The 
Independence) in Baghdad. The owner of the newspaper was Mr. 
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Abdulgafoor Albadri. Aladliah magazine was published on 1st September 
1920; Alistiqlal newspaper in the city of Najaf on 1st November 1920. These 
newspapers and magazines attracted nationalists, liberals and educated 
youth after the revolution, and they covered all the national events and issues 
from a new and modern point of view.294 
The press had become an essential part of the Iraqis’ lives because it was the 
only platform through which they could explain themselves, their ideas and 
thoughts. So, one of the seven famous items, or clauses, of the twentieth 
revolution was liberating the media and launching freedom of speech with the 
application of Ottoman publication law, until a new law could be established to 
replace it.295 
3.2. Catalysts for the Development of Iraqi Press. 
1) The Struggle for the Independence of the Country: 
Following the Paris conference, and their signing of the treaty which called for 
the population’s right to decide their future and destiny, nationalists started 
calling on the British authorities to give Iraqis the right to decide the future of 
their own country. This was more pronounced following the establishment of 
Damascus’s independent government under King Faisel the 1st. These 
demands came hand in hand with calls from educated people, who asked the 
British authorities to liberate the press, and to give them permission to publish 
daily newspapers in the cities of Baghdad, Mosul, Basra, and Najaf. In 
response, the British authorities accepted the request, as they were trying to 
set up a civil system instead of the existing military occupational system. The 
British permitted them to publish three newspapers; Aliraq, Alsharq (The East) 
and Alistiqlal (The Independence).296 
2) The Twentieth Revolution: 
The Occupation authorities delayed the implementation of their promises and 
continued to use a military system to control the country. In reaction, 
nationalists insisted upon the deliverance of the rights of the Iraqi population, 
including freedom of the press. The pressure on the British authorities forced 
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them to give the revolution’s leadership the right to publish newspapers, to 
explain their intentions and lay out their plans for the revolution.297 
3) The Establishment of the National Governing Era: 
After the national movement’s calls for independence became stronger, the 
British conference in Cairo 1920, which was attended by Winston Churchill, 
decided to set a formality state in Iraq, and to give independence to the 
country by forming the monarchy under Alhashimi’s Crown. The British 
authorities used propaganda to implement their decision, and persuade the 
Iraqis of the integrity of British policy and forming the monarchy. The British 
introduced their project to the Iraqis through the press, publishing five 
newspapers in Baghdad, which were: Alfalah (The Farmer), Lisan Alarab (The 
Arabs’ Tongue), Dijlah (Tigris), Alrafedain (Mesopotamia) and Almufeed (The 
Useful).298 
4) The Emergence of the Political Parties: 
King Faisal Alawal’s (Faisal the First) rule (1921-1933) was a significant 
period in the history of Iraq. It was the stage of the construction of the modern 
Iraqi state. The period’s political landscape saw the establishment of the new 
state, the forming of political parties and their being granted permission to 
publish newspapers as their mouthpieces. The political parties used these 
newspapers to express their political thoughts and ideas. These newspapers 
attracted educated Iraqis, illuminating Iraqi minds and guiding them toward a 
positive future.299 
 
3.3. The Iraqi Press during the Monarchic Era (1921-1958). 
The Iraqi government published the weekly Alwaqaa Aliraqiyah newspaper 
(the official Gazette of Iraq) on 8th January 1922, in Baghdad, in both English 
and Arabic. It was to be the official newspaper to publish the Iraqi 
government’s statements and laws, which were issued by the British high 
commissioner, the Iraqi cabinet or the ministries.300 Ibrahim Hilmi Alomar then 
published Almuffeed (The Useful) newspaper on 11th April 1922, and then 
Altawheed (Monotheism) newspaper in Baghdad. They were political daily 
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newspapers in the Arabic and Kurdish languages.301 The political parties 
published many newspapers. The Altaqadom Party (Progress Party) 
published Alliwa (The Flag) newspaper on 20th May 1928, followed by the 
Altaqadom Party publication, Altaqadom newspaper, with Mr. Salman Alsheik 
Dawwad as the editor-in-chief. One of the most active publications of partisan 
press of the time was the Alnahdah Aliraqiyah (The Iraqi Renaissance) 
newspaper, which was published by the Alnahda Aliraqi political party.302 
In June 1930 the Iraqi government signed a treaty with the British, named the 
1930 Treaty, which gave the British the right to have two military bases in 
Iraq. The Iraqis had a negative reaction and the media criticised it strongly, 
and most of the newspapers attacked the agreement. The Iraqi government 
responded with the closure of many of these newspapers, and prosecuted the 
newspapers’ owners and staff. The reaction of the government was the 
production of a new publication law, entitled Publication Law 1931, which was 
no less aggressive towards the media. The law was then amended several 
times to make it more suited to the government’s interests and intentions.303 
The comic newspapers played a vital role in the period between the world 
wars, and were very effective in influencing public opinion. An example was 
the weekly humorous newspaper Habazbuz. The first issue was published on 
29th September 1937, and it ran until its owner and publisher, Nori Thabit, 
died in 1938.304 
After the Communist Party started its work in Iraq in March 1934, they found 
no way to operate overtly as a political party. Therefore, the need for secrecy 
extended even to their publication, Kifah Alshaab. They used the bulletin to 
explain their political point of view. In addition, in July 1935, they secretly 
published Kifah Alshaab (The Population’s Struggle) newspaper. It had the 
Communist Party’s name on the front page, and was a turning point in the 
history of the Iraqi media. It broke with tradition and challenged the necessity 
of getting permission to publish a newspaper. The newspaper had fearless 
editors and writers within its ranks. It was printed by copy machine, and 
consisted of four pages, with the first page in colour. 500 copies of each issue 
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was produced, which was more than some of the publicly known newspapers, 
but after issue number six it closed due to a police raid on its bureau.305 
3.4. The Iraqi Media during WWII. 
With the outbreak of the Second World War, the Iraqi government, a puppet 
regime of the British government, stopped all political party activity in Iraq. 
Most of the political parties’ newspapers ceased to operate, but during the 
years of the war the Iraqi government did permit some newspapers to 
distribute their publications: Sawt Alhaq (The Voice of Justice), Alahwal (The 
Status), Aljehad, Alliwa (The Flag) and Alshihab newspaper (The 
Meteoroid).306 The Iraqi government’s loyalty to the British government, along 
with its ignorance of the Iraqis’ demands and intentions, drove the country into 
the May revolution against the monarchy. The revolution was led by Rasheed 
Alli Al-Gailani and a group of nationalist military officers. The uprising did not 
fully succeed, but it did reflect the instability of political life in Iraq. The events 
after the revolution could explain why the Iraqi government was devoted to old 
policies which caused the Iraqi population so much stress. Logically, the 
reaction of the Iraqi community would be very strong against the authority that 
was supported by the British. The pages of the Iraqi press were an 
explanation of the stress and the ignorance that the Iraqi community suffered 
at that time. Perhaps the revolution was one of the causes of the Iraqi 
government’s decision to stop the national newspapers from publishing.307 
One of the freedoms which the Iraqi population gained from the Second World 
War, after a long period of struggle, was the rebirth of a political party culture. 
The Iraqi population kept up their demands of resurgence from political 
parties, so that during the tenure of the Iraqi Prime Minister Taufeeq Alsewidi, 
the government permitted five political groups to run on 2nd April 1946. The 
press of the political parties returned along with the parties themselves. The 
political parties’ publications defended their groups’ thoughts and ideas, 
freedom of speech and various other rights.308 The press defended the 
parties, and considered the freedom of political activity as one of the most 
significant freedoms; a sign of democracy in the country. It was a very hard 
struggle because the press was defending something the government did not 
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believe in. The government allowed the political parties to act and organise 
themselves in reaction to the anger of the population, and then punished 
them.309 In September 1954, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Mori Alsaed, issued 
decree number 19, by which the government dissolved all the political parties 
and their establishments, including the media organisations and theatres. The 
government forced anyone who wanted to reform the establishment to apply 
to the Ministry of Interior for permission. The government satisfied the decree 
by issuing a statement saying that the political parties and their organisations 
used their voices to incite the population to riot, and caused disorder to serve 
foreign parties; therefore, no permission was given.310 
The history of the Iraqi media is full of struggle against various governments 
and of government attempts to monopolise the press. The Iraqi press was 
often like a tongue which voiced the community’s pains. It played a big role in 
inciting community action against governmental exploitation. The government 
lay down policies with the aid of the British government and, as a result, it 
shut down the voices of the press whenever it had the chance. Finally, Prime 
Minister Nori Alsaed issued a decree to close all newspapers and political 
parties, due to government feeling that the media had started playing a role in 
the community which threatened the stability of their position. So, the public 
press disappeared with a single signature, not to return until after the 14th of 
July Revolution.311 
3.5. The Iraqi Press after the 14th of July Revolution, 1958. 
After the success of the revolution, the leadership of the movement drafted a 
new constitution. Item number 10, chapter 2, mentioned that freedom of 
speech and beliefs should be protected and guaranteed to the Iraqi 
population.312 The revolution made public the press’ demands and intentions, 
but, in spite of this, the press withered considerably after the revolution. Press 
was contracted to very few organisations. The Iraqi News Agency was 
established on 22nd September 1959. In addition, there were very few 
newspapers published after the Revolution, one of which was Ajumhoriya 
newspaper (The Republic), which was the mouthpiece of the Arab Baath 
Socialist Party. The first issue was published on 17th July 1958 in Baghdad. In 
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Kirkuk, they published Albasheer (The Missionary) in 1958, and in Baghdad, 
there were another four newspapers which were published at different times, 
like: Sawt Alahrar (The Voice of the Liberals), which was leftist; Alraqeeb (The 
Watcher), and Alistiqlal (The Independence). Alrai Alam (The Public Opinion) 
was a very bold and critical publication, so it was closed down by the 
government.313 
Following the revolution of the 8th of February 1963, and the execution of the 
Iraqi President G. Abdulkareem Qasim, the fellow military officer, Abdulsalam 
Areef, became President. Aljamaheer (The Population) was published; a 
Baathist newspaper. Tariq Aziz was its editor-in-chief. Following this was the 
publication of Althawrah (The Revolution), which was anti-leftist. In addition 
there existed Altaliah newspaper (The Lead). On 28th April 1964, the 
revolution’s leadership, (i.e. the government), issued a new publication law 
which cancelled all the permissions given to publications before this date. 
According to this law, permission of any publication should not be given by 
just one committee. The committee could contain no less than five persons 
not including government employees, and at least two of them were to be 
journalists, to form its board of directors.314 
When the Baath Party led the revolution of July 1968 and gained power, they 
seized Aljumhoriya (The Republic) and Althawrah newspaper (The 
Revolution). Publication law number 206-1968 cancelled all permissions of 
newspapers and magazines in Iraq. The Baath Government allowed some 
newspapers to be published, such as Alfiker Aljaded magazine (The Modern 
Thoughts), which was the Communist Party’s magazine. The first issue was 
published on 19th May 1972. In 1976, the first issue of Aliraq (The Iraq) 
newspaper was published. It was a weekly political newspaper and it stated 
that it was the mouthpiece of the Iraqi Kurds.315 At the very beginning of the 
eighties, the leftist newspaper, Tareeq Alshaab (Road of the Population), 
closed after the Communist Political Party was prosecuted in Iraq, along with 
all the other political parties. With the start of the Iraqi-Iranian war, the Iraqi 
government published Alqadisiyah (The Name of the War). This was a daily 
newspaper that focused specifically on the news of the war.316 
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3.6. The Establishment of Television Broadcasting in Iraq. 
The television, as a new scientific invention, was not well known in Iraq before 
1954, except in its existence as new technology. People learned about it 
through radio stations and newspapers. Firsthand experience of the new, 
superior method of broadcasting was extremely rare, not only in Iraq, but in 
the whole of the Middle East region. The television set was shown to the 
average Iraqi person for the first time at the British Trading Fair, held in 
Baghdad in 1954, although at this point there was still no broadcasting 
throughout Iraq. The Iraqi newspapers published an advertisement on 18th 
October 1954, seeking staff to emply. The advert was entitled A Lady TV 
Presenter, and read: “The TV station, which would be established inside the 
British Trading Exhibition by Bay Company, is in need for a qualified lady who 
has a perfect command of Arabic and/or [the] English language. So, whoever 
finds herself fitting with [these requirements is] to apply for the job by 
attending at Hasso Akhwan (Hasso Brothers) Limited, in Baghdad.”317 
It was very obvious that the company wanted to employ a pretty and attractive 
woman as a presenter, in order to attract viewers through the screens of the 
exciting new television sets of the time. It was a gesture based on the 
understanding that a woman is more likely to grab the viewers’ attention than 
a man in a very conservative society. One of the Iraqi newspapers labelled a 
resulting article The First TV Programmes in the Middle East, and stated that 
“two TV programmes would be broadcast in the afternoon from the location of 
the Exhibition’s studios, from 4:30pm to 5:30pm, and in the evening, from 
8:30pm to 10:20pm. Besides that, it would broadcast important sights from the 
exhibition...They could be watched in different areas, on 12 sets inside and 
outside of the exhibition, and in some [other] places that would be announced 
later.”318 A day before the inauguration of the exhibition, an Iraqi newspaper 
published a story about Iraqi journalists who had visited the television studio 
set to broadcast programs during the opening days of the exhibition. The 
newspaper noted that an English female presenter was filmed delivering a 
welcoming message, which was watched by the journalists from a room 
attached to the studio.319 
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However, the article pointed out that the advertisement for an Iraqi lady to be 
a TV presenter did not succeed in attracting even one Iraqi lady to work for 
the television station. It certainly was a new profession for a conservative 
country characterised by macho culture, where there was little or no room for 
women’s jobs in the public eye. The newspapers had continued publishing the 
advertisements for the television programmes, which were due to be 
broadcast in the exhibition. It also set the fees that must be paid to watch the 
programmes at 50 Fils, (approximately 20p sterling).320 This advertisement, 
therefore, confirmed that watching the programmes was not to be free, but for 
a price. At the same time, the Arabic radio station, Alsharq Aladna Radio (The 
Near East Radio), aired news saying that the Iraqi government was planning 
to buy the TV station shown at the British Trading Fair in Baghdad. The radio 
pointed out that the television station would not start broadcasting until six 
months later, and that a number of Iraqis would be sent abroad for a training 
course on the station’s operating system. The news also mentioned that Iraq 
would be the first country in the Middle East that would be broadcasting 
television.321 
It was obvious that the plan to purchase a television station was discussed 
officially in Iraq, because the newspapers published that the Iraqi cabinet 
discussed the issue in depth. However, the members saw that technical 
difficulties and the lack of programmes to air were sufficient reasons for not 
buying the station. The station’s offered price was sixty five thousand Iraqi 
dinars (approximately £100,000), which was less than the entire budget for 
Iraqi radio the year before the launching of the exhibition.322 
The idea was rejected by the Iraqi government for practical reasons. As a 
result, The Bay Company gave the station to the Iraqi government as a gift.323 
The station was provided with three cameras and a 16mm projecting cinema 
screen. The station was installed at the Iraqi Radio Station’s studio. An Iraqi 
newspaper published an article announcing the arrival of a wireless television 
receiver which was to be installed on a 14 foot tower (or pylon). The article 
highlighted that the area of coverage for the programmes would be a 30km 
radius around central Baghdad.324 To reach more people, a number of 
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television sets were installed throughout some districts of Bagdad, in addition 
to the television sets within the Trading Fair. News then spread that the Iraqi 
television station would be one of the first stations in the world that would 
mostly air educational programmes, aimed at adults as well as children. In this 
regard, the station would be ahead of many others in the world, including 
British stations.325 
The Iraqi Monarch, Fasial II, was to cut the ribbon for the station, and was 
given a tour on 2nd May 1954. In the inauguration ceremonies, the General 
Director of Iraqi Radio made a speech announcing that the station would be 
supervised by three Iraqi engineers who had graduated from British 
universities, in addition to eleven students selected from the Industrial School; 
who had been further trained by the television station to carry out their on-site 
tasks. He also mentioned that additional numbers of students would be 
selected for the following year.326 The development of the Iraqi television 
industry was very slow in the early years, due to the staff’s limited capabilities, 
as well as a lack of technical equipment and funds. In spite of this, the Iraqi 
government understood the potential power of television.327 After 
acknowledging the impact television could have, the government tried to use 
the station very soon after the initial launch to influence the Iraqi people. 
3.7. Iraqi Television during the New Republic, from 1958. 
On 14th July 1958, a military junta took control of the country by a coup d’etat 
against the monarch, Faisal II. They dissolved the royal system and 
established a republic. One of the leaders of the coup, Colonel Abdulsalam 
Araef, occupied the building of the only Iraqi radio station and announced the 
first communiqué of the republic regime over the airwaves. The Iraqis awoke 
to hear the tune of the national anthem in the morning, followed by the Voice 
of Colonel Abdulsalam, reading communiqué number one, which declared the 
end of the monarchic era and the beginning of the Republic Order in Iraq.328 
By and large, the television later turned out to be one of the Iraqi 
government’s political tools to influence the domestic population. For instance, 
they broadcast The People’s Court (Almahdawi’s Court), in which the 
government showed the trials of opposition figures who rebelled against them. 
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It was a daily show, and a way to terrify people in a way that had a lasting 
effect on them. Historians regard the programme as one that instilled the 
government’s guided policy.329 
A remarkable historical event was when the leader of the coup, or revolution, 
General Abdulkareem Qassim, was executed by the leaders of the following 
1963 coup at the studios of Baghdad TV. On February 8th of that year, military 
leaders were bent on showing the footage of Qassim’s execution in order to 
publicly confirm the death of the first republican leader. This was an exercise 
in flexing their muscles and draining the morale of Qassim’s supporters, who 
were still resisting the coup leaders. In 1967, Baghdad TV was covering an 
area extending from the centre of the capital to 100km north and south, 
broadcasting programmes for seven hours a day. The television was used 
once again to show the clout of the government, just as it had been 
manipulated within the early period of Republican rule.330 
3.8. Iraqi Television after the 17th to 30th July Revolution 1968. 
Between 17th and 30th July 1968, the Baath party staged another coup led by 
Ahmed Hassan Al-Baker and Saddam Hussein. The new regime considered 
television high priority, and they tried to provide it with up-to-date technology. 
They also developed the financial and administrational systems of Al-Iraq 
television. In 1970, the government enacted a new law that offered the 
television directors better flexibility and patent power to run their stations. A 
five year plan, running from 1970 to 1974, provided increased funds for its 
budget, in order to expand the station and its broadcasting capabilities. The 
government also established a second channel, increasing the variety 
available for its viewers. In addition to taking advantage of new technologies, 
the station also developed the skills of its staff.331 
In 1976, colour broadcasting was launched by Baghdad TV after years of 
black and white programming. Colour broadcasting started with children 
programmes, which ran for about 45 minutes a day. They then increased the 
number of programmes aired in colour, until all of the channel’s shows were 
broadcast in full colour. The big shift in Baghdad TV’s technical requirements 
called for a number of modifications in the studio’s equipment, as well as the 
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introduction of some new equipment for replacements.332 This big change 
from a technical point of view carried the Baghdad TV station into a new era. 
The mid 1970’s saw big developments in the news and political departments, 
to facilitate broadcasting of news and other programming internationally. This 
indicated that the station’s standards were more professional than ever 
before.333 
Baghdad TV focused on cultural programmes, as well as some Arabic and 
western programmes, as it was mostly produced by Iraqi staff. Iraqi 
programmes managed to attract the attention of the Iraqi audience much 
more than the foreign ones, because they were more representative and 
expressed the Iraqi culture more accurately. One of the well-known 
programmes was Studio al-Huwat (Studio of Amateur Singers), a programme 
similar to Simon Cowell’s Britain’s Got Talent. The presenter in the Iraqi 
programme was Kamal Akif, who was a melody composer and mentor for 
many Iraqi singers. The successful management of the new broadcasts 
received praise from both the Iraqi elite and the average person.334 
3.9. Iraqi Television under Saddam Hussein’s Rule. 
The researcher was eight years old when the Iraqi President, Saddam 
Hussein, granted television sets to the residents of the Iraqi marshes before 
the breakout of the Iraqi-Iranian war. The researcher thought, like other glad 
lay-people, that their President was keen to create a civilised community 
enjoying the latest developments in technology and entertainment. New 
methods of agriculture and machinery were introduced, as well as attractive 
opportunities for foreign companies to construct huge industrial and housing 
projects. But the television boom was short-lived, as the war with Iran broke 
out officially on 22nd September 1980. The focus of the government turned 
from building up the country to protecting it. This shift was stated clearly by 
Saddam Hussein, when he appeared on Iraqi television screens saying that 
the pen and the rifle are one weapon in the battle. By the pen, he meant the 
media organisations. This was the graffiti painted as a motto on the wall of 
many a primary school. Many researchers observed that during this period, 
while Saddam developed Iraqi media technically, he also destroyed media 
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professionalism at the same time, turning it into a type of propaganda 
apparatus. The media under Saddam was a government-run organisation, 
which served the government’s political agendas. For this reason, the 
government developed the media technically and increased staff numbers.335 
When the Iraqi-Iranian war broke out in 1980, the broadcasting of Iraqi 
television covered the whole country from the South to the North. The Iraqi 
government used television as a tool to explain their ideas, thoughts, attitudes 
and policy. The television was used to counteract Iran’s psychological warfare 
against Iraq. The programming covered the war from the Iraqi side, focusing 
particularly on the front line, through the program Sewar min Almarakah 
(Footage from the Battle), which showed scenes from battles and trenches. It 
also broadcast grisly scenes of dead Iranian soldiers, and prisoners of war 
who were cuffed by victorious Iraqi soldiers. The aim of the programmes was 
to raise the morale of soldiers and portray the government as triumphant in 
the eyes of its Iraqi viewers.336 
As the television stations were dependent on the policy of the Iraqi 
government, they launched a guided propaganda campaign against the 
Iranians. This was to persuade them of the Iraqi political point of view after the 
withdrawal of the Iraqi army from Iranian lands in 1982. It portrayed the war as 
having been imposed upon Iraq, and that the Iraqis had no option but to fight 
and defend their country. Iraqi television also launched psychological warfare 
against the Iranians, by broadcasting footage of the battles in which the 
Iranians were defeated and suffered heavy casualties.337 The work of both 
stations was carried out by Iraqi staff, as the broadcasters deployed a suitable 
number of journalists throughout the country, in the front lines, to facilitate the 
psychological war against the Iranians, as well as propagating its ideology to 
the Iraqi people themselves.338 
The war provided Iraqi journalists with new experiences, especially when it 
comes to the role of war correspondents and cameramen. It was the first time 
they were embedded with military troops to conduct live coverage of a war on 
the battlefield, or in other words, to propagate the war. The footage captured 
by Iraqi journalists was bought by international television stations as an 
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indispensable source of media; as a readymade package from frontline 
assignments.339 Since 1980, the media in Iraq had become a vehicle for the 
government represented by Saddam, to fulfil their own political targets and to 
defend the President’s policies, both internally and internationally. The 
Ministry of Information, and the Special Office of Saddam Hussein, had the 
final say in editorial decisions, especially in key events or ceremonies chaired 
by the head of the regime.340 
Mr. Wafa Al-Saffar, the News Director of Al-Iraq television for 20 years, 
described the circumstances of working under Saddam’s rule as “hard, 
torturous and full of despicable sponsorship, restrictions, and forced policies 
upon the media”. As in many circumstances, Iraqi journalists had no better 
option than to work. The country was closed for travel and all able men were 
sent to the trenches unless they worked in key security or media jobs in 
towns. Mr. Al-Saffar described the media scene as being overwhelmingly 
controlled by Saddam. It was reliably one sided and dedicated to the 
authorities and the Baath Party, without showing any consideration to viewers. 
“We had a very big list of banned items labelled under ‘the long illicit list’. We 
used to receive daily orders which outlined guidelines for the programmes, the 
news bulletins, and the words and terms which we have to use”, Mr. Al-Saffar 
said. “It unleashed a strange environment for editors who had to forsake their 
professionalism for public relations activitiy that propagated the government’s 
side only, and ignored the variety of views available from the wider spectrum 
of sources.” “Because of the high pressure from the government and the huge 
numbers of phones calls that we received every day from top officials and the 
security offices, the editors became more restricted than the regime itself. In 
other words, there was a security agent in the mind of each one of us. We 
were very worried about being misjudged or misinterpreted,” Al-Saffar 
added.341 
The tough times brought about a terrifying police system that inflicted a 
stranglehold on the capabilities of journalists. They also left traumatic marks 
upon the minds of journalists working in the government sector. “The process 
was very complicated due to the orders handed down to different offices, and 
each one made more complicated rules and invented more restrictions to 
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keep our work on the safe side,” Al-Saffar explained. Media officials sought to 
keep their places inside the towns, and not to go to the trenches, at the cost of 
professional standards and their human values. They also looked for ways 
that glorified the administration, though they were not asked to. “It was not 
possible to put blame on the head of the [administration] and to hold him 
wholly responsible, because actually subordinates who were in charge were 
acting very badly to stay in power. We were producing meaningless material 
to be on the safe side. That hugely affected the performance of journalism in 
Iraq and unfortunately resulted in having no big names in the Iraqi media, 
because we did not have a suitable environment to create talented 
journalists,” Al-Saffar concluded. 
These circumstances put a lot of pressure on journalists to hype up their 
reports, in order to ensure that their superiors would be satisfied with the 
material. Therefore, the resulting reports were exaggerated and often far from 
reality. “The main media policy was not to criticise the government at all, 
influencing public opinion for the government‘s [benefit]. The station was 
working hand in hand with the government, so we were obeying the 
government policies and justifying their mistakes.”342 
3.9.1. Baghdad International Television. 
After the 1991 war, the Iraqi government established Baghdad Cultural TV, 
and appointed the famous Iraqi journalist, Faisel Al-Yasiri, who had lived 
abroad for 32 years, as a director of the television station. The station focused 
on cultural and educational programmes. After the success which was made 
by Al-Yasiri and his staff, the Iraqi government believed that Baghdad Cultural 
TV was of a high professional standard, and was therefore able to compete 
with the booming international satellite channels. So they decided to shift the 
branding of the station to Baghdad International TV. Consequently, the 
authorities asked Al-Yasiri to start working with the editorial staff to launch the 
satellite channel.343 
Al-Yasiri said that he met the former Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, after 
three months of starting work at Baghdad Cultural TV. Saddam said that he 
appreciated the station, and that the Iraqis were in need of entertainment. Al-
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Yasiri understood that Saddam tacitly wanted the channel to report his news 
and activities, glorifying him, along with repeating programmes about him. Al-
Yasiri said that Saddam may have mentioned his desire to have a stronger 
presence on state television, because the channel made recognisable 
changes to its policy, such as a new style of news editing; now more 
professional than before, and with a diminished presence of propaganda. He 
even changed the style of songs on the station, broadcasting romantic and 
emotional songs rather than nationalist ones. Al-Yasiri attempted to make use 
of the little space of freedom he had as a director; to do something 
different.344 Al-Yasiri said that he suggested to Saddam that he allow the 
Iraqis to watch the international satellite channels, but Saddam rejected the 
proposal because he thought that by allowing the satellite channels to be 
viewed, the Iraqi people would stop watching his own stations. He added that 
the Iraqi people needed a form of ideological protection.345 
The idea of launching the first Iraqi satellite channel dominated the minds of 
Iraqi high officials after the success of launching the Alabid Missile system 
into space on 5th December 1989. The government decided to establish an 
Iraqi satellite channel, and to name it the Iraq Satellite Channel. Preparations 
for the project started, but the surrounding circumstances hindered efforts due 
to the 1990 war and the embargo. The set-up was complex, as a project like 
this required hiring a frequency on one of the satellites’ spectrums; funding a 
broadcasting station, receivers, dishes and staff who could produce the 
programmes that suited the objectives of the channel. This gave the channel 
and its content a clear Iraqi identity. In 1993, the Iraqi Ministry of Culture and 
Information tried to persuade the Arab and international communities to have 
a presence on international satellites. The Ministry contacted the 
administration of ArabSat to book space on one of its second generation 
satellites, for the Babylon Production Company that would broadcast normal 
programming and cinema. On 14th April, ArabSat gave conditional permission 
to the Iraqi government to book a channel for the Ministry of Culture and 
Information, providing Iraq booked in on the fourth satellite. The Iraqi 
government would also have to pay $2 million annually before it could start 
airing the channel’s programmes.346 Baghdad International TV was 
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established on 10th December 1996, by order number 154 which was issued 
by the Revolutionary Command Council. The order specified the channel’s 
task of producing and airing programmes to the Arab nations, and the world, 
using satellite technology. The order gave Baghdad International TV a form of 
independence in finance and administration.347 
However, all of these efforts were exerted and negotiations did not have 
tangible results, so the Iraqi satellite channel did not air. In 1996, the Iraqi 
government succeeded in booking a satellite channel on the European 
Eutelsat. The organisation agreed to offer a space for a price of $3,250 million 
a year. By the end of 1996, the preparatory works were finalised to open the 
Iraqi satellite channel through Eutelsat on Hot Bird Two. It was a new 
experience for the Iraqis, so it was full of challenges; especially from a 
technical point of view. There were compatibility issues between Iraq’s 
broadcasting technology and the world standards of telecommunication 
technology of the time, due to the heavy impact of sanctions imposed by the 
international community.348 
In 1994, Al-Yasiri had been selected to be the director of Baghdad 
International TV and had started working in this role. However, the staff faced 
a lot of challenges in booking an allocation on satellites due to the restrictions 
of the sanctions. The struggle went on until 1996, when the channel managed 
to broker a deal with NileSat to air its programmes. As a result, the channel 
prepared a pilot program plan for launching as an international channel, and 
to be able to compete in the satellite channels’ market. Al-Yasiri stated that, 
“its platform should comply with the international standards and satisfied 
interests of different sectors of audience.” Moreover, the channel was not 
targeting Iraqis inside the country, as Iraqis were banned from having dishes 
to watch satellite channels. Its broadcasting was dedicated purely to 
audiences living outside the country. “Yes, I am not denying that it (the 
channel) was to reflect the policies of the Iraqi government and the good 
[light] of Iraq, but it should satisfy the mood and the interests of the foreign 
world,” stated Al-Yasiri. These two requirements made the scale of the 
challenge become bigger and bigger. The director had to balance between 
the required standards and the directions set by those who were supervising 
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the media sector in the Iraqi government, whom in turn could not understand 
the differentiation between the Iraqi audiences and others.349 
The director recruited 145 people as staff for the channel and enrolled them 
onto a six month course, granting them professional qualifications in an 
attempt to compete with the international channels. To help the staff have a 
deep and full understanding, al-Yasiri gave them the chance to watch 
international channels inside the studios, but this step fuelled the anger of 
security officials, who were in charge of the media sector, and subsequently 
upset high-ranking government officials by breaking the rules. The 
government asked the director to stop the process of watching international 
satellite channels. The big challenge came when the channel started airing 
domestic news, and struggled with the dilemma of how to report the actions of 
Iraqi political leaders. For example, the channel received an open letter sent 
by the Iraqi Vice President, Azzat Al-Duri, to Saddam Hussein. The local 
channels used to air the whole letter in local Iraqi stations, but the director 
decided on a new direction to reflect the new policy of the channel.350 
Al-Yasiri stated, “I decided in this station just to give two lines from the letter, 
and I changed the style of the news editing, as well as ignoring some of the 
non-important news internationally.” The step generated uncomfortable 
reactions among high-ranking officials, and they expressed a desire for it to 
be like the local stations, but the director was quite sure that the channel 
would fail if it followed this policy. He decided to withdraw from the project 
before broadcasting commenced. The incident affirmed the fact that media in 
Iraq was owned and run by the Iraqi government. Its officials wanted the 
media to be the mouthpiece of their influential figures within government. 
“There were many obligatory procedures in the Iraqi media organisations, and 
every journalist knew it very well even though there was no written law 
outlining the forbidden items, but we got to know the forbidden and the 
permitted things by experience. Therefore, I could say that the journalist in 
Iraq was not working as a member of his profession, but like a governmental 
non-journalist employee.”351 
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The hardest part in the first steps of the project was providing engineering 
facilities and equipment which could provide the satellite with a signal. This 
process necessitated the construction of a fully equipped broadcast station in 
Baghdad. The Iraqi network staff managed to organise the construction 
successfully, and it worked with NileSat.352 The channel’s first day of 
broadcasting was Friday 17th July 1998, using the Egyptian satellite, which 
covered North Africa, some southern African countries, Mediterranean 
Europe, the south eastern part of the former Soviet Union, eastern Iran and 
the Arabian peninsula. The experimental broadcasting continued for three 
months, for four hours a day, from 7 to 11pm, Baghdad time. 353 
On March 10th of the following year, the channel started airing on the 
European satellite Eutelsat 2F3, on the Frequency 10984. This covered the 
east of Ireland, parts of Russia, Middle Asia, some parts of Iran and all areas 
spanning from Sweden, in the north, to Spain, in the south.354 There is no 
doubt that the Iraqi government had strong reasons for these efforts. Al-Yasiri, 
the supervisor of the project, believed the purposes could be: 
1)  “To use the space to air and spread the Iraqi media message to the 
world. 
2)  To identify Iraq as a civilised country, and to broadcast the bright image 
of  Iraq and its developments. 
3)  To link Iraqi diplomatic missions with cultural centres outside the 
country,  so as to relay Iraqi issues internationally. 
4)  To link the Iraqi community who live outside of the country with the    
 Iraqi media, informing them about current affairs in the country. 
5) To demonstrate the Iraqi government’s point of view on Arabic and 
 international issues. 
6)  To respond to the hostile media against Iraq, and to build bridges with   
 the Iraqis and Arabs outside of the country. 
7)  To promote Arabic values, singling out the Arabic cultural identity and 
   protecting its unity.”355 
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However, the aims of Iraqi television were defined by Dr Waleed Alhadeethi, 
who headed the channel after al-Yasiri, in Baghdad’s first Media National 
Conference in 2001 as the following: 
1) “To declare the Iraqi voice (governmental voice) to the world, and to give 
an objective image about the civilised developments in the country. 
2) To explain the Iraqi point of view on Arabic and international issues. 
3) To reflect the Iraqi achievement made under the embargo (sanctions) by 
producing programmes about Iraq’s accomplishments, demonstrating the Iraqi 
renaissance in spite of the embargo in the spotlight.”356 
It was obvious that the policy of the Iraqi satellite channel was not different to 
the policy of local Iraqi television. In other words, it was just a mouthpiece of 
the Iraqi government and it was another striking example of government 
intervention in the state-run media. The channel had to perform its tasks 
based on using its limited capabilities, for instance, by producing and 
broadcasting programmes and commercial advertisements, and then selling 
them for a price. 
The annual budget of Baghdad International TV came through the following 
sources: 
1)  The annual governmental grant as specified in the annual     
governmental budget. 
2)  The incomes of Baghdad International TV through its own activities. 
3)  Funds left over from the previous year and, therefore, circulating to the 
 following. 
4)  Contributions and donations in accordance with the law.357 
On 28th April 2001, airing hours reached 11 per day, and a plan was in place 
to extend this to 12 hours a day, from 5pm to 5am, on its first anniversary. On 
28th April, the channel managed to produce and air programmes 24 hours a 
day.358 By that time, the channel was able to cover the whole of the Arab 
region, Europe and America, as it was now linked to 6 satellites.359 
The channel also aired some of the programmes in other local languages. It 
started to broadcast some of its programmes in the Kurdish language, which 
reached a daily total of four hours on 13th August 2001. The Kurdish 
programmes were divided into two periods: from 12pm to 2pm, and from 
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5.30pm to 7pm.360 This step reflected the government’s desire to reach out to 
the Kurdish community in Kurdistan, which was taken out of the Iraqi 
government’s control by Anglo-Americans who created a no-fly zone haven 
for Kurds. 
3.9.2. Al-Shabab Television. 
Al-Shabab TV (The Youth) was the only private station in Iraq, but it was 
owned by Udai Saddam Hussein, the eldest son of the then Iraqi President, 
Saddam Hussein. It was launched on 1st July 1993 as the first private channel 
in Iraq. It was broadcasting films, programmes and songs, which were stolen 
from Arabic and international channels without requesting copyright 
permissions to rebroadcast them.361 
In a short time, the station became very famous and popular among the 
Iraqis. As the Iraqi government then forbade Iraqis to own satellite dishes for 
political and security reasons, Al-Shabab station was the only outlet for the 
Iraqi audience; especially when it gave them the chance to criticise 
governmental establishments and high officials. It was a big surprise because 
it was the first time the public could see public criticism of the government 
under the rule of Saddam Hussein. It was a major step in the country’s 
freedom of speech, exercising the power of the press to offer criticism of the 
government. There was a talk show called Anta Walmasaool (You and the 
Official), which put high officials on air, face to face with the audience. The 
talks were focused on displaying the complaints of Iraqis, and their criticism of 
the performance of the governmental offices.362 The station was broadcasting 
a news bulletin every hour, as well as the main news at 7pm, which contained 
political and business reports, as well as sports coverage. The station gave 
high priority to Saddam and his son’s action in its coverage and news. Al-
Shabab was sharing the coverage of Saddam’s meetings and conferences 
with the state-run Iraq TV.363 
Al-Shabab was noted for its young staff and, as well as delivering news 
bulletins, it focused on entertainment, art and cultural programmes, especially 
music based shows. When the coalition forces, which were led by America, 
launched the war against Iraq, the channel stopped its cultural programmes 
 100 
and started broadcasting coverage of the war; the national anthem; patriotic 
songs; statements by the spokesman for the military forces headquarters; 
statements by the infamous Iraqi Information Minister, Mohammed Saeed Al-
Sahaf; footage from the battlefield; related interviews with ordinary Iraqi 
people; and poets with enthusiastic words to provoke the feelings of the 
Iraqis. The channel stopped its airing when the US-led coalition forces’ air 
fighters attacked its Baghdad studios with missiles at dawn on 28th March 
2003. 364 
Faisal Al-Yasiri, who spent thirteen years working in the Iraqi media under 
Saddam, described Saddam as “a figure with [a] very profound understanding 
of the media role and its importance, but at the same time, not a good user 
and player of the media.” He attributed the drawbacks to Saddam’s inner 
circles; that were “biased and always polishing his image in front of him.”365 
As soon as the channel was established, it was intended that it would not to 
follow the protocols practiced in other Iraqi television stations, which gave first 
priority to the activities of Saddam and then other ranking figures in the 
leadership. The channel did not follow the general agenda (brain washing), 
which gave special attention to the President’s schedule and activities. 
Instead the top priority became covering the activities of the President and his 
son Udai, the head of the all-powerful Olympic commission.366 
After the Desert Fox Operation took place in December 1998, a massive re-
shuffle of the way the media covered the news was undertaken. It started 
talking about the general agenda, with three major authorities responsible for 
supervising the role of the media: 
1)  The Presidential Office. 
2)  Ministry of Culture and Information (media). 
3)  Ministry of Foreign Affairs (headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Tariq Aziz, who authorised the Iraqi ambassador in Austria, Naji al-
Hadeethy, whose  notes, outlining directions, were circulated and 
reported weekly by fax to Aziz). 
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However, new directions sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs urged for more 
emphasis on the brighter side of Iraq. This was a element that Iraqi 
television had lacked since 1991, due to the extreme focus on the Iraqi 
siege, and its severe consequences for the Iraqi people and their 
lifestyle.367 
In a related meeting held by members of this group in February 1999, Tariq 
Aziz asked the attendants to seek out wider coverage and longer hours of 
broadcasting, mainly addressing Iraqis living abroad. The step could be 
interpreted as an attempt to encourage them to return to the country, or at 
least keep them in touch with people still residing in Iraq. Thus, Mohamed al-
Said Mohsin, a presenter of an entertainment programme Tajwall 
(Wanderings), was asked to provide poems centred on a theme of 
homesickness and the sweet feelings of being at home in Iraq. In addition to 
Tajwall, Mohsin produced another set of programmes in favour of the same 
theme, such as Jisser Al-Mahaba (Bridge of Love). Once this program started 
broadcasting at 6pm, a telephone line was available for Iraqi viewers living 
abroad to call in, in order to send their regards and wishes to their relatives 
and friends inside the country. The programme was shown around the same 
time of day as Tallola Iraqiya (Iraqi Vigil). This programme featured influential 
Iraqis, from athletes, to singers and artists, who might leave a mark on Iraqis 
living abroad. In addition to that, scenes of picturesque greenery were added 
as backgrounds to the programme, to pass the message that Iraq, and 
especially Bagdad, was doing well and looked beautiful. The two hour show 
was broadcasted late at night, from 12am to 2am, taking into consideration 
the difference in time for Iraqis living in Europe and North America. However, 
telephone calls were monitored for security reasons.368 
Mohsin stated that “the telephone calls we received were not aired live. All 
calls had to go through a security check process. Calls were first received by 
the telephone section, which then put each one under an editing process. 
After the editing process was over, we faced a challenging task to air those 
telephone calls as if we had received them live.” Iraqi journalism has suffered 
greatly for many years. Distractions from their work, as well as traumatic 
experiences, left journalists believing that these oral directions were rules and 
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laws that must not be broken. For instance, the Minister of Information, 
Mohammed Saed Al-Sahaf, tried to break the rules by giving more freedom to 
the staff of Baghdad International TV. He met the staff and told them that the 
Ministry would issue punishment only once the work had been submitted. The 
statement offered a little relief from the former policy, which allowed for 
punishment to be issued to journalists before work had even been completed. 
This ludicrous policy allowed for journalists to be abused for nothing more 
than unsubstantiated claims that they fell short of their duties in their work. He 
said, “so Al-Sahaf said you have the right to think freely, but keep in your 
considerations the rules and consequences.” However, this space allowed for 
journalistic freedom, but did not rule out the concerns of the journalists 
themselves upon whose minds the government had left unforgettable marks. 
“We, as journalists, could not get rid of our fears, and what we used to do 
[following] the directions due to the fear factor, [when considering] what...cruel 
punishments [we saw] against some of our colleagues in the media sector.” 
369 
Conclusion. 
The Iraqi media faced big challenges from the first day of its creation, with the 
political and military leaders always trying to use it to serve their own 
agendas. Especially under Saddam, the media became solely a propaganda 
tool in the hands of the government, rather than a collection of independent 
journalistic organisations. The regime controlled it with in an iron hand and 
punished any journalist who tried to work professionally. Thus the practice of 
the freedom of speech or professionalism became a crime which could cost 
the journalist his or her life. The Iraqis got used to this governmental policy 
over the years, and using the media as a propaganda tool became common 
practice among the Iraqi journalists working inside Iraq. So independence was 
far from the journalists’ knowledge, understanding, ethics and practices, 
whereas the fear of punishment was very present in the minds of Iraqi 
journalists. This controlled the performance of all journalists and made them 
like any other governmental employee. 
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4. Chapter Four: Al-Iraqiyah Television Channel. 
Introduction. 
As I wrote in the previous chapter, the Iraqi media struggled for decades 
under the control of the governments and got used to being used as a vehicle 
to serve the politicians’ agendas. But the needs or the voice of the Iraqis as a 
population did not exist in the Iraqi media at that time. Many professionals 
saw some hope and light in the US invasion, and looked at the war as the 
saviour of the Iraqi media. Such hopes were the result of US promises to build 
up a free and independent media after toppling Saddam’s regime. But those 
promises were not fulfilled.  Experts pointed out that the American plan for the 
policy and development of Iraq’s media after the invasion has been poor. The 
goal of the US Department was to create an independent channel based on 
western examples, such as the BBC or PBS.370 Interviews conducted to 
examine the details of the channel’s development revealed that the US 
administration was floundering with regard to the required content, and 
personalities who would run the institution. It was the American administration 
themselves who stipulated that the structure of the new Iraqi media project, 
called Iraqi Media Network (IMN), be established in January 2003. The 
operation was led by Bob Reilly and Mike Furlong. Reilly was a former 
director of Voice of America and an outspoken, right-wing ideologue, who 
began his public career in the 1980s as a propagandist in the White House for 
the Nicaraguan contras. Mike Furlong was a Defence Department contractor 
who worked on broadcasting issues in post-war Kosovo. The US government 
confirmed a budget for the project of $15 million in February, a month before 
launching the war.371 
4.1. The US Administration’s Preplanning of the Post-War Stage. 
This ‘concept’ was planned by the Pentagon in January 2003; less than two 
months before the war began. On the other hand, the Pentagon had hired the 
SAIC to run a secret ‘government in exile’, of Iraqis and Americans in Virginia, 
to compose a plan to run the country in the eventuality that Saddam Hussein 
would be ousted. The SAIC quickly formed a committee of five exiled Iraqis to 
plan this new media outlet.372 Ahmed al-Rikabi. Al-Iraqiyah’s first director, 
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agreed with this statement. However, he said that the saga of the new 
channel went back to an earlier time. The Swedish and UK-educated 
journalist, Al-Rikabi, a son of the Iraqi Islamic opposition figure, Hussein al-
Rikabi, was asked about his plan in the event that Saddam Hussein’s regime 
was toppled. He went on to say that the project was proposed in an indirect 
way during a symposium over post-Saddam Iraq, organised by the US 
Secretary Department. Al-Rikabi felt that most of the involved personalities 
were from the US Intelligence Service.373 
Al-Rikabi, who was already a strong supporter of the war, had experience with 
the Americans due to his job before the war as the London bureau chief of Al-
Iraq Alhor Radio (Free Iraq); an arm of the US-funded Radio Free Europe. In 
addition, throughout the year of 2002, he was a secret contributor in the 
media subgroup of the post-war planning team under Richard Warrick, the US 
State Department official, “whose detailed report on how to run post-war Iraqi 
media was junked under Pentagon influence. The first CPA head, Jay Garner, 
revealed much later in a BBC interview, that he had been ordered by the US 
Defence Department not to have [Warrick] on his staff. ‘I had a vision of an 
Iraqi BBC; state owned, but editorially independent and objective,’ he said.”374 
In February 2003, Rikabi was summoned to Fort Bragg, in the US, from 
London. After a gloomy delay in which no one seemed to notice his presence, 
he said he was suddenly told as chief-designate of the new US-backed Iraqi 
Media Network, that the invasion was happening in two weeks and that 
without telling anyone why it was so urgent, he should assemble a small team 
of broadcasters - mainly from Detroit's Iraqi community - to fly to the Gulf.375 
Nevertheless, Al-Rikabi was called in February 2003 and told to take a US-
bound flight immediately. He could not understand the American decision, and 
his hopes of ousting Hussein’s regime had faded due to the many previously 
discussed projects. Al-Rikabi met with high-level intelligence and army 
figures, and was told that the war against Saddam’s regime would be 
launched in two weeks and that he had to start the creation of the channel. He 
was told to stay in the United States and to look for potential staff for the 
channel, mostly from a pool of Iraqi exiles living in the States. The search was 
drawn from a small pool, concentrated particularly in Detroit, where many 
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Iraqis live, and Canada. At a later stage, he was also permitted to contact 
certain Iraqi media professionals living as European exiles.376 
The limitations on the times and places for the search complicated Al-Rikabi’s 
task, and precipitated failure in selecting sufficiently qualified media workers. 
The recruitment and selection was undertaken by a US firm, and the 
advertisements for the jobs appealed to future linguists with an understanding 
of Iraq. Al-Rikabi, who had no information about the qualifications of Iraqis 
who worked in media organs before, chose a number of applicants whose 
resumes showed some previous experience, whatever it was, in journalism.377 
A prime example of the lack of professionalism within the organisation’s staff, 
would be the case of a presenter of the morning news show, Under the Statue 
of Liberation, Wajeeh Abbas, who greeted the nation with words that translate 
as ‘Morning of Penis’, which phonetically is very similar to the usual greeting 
of good morning.378 An interview with a journalist, who would like to remain 
anonymous for reasons of security, describes a conversation between 
Wajeeh Abbas and a colleague, prior to the blunder, in which Abbas was bet 
an amount of $100 if he would say the offending line. Professor Muaid Al-
Khafaaf, a specialist of ethics and the history of Iraqi media, stated that the 
behaviour of Abbas is completely unprecedented, even in items such as 
political cartoons, which would often portray figures as animals in order not to 
violate the understanding that foul speech is not suitable for human beings. 
Al-Khafeef elaborated that the incident reflects the low standards of ethics and 
professionalism of Al-Iraqiyah.379 
4.2. The development of a New Media Landscape. 
Al-Iraqiyah television, formerly known as the Iraqi Media Network (IMN), 
began transmission on 13th May 2003. The channel, which started solely as a 
terrestrial one, is now available on different channels in 26 major cities and 
towns across Iraq. It is received in Baghdad on VHF channels one, seven, 
and nine, and UHF channels 37 and 67. It is also received via the Arabsat, 
Nilesat and Hotbird satellites. It now broadcasts 24-hours a day.380 
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The history of the channel involves a ferocious battle during the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003. This conflict over the management and control of Al-Iraqiyah’s 
broadcasting content has extended to the present time. The content the 
channel broadcasts has played a major role in exacerbating the post-war 
media landscape, which has already been afflicted with sectarianism and 
political limitations. The burgeoning Iraqi media was blossoming after the war. 
However, it still had a number of flaws that had affected its performance 
previously.381 The explosion of numerous media outlets in Iraq after 2003 was 
a positive development. Yet there have been costs to the country that are still 
being paid today. The new media organs are controlled by religious and 
ethnic political parties, as well as influential religious, political and business 
leaders, who make use of the media to serve particular agendas or promote 
their beliefs. This was, in some way, different from America’s promise to the 
Iraqis, to create independent, professional journalism, which would promote 
the Iraqi public‘s interests rather than that of governmental or political 
bodies.382 
The development of Al-Iraqiyah experienced ups and downs and a number of 
managerial changes. To elucidate these pivotal stages, one needs to look at 
Al-Iraqiyah’s chronological progress; from a group of fledging media outlets 
used for propaganda during the war, to an established channel, whose 
management was directed either by the Prime Minister or the Parliament in 
the earliest political step. The American plan was criticised from the very 
beginning, when it gave the contract to the SAIC, as experts believed that it 
had zero experience in operating either a television or radio station. The 
SAIC’s directors, who were either previous CIA, military or FBI top brass, 
perhaps managed to convince the US administration that it had enough 
experience in military media management.383 The company website shows a 
nine point programme of "Information Dominance/Command and Control", 
starting with “Battlefield Control” and ending with “Information 
Warfare/Operations.”384 
“Intelligence experts say that it is the largest recipient of contracts from the 
National Security Agency, and one of the top five contractors to the Central 
Intelligence Agency; two of the top spy agencies in the United States”.385 The 
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original programme of the company for Iraq stressed the need to muster up a 
revolt by the Iraqi people against Saddam’s regime. As the Iraqi opposition 
was divided along ethno-sectarian and political lines, the idea of establishing 
an effective media outlet to compete with the Saddam-run channels was 
unlikely to bear fruit. The overseas broadcasts of the Prague-based Free Iraq, 
and the US-funded, Radio Sawa, were not received well; at least not well 
enough to win the hearts and minds of debilitated people living under 
draconian international sanctions.386 Moreover, the Iraqi people had not been 
offered incentives to rise against Saddam while America suffered from a 
credibility gap. Memories of what happened during the 1991 uprising ran 
deep. People were afraid of being betrayed again and nothing that had 
happened since the uprising had gone towards restoring their faith in America. 
The United States had not told Iraqis of any concrete steps in support of 
democracy.387 The US administration delayed the announcement of its plan to 
establish a provisional media network that could counter and supersede 
Saddam’s media network during the war, as an attempt to keep the timetable 
of their military operations secret from Saddam’s regime. The key members of 
its staff, who were recruited from the pool of United States and European 
exiles for the new network, did not even understand the specifics of the jobs 
they were hired for; this was still the case when the work was due to start.388 
During the first days of the war, Al-Rikaby moved to Kuwait with a small team 
to start the task of launching their journalistic work hand in hand with the US 
military operation. The team successfully made some irregular news 
programmes for broadcast through a transmitter in Umm Qasr. Then, Al-
Rikabi moved very quickly to Basra with his team, because the Kuwaiti 
government felt embarrassed about being involved in the war against Iraq by 
launching such a media operation from its own lands. A few days later, the 
team were moved to Baghdad's airport, supposedly under US control, 
although still under regular attack from the Iraqi forces. They were flown in by 
US forces in time to make the first radio transmission from a small tent at the 
airport. The infant station’s first words reached the public through the airways 
on 9th April 2003, declaring; "Welcome to the new Iraq. Welcome to an Iraq 
without Saddam, Uday or Qusay.”389 
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It seemed the American-led forces preferred to adopt the normal approach of 
putting the existing stations out of service, and then air over their frequencies 
through a commander solo aircraft spinning over Baghdad and the rest of 
Iraq.390 
However, Al-Rikabi, who was contacted by the Americans, and was later 
appointed as the director of the first Iraqi Media Network, pointed out that the 
pilots of the American jet fighters ignored his notifications regarding the 
locations of the network’s broadcasting stations, in order to avoid harming 
them in their efforts to bomb targets, including Saddam’s statue. “I requested 
that the US army ensure that the broadcasting stations, buildings and facilities 
were not harmed, so that we could make use of them at a later stage, and 
recommended for them to take down Saddam’s statues. Instead, they 
demolished all the stations and their facilities, and left Saddam’s statues 
untouched,” Al-Rikabi stated.391 Moreover, the lack of information from the US 
army on Iraqi media, along with its weak post-war planning, put an end to the 
rest of the untouched media facilities and infrastructure. The facilities, which 
were left unguarded, were exposed to massive looting, which swept the 
country immediately after the downfall of the Saddam regime. As well as the 
destruction of broadcasting facilities, these circumstances caused the trashing 
of video libraries and the laying to waste of studios. There was nothing left of 
these buildings except the walls. The biggest losses were the libraries (Iraq’s 
storehouses of knowledge).392 
4.3. The Iraqi Media Network (IMN) in Operation. 
Iraqi staff, who were keen on showing the fruits of the new media scene, 
managed to put Al-Iraqiyah station on the air on 13th May 2003. Al-Sabah 
newspaper, another CPA and SAIC product, published its first issue on 15th 
May 2003.393 This moment was warmly received by the Iraqis, who were 
looking forward to new, free, engaging and professional media after 35 years 
of state-run broadcasting. The Iraqis were hoping that the new media would 
create a healthy environment to reconstruct the country and to build the future 
state.394 
The launching of the broadcasting service called Towards Freedom was a 
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failure for various reasons. The service allowed unprofessional procedures to 
abound, including flaws in management. Part of the failure lay in the decision 
to carry programmes produced by US channels that were formulated to suit 
the taste of the US audience. For example, Al-Iraqiyah carried programmes 
from ABC or NBC’s Nightly News, as well as a two-hour feed produced in the 
United Kingdom, which was sent by satellite to Washington to be reviewed, 
then from Washington to Kuwait for post-production, and, finally, to the 
commander solo for broadcast in Iraq.395 
In May 2003, the appointed US administrator of Iraq, retired Lt. General Jay 
Garner, expressed explicitly his disappointment with the lack of progress 
made in establishing a television and radio broadcast system for Iraq: “We 
have not done a good job…I want TV going to the people with a soft 
demeanour; programmes they want to see.”396 Garner’s suffering did not last 
for a long time. He was replaced by L. Paul Bremer III, as the ruling Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) on 6th May 2003, in a move described as 
transferring the administration of Iraq into the hands of a diplomat from the 
State Department, instead of a military general.397 
4.4. Iraqi Media during the Paul Bremer period. 
One of the harshest orders given by Bremer was “Order 2”, which disbanded 
the former Ministry of Culture and Information to which all Iraqi journalists 
belonged, as they all worked in state-run journalistic institutions.398 The order 
was a blow to many Iraqi journalists who thought that the new changes would 
bring freedom, transparency and professionalism to their institutions.399 As the 
new administrator, Al-Rikabi took a number of steps to have the IMN’s 
performance resemble that of the BBC and PBS. He had asked the SAIC, 
which was hired by the US Defence Contracting Command, to lay out a plan 
for a 24-hour news channel, a sports channel and two FM radio stations, 
along with Al-Sabah newspaper. The contractor failed in its task to provide the 
desired results. Moreover, a sudden financial crisis hit the network despite the 
fact that the IMN at that time was the most expensive US government media 
project in history, with estimated running costs of $4 million a month. This 
forced IMN to take austere measures, so that there were no funds for basic 
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equipment, such as camera batteries, tripods or editing apparatus. A request 
for a Reuter’s subscription, which would cost $500, was turned down.400 
The financial shortage pushed staff to practise piracy and violation of 
copyright. Dan North, the CPA-appointed director, reminisced about these 
difficult conditions, saying that a “lack of planning for programme production 
or acquisition resulted in illegal airing of copyrighted European and Hollywood 
film tapes, confiscated from the mansion of Saddam's son, Uday.”401 North 
also pointed out that the IMN staff were  ordered to cover endless daily CPA 
news conferences, interviews and photo opportunities, leaving little time and 
few facilities to cover genuine news stories by IMN reporters on the street.”402 
The occupying authority told Al-Iraqi staff to stop doing ‘man-on-the-street 
interviews’ because some of them were too critical of the American presence 
in Iraq. The authorities also asked them to stop including readings of the 
Koran as part of cultural programming. The Iraqi audience considered these 
steps as the introduction of an intentional campaign targeting their Islamic 
heritage, while US officials were uninformed about the serious implications of 
their procedures. All these decisions should lie with the Iraqis, Don North later 
told the Washington Post; "this is the last thing I want to do; tell them whether 
they can have their Koran or not."403 
Iraqi viewers were hoping to forget the imposed routine of programmes, which 
included Egyptian soap operas and Saddam's long speeches, but these 
hopes came in contradiction with the Pentagon’s first goal after occupying 
Saddam’s TV studios, which was to broadcast pro-American shows on Iraqi 
airwaves.404 So they switched Saddam’s long speeches with translated 
speeches by administrator Paul Bremer. It seems that part of the problem was 
that Al-Iraqiya was run by the Pentagon, not the State Dept. or the 
Broadcasting Board of Governors; the Pentagon, being an independent 
federal agency which supervises all US international, non-military 
broadcasting, including Voice of America (VOA).405 It was believed by 
professional Iraqi journalists that the Americans were not interested in 
professional Iraqi journalism, and that all the calls for improving working 
conditions made by the IMN members were turned down. Even when IMN 
staff twice went on strike for higher wages, they were told, in effect, to either 
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accept it or leave. The CPA paid the IMN staff low wages based on the same 
standards of the old Ministry of Information (under Saddam Hussein), which 
offered a reporter the equivalent of 120 US dollars a month. As a result, some 
staff members had already quit working under the IMN to join with foreign 
agencies, TV stations or newspapers that paid better salaries.406 
The SIAC had put forward tens of millions of US dollars for the construction of 
one broadcast studio. Ahmed Bin Afif, a specialised engineer of broadcast 
facilities, commented that, “even today, a fully equipped, state-of-the-art 
broadcast studio would not cost more than 3 million dollars. Therefore this 
makes one wonder where the substantial finances received from the SIAC 
had been spent.” Simon Haselock, the British representative in the new Iraqi 
media project, said that SIAC spent tens of millions of US dollars, but the 
problem was that the quality of the broadcasts did not reflect the investment. 
He said, “I wouldn’t deny that SIAC delivered high quality equipment, but the 
standards of the productions were far below international standards.”407 
Al-Rikaby was partly dependent on the skills of some Saddam-era journalists, 
but he was determined to keep well-known TV faces off the screen until the 
network's editorial values were firmly established. Al-Rikaby spoke proudly of 
experiences in which he managed to turn those journalists of the former era 
into accomplished journalists, who could understand perfectly the editorial 
lines of the new policies.408 
The Iraqi journalists from Saddam’s era who worked within the IMN believed 
that Al-Rikaby had a negative attitude and felt hostile toward them, regardless 
of IMN’s ethos of professionalism. As he called one member of staff, Ziad 
Tariq, who held a PhD in media studies, Al-Rikaby asked him mockingly, 
“What was your topic about? Was it about Saddam or the Baath party?” Ziad 
answered him saying that he finished his PhD after 2003. Immediately Al-
Rikaby punched him in public and fired him. There were many motivations 
behind the concerns of seasoned journalists. One of them was a fear of local 
Iraqis who worked closely with the American troops, as they felt that they 
could steal their positions. Also, the exiled journalists returned to the country 
with a feeling of revenge for everything that had happened to Iraq.409 There 
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were many journalists who had worked for the Iraqi media under Saddam, 
and it would be wrong to assume that they all automatically lacked 
professionalism, although it seems that this was a widely held opinion at the 
time. After the 2003 invasion, most of them had started working for 
international news agencies, television stations and newspapers, and they are 
still doing well for themselves. It would be wrong to blame them for the failure 
of the American media projects in Iraq.410 
North saw how the Pentagon’s control over Al-Iraqiya made things even 
worse. The CPA’s original plans for IMN were more interested in managing 
news for both Iraqis and Americans. It was an attempt to send messages to 
both US managers, and to Iraqi viewers, about the nature of broadcast items. 
Although “the United States has a responsibility to effectively explain its 
positions and policies to Iraqis, to Americans and to the world, it does not 
warrant them to make IMN play a double role or to be turned into another 
Voice of America. Through a combination of incompetence and indifference, 
CPA has destroyed the fragile credibility of IMN.”411 
Iraqis were already upset that they experienced a lack of safety in every 
waking moment of their lives, and they did not have the basics for a standard 
quality of life. It would take over three hours waiting in a queue to buy a tank 
of gasoline, and electricity had not been restored to many homes. Even so, 
there were high hopes that the Americans would manage to at least deliver 
interesting television entertainment and reasonably honest news, which could 
compete with the Arab language television stations like Al-Jazeera.412 Seven 
months later, like so many of the goals and hopes for the new Iraq, a credible 
media landscape had not been realised. The failure to establish television that 
was “accountable to the society” was strongly felt. Instead, the IMN had 
become “an irrelevant mouthpiece for Coalition Provisional Authority 
propaganda, [managing] news and mediocre programmes.”413 
The resentment led the once-enthusiastic Don North to leave the most 
interesting job of his career. At about the same time that North resigned, the 
anchor of the new Iraqi broadcasts, Ahmed Al-Rikabi, also quit his job. "The 
people of Iraq, including the Sunni Muslims, are not about to turn against their 
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liberators, but they are being incited to do so. These channels contribute to 
tension within Iraq. You need television at their level.”414 Ahmad Al Rikaby, 
proudly told Baghdad Bulletin, “I opened my eyes to a family who were 
fighting Saddam Hussein and became part of this fight...I always wanted to 
speak freely in Iraq but never had a chance to do so. The project of creating 
free media in Iraq is an honour, a dream.” 415 
4.4.1. The Attempts to Protect the Media’s Integrity with Legislation. 
Not only Iraqis, but also international bodies and NGO’s helping Iraqis to lay 
out a suitable media policy, were prevented by America’s behaviour. It had 
unleashed a new conflict between two participants, described, in the period 
from summer 2003 to March 2004, as a typical conflict between American and 
British views. Both the United Kingdom and the United States saw 
broadcasting and media through the prism of their own experiences or 
influential ideologies. It seems that due to the chaos and violence which were 
overwhelming and affecting the shaping of policies, the US seemed to prefer 
independent players, while the UK looked for a strong public service version 
of Iraq’s state broadcaster.416 
The UK was represented by the Media Development Team (MDT), 
established by Simon Haselock, a British retired Royal Marine who served as 
spokesperson for the Office of High Representatives in Bosnia, and a key 
media policy maker there. He then assumed the position of Temporary Media 
Commissioner in Kosovo. He was perhaps the most qualified expert in the 
field of post-conflict media, as he was working under circumstances involving 
both international governmental organisations and media development for 
conflict zones.417 
As the UN recognised that the fall of Saddam Hussein “removed a 
government that preyed on the Iraqi people and committed shocking, 
systematic and criminal violations of human rights,” journalists were not 
protected from mistreatment. Since April 2003, the condition of the media 
sector and human rights has improved in some areas, but worsened in many 
more.418 Haselock said that he was contacted by the UNESCO official in April 
2003 to draft a plan to help Iraq establish a public media network. He pointed 
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out that the discussion with international figures and officials took him to Cairo 
and a number of European capitals to make use of previous experiences in 
similar war-affected countries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina.419 
The MDT manager’s involvement set him on a collision course with the US 
administrators. However, Haselock had managed to informally convince Paul 
Bremer of the importance of creating an interim licensing system to control the 
Iraqi airwaves. The MDT broadly saw the system as a regulator, based on 
Britain’s Ofcom, to license all channels using Iraqi airwaves through 
consultation with the Iraqi Governing Council. The discussions and challenges 
on the ground had raised some questions: should the body have jurisdiction 
over all telecommunications and broadcasting, or over broadcasting only? 
Should the Iraqi Media Network become privatised or licensed? The right 
answers to these questions should help to develop an independent media in 
Iraq, not a controlled one.420 
The background of the American occupation which was seen by many as 
illegitimate, along with an arrogant approach by the American administration, 
intensified the conflict between NGO’s and US officials in Iraq. This conflict 
came to a head at the Athens Conference, held in June 2003 to help establish 
Iraqi media institutions. Although the NGOs participating in the conference 
called for opening direct and free venues to facilitate the easy exchange of 
ideas between Iraqi journalists themselves, it also opened the gates for them 
to be in touch with other journalists around the globe. This was considered to 
be an attempt to make a kind of marriage between their experiences, helping 
the Iraqi journalists develop their own capabilities.421 
The conference approved a framework document for the improvement of the 
Iraqi media, known as the Athens Framework, which was widely approved by 
leading international media development organisations, including UNESCO 
and the European Union. This framework document recommended that the 
Iraqi authorities “should establish an independent broadcasting regulator and 
public service broadcaster. It also advised to look for ways to enact a 
legislation and regulation for doing so.”422 However, the view of NGO’s varied 
regarding involvement with the Americans. Key NGO’s opposing the 
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American occupation decided to reduce their presence and operations in Iraq, 
or to work largely from outside in order to avoid any involvement. While some 
would have been more willing to engage if the State Department and USAID 
had been in charge, they were unwilling to cooperate with the Department of 
Defence. It was a significant move by civil society, but unfortunately, it 
damaged the Iraqi media more than it affected the US stance on invading 
Iraq.423 It was obvious that the Athens Conference lacked the presence of 
Iraqis, especially those who were working in the field inside the country itself. 
This was partly because Iraqis had no passports at that time, or were confined 
to the US fortified Green Zone. The only Iraqi Governing Council was busy 
finding ways to legitimise its presence, and had offered no point of view 
regarding broadcasting policy.424 
The coordination brought two important laws, namely, Order 65 and 66. Order 
65 ordered the formation of the Communication and Media Commission 
(CMC), consisting of nine commissioners, and the power was to be laid in the 
hand of the Chief Executive Officer. Despite the fact that the Iraqi members 
were given the freedom to discuss the issues and draw the criteria of 
regulation, the body borrowed certain provisions from previous similar policies 
endorsed in Kosovo; notably, the role of the board being to deal with appeals 
independently. Nevertheless, Haselock defended the steps, saying, “they 
were made purely at the hands of Iraqis and not inserting an international 
judge, and Order 66 created a new governing entity called ‘public service 
broadcaster’, which controls the streaming of broadcasting in the Iraqi 
airwave.”425 The testing time for the two orders came in November 2003, 
when the US appointed an Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) and shut down the 
Doha-based channel al-Jazeera, and the Saudi-owned channel al-Arabiyah, 
for "inciting violence" by broadcasting a voice said to belong to Saddam 
Hussein. The US Department of State approved the temporary closure, but 
groups advocating freedom of press were enraged by it. In early December, 
the Iraqi Governing Council (IGS) closed the Baghdad office of al-Arabiyah in 
a controversial move that sparked charges of outright censorship. The 
channel was closed under a charge of “inciting violence” after it aired an audio 
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tape purporting to be from Saddam Hussein, calling for attacks against the 
US-led coalition and Iraqi authorities.426 
In the tape, broadcast on 16th November, the speaker told Iraqis that the “road 
to Jihad and resistance” is the only one to make the “armies of the unjust 
occupation leave our country.” The voice criticised Iraqis who were 
cooperating with coalition forces, calling them “stray dogs that walk alongside 
the caravan.”427 IGC members lashed out at the channel’s decision to air the 
tape, the content of which was also broadcast on numerous other channels in 
the Arab world and abroad. “Al-Arabiyah channel incites murder because it is 
calling for killings through the voice of Saddam Hussein” said Jalal Talabani, a 
member of the IGC and the current Iraqi President. On the ground, about 20 
Iraqi police officers raided al-Arabiyah’s offices in Baghdad, making lists of 
equipment to be seized if the channel continued to report from Baghdad. 
“Officers, who carried out an order from the IGC told the employees they 
would be fined $1,000 and imprisoned for a year for each violation. But police 
had told the correspondents that the council might reconsider its decision if 
the news channel writes a letter pledging never to encourage terrorism,” said 
Ali al-Khatib, a correspondent who was later killed by US forces while filming 
a bombing.428 
 
4.4.2. Discord between the Americans and Arabic Satellite Channels. 
There was tension between the Arab satellite channels, the US-led coalition 
and the IGC during the very beginning of the war on Iraq. During the fighting 
in April 2003, the offices of Al-Jazeera were bombed by US warplanes. The 
CPA and the IGC had, on several occasions, lashed out at the channels and 
banned broadcasters Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiyah from attending press 
conferences and events.429 The US State Department defended the ban order 
and its then spokesman, Richard Boucher, said their aim was to try “to avoid a 
situation where these media [organisations] are used as a channel for 
incitement, for inflammatory statements and for statements and actions that 
harm the security of the people who live and work in Baghdad, including 
citizens themselves.”430 The American media project in Baghdad (represented 
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by Al-Iraqiyah) was on air at that time and the Americans, along with the IGC, 
tried to use it as a weapon to fight Arab channels in Iraq. However, to concoct 
such a plan was to be divorced from reality, since the professional 
performance of Al-Iraqiya was not comparable with that of Al-Jazeera and Al-
Arabiyah431 
Unlike Americans, who branded both networks "violently anti-coalition”, Iraqis 
who possessed satellite dishes at that time considered Al-Iraqiyah as “stodgy 
and slow on breaking news, and they [preferred] Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiyah; 
the flashy Gulf-based stations where anti-American fighters are branded 
resisters.”432 An October study by the US Department of State showed the 
Arab channels gaining ratings over Al-Iraqiyah. It said 63 percent of Iraqis with 
access to a satellite dish got their news from Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiyah, and 
only 12 percent watched Al-Iraqiya.433 Shamin Rassam, an Iraqi-American 
director and well-known broadcaster for Hussein's media before leaving Iraq 
in exile in 1990, said there was no doubt that IMN’s audience would rise. She 
defended IMN’s programming against accusations of being a propaganda 
channel, saying that after 30 years under Saddam, Iraqis must learn to shed 
their scepticism of official state television. She also said that the spread of 
satellite dishes meant that competition was to be expected.434 
4.4.3. IMN’s Competition with the Arabic Satellite Channels. 
Rassam said that besides giving Iraqis access to a source of news and 
information, IMN acts as a balanced media organisation to counter the 
“extreme anti-American bias on Arabic satellite news channels.” She added 
that her station, Al-Iraqiyah, “is an outlet for people who want to know what 
the US civil administration is really accomplishing and how its plans for Iraq's 
reconstruction are progressing.”435 Yet even the Pentagon appeared to have 
realised that their goals of establishing an active television network, funded by 
the military, had failed, and that the SAIC had done a bad job. Consequently, 
it looked for better alternatives that could communicate the American 
message to the Iraqi and Arab people.436 The Bush administration treated the 
Arab public as “either an enemy to be defeated in a war of ideas, or an object 
to be manipulated (via public relations). Between the failure of Al-Iraqiyah and 
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their harsh attacks on the Arab media channels, they decided to launch an 
Arabic satellite television station called Al-Hurra (The Liberal), to have a 
controllable voice in the Arab sphere.”437 It seems that they found the solution 
to their problems in establishing a direct US-backed television channel, Al-
Hurra, similar to previous radio projects. 
“We will be on two fronts,” Norman J. Pattiz, chairman of the Broadcasting 
Board of Governors’ (BBG) Middle East committee, told TV Week recently; 
“we will be on satellite across the Middle East, but [we] will also provide a 
targeted product that will be available terrestrially only within Iraq, which will 
focus on Iraq.” The BBG’s main offices are based in Springfield, Virginia. It 
also has a broadcast centre in Dubai and news bureaus in Amman, Cairo, 
Kuwait City, Baghdad and Jerusalem.438 However, the establishment of the 
Al-Hurra project did not wipe Al-Iraqiyah from existence. December 2003 was 
the time for the American administration to finish its contract with the SAIC 
and to find an alternative contractor.439 
4.4.4. The American’s Recruitment of Harris Corp. 
The bidding ended with the selection of Harris Corp. to run the project with a 
total cost of $165 million. Harris Corp. then subcontracted the work to the 
Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) and Al-Fawares; a 
telecommunications company based in Kuwait.440 Management of the project, 
including installing the infrastructure, was assigned to the American company, 
Harris, while the Lebanese took responsibility of training media personalities, 
and programming the radio and television networks. Al-Fawares took on the 
role of operating and managing the Al-Sabaah daily newspaper.441 
Many of the Iraqi Journalists, who were involved in the IMN, believed that 
changing the company would not fix the problem. Besides that, Harris 
specialised in designing, manufacturing and installing communications 
equipment and infrastructure, and whose limited experience in the media 
industry would not be sufficient to run a television channel in a war zone like 
Iraq. This worsened the disorder which was caused by the SAIC’s mistakes 
during the previous contract.442 In contrast, a Harris spokesman, Tom 
Hausman, insisted in an interview with Orlando Business Journal that Harris 
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was the right company for the job: “Harris is very experienced in large 
communications integration projects. We've done significant projects 
worldwide. We know broadcast equipment and how to integrate it.” Also, there 
were some concerns about the contract process, as the Defence Contracting 
Command had no competitive bidding process when it tendered its initial 
twenty four contracts.443 
“The process of awarding government contracts has a number of flaws...and 
the process itself is political,” explains Steve Weiss, Communications Director 
for the Centre for Responsive Politics. “It doesn't necessarily result in the best 
company getting the contract all of the time.”444 However, looking into the 
campaign contribution records of the Republican Party, one can find some 
sort of explanation, especially when one discovers that Harris is a strong 
supporter of the Republican party. For instance, Harris donated $263,570 in 
the 2004 election to GOP political action committees and candidates.445 “You 
could see how the government would write a contract that would be more 
easily won by a technology and equipment company than a media company,” 
explained Kelly McBride, the ethics group leader for the Tampa-based 
Poynter Institute. “But it doesn't make a lot of sense for a tech company to be 
running a media network.”446 The same official ignored the fact that there 
were problems with the new management, and its perception of the needs 
and the tastes of Iraqi viewers and readers. Although the programmes under 
the new administration had improved, they consisted of mainly entertainment 
programmes that were irrelevant to daily life in Iraq. The programmes featured 
presenters speaking Arabic but with a Lebanese accent, which alienated most 
viewers and increased criticism of the network. Al-Iraqiyah also turned into a 
podium for Paul Bremer’s weekly speeches, which built up the image of the 
station being a puppet for occupying coalition authorities.447 
Al-Iraqiyah’s performance did not live up to that of the many regional Arab 
channels vying for control of the free sphere in Iraq. The channel was 
increasingly losing ground as attacks against Americans were increasing, and 
resentment amongst the Iraqi people ran deep. It became clear that the hopes 
pinned by the American authorities on the new operator seemed unattainable, 
and were marred by chaos and financial irregularities.448 The results became 
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clearer in April when US forces shut down the Al-Hawza newspaper; the 
mouthpiece of the Sadrist movement that was an opposition group loyal to the 
firebrand Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. The occupation authorities accused 
Al-Hawza of propagating lies that incited violence against the coalition forces. 
On the other hand, thousands of outraged Iraqis protested against the closing 
of the paper, and considered it an act of American hypocrisy and censorship 
of the media, laying bare the hostilities many felt towards the United States a 
year after the invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein.449 The shutting down of 
the newspaper showed the dilemma which the Americans faced while trying 
to achieve a balance between two of their main objectives - promoting 
democracy and sustaining stability.450 
4.4.5. Continuing the Legacy of Censorship. 
Al-Hawza newspaper was charged by Iraqi journalists of publishing rumours, 
especially ones of anti-American sentiment. The paper was considered to be 
a mouthpiece for the young Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and it was the most 
critical publication of the Americans. The order to close the paper was signed 
by L. Paul Bremer III, the head of the CPA in Iraq, who cited several examples 
of its false reports, including a piece of news that said, “the cause of an 
explosion that killed more than 50 Iraqi police recruits was not a car bomb, as 
occupation officials had said, but an American missile.”451 The American 
administrator’s decision was based on the CPA Order 14, which was an 
attempt to control any messages inciting violence or disorder. The Order gave 
the justification for severe governmental sanctions, including up to one year in 
prison and fines of up to $1,000. For media standards and international law, 
“Order 14 is problematic for a number of reasons: it fails to define ‘incitement’ 
so that it meets generally-accepted international standards. It allows the 
government to impose sanctions directly on the media. It does not establish 
fair enforcement procedures, nor does it guarantee adequate due processes 
protections for press organisations, and it included the sanctioning of 
imprisonment.”452 In a bid to ease the crisis, the American military authorities 
said Al-Hawza could reopen in sixty days. However, the paper's staff said 
they had lost their jobs.. The American practice in Iraq was considered to be 
one of basic irony by the Vice Chairman of the Committee of Concerned 
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Journalists, Tom Rosenstiel, a non-profit organisation based in Washington, 
who said, “If you're trying to promote democracy in a country that has never 
had it, you have to lead by example.” Mr. Rosenstiel added, “'I'm not in Iraq, 
but it’s hard for me to see how the suppression of information, even false 
information, is going to help our cause.”453 
The US authorities used Al-Iraqiyah as a podium for US political officials and 
military commanders. Al-Iraqiyah provided complete coverage of the regular 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) briefings that featured Dan Senor, Brig 
Gen, and Mark Kimmitt. It also showed press conferences by Gen. John 
Abizaid, the overall US commander, and a weekly interview with L. Paul 
Bremer, the US administrator. The coverage made the channel appear to 
succumb more to the US officials’ wishes.454 The channel also seemed to be 
ignorant of the needs of Iraqis, and centred instead on the American view 
point, which resulted in gross misunderstandings of the Iraqi situation. This 
policy encouraged the Iraqis to depend on Arab and regional satellite 
channels like Al-Jazeera. For instance, Al-Iraqiya labelled the gunmen fighting 
coalition forces as “terrorists” while it called the occupying forces as “coalition” 
or “friendly” troops.455 
The explosion of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal and the abuses committed by 
American soldiers against Iraqi inmates aggravated the negative image of the 
Americans, which had developed throughout the occupation. The non-
objective coverage of the scandal by the IMN blunted the credibility of the 
channel, as it was considered to be a part of the American propaganda 
machine.456 The Washington Post cited occupation authority spokesman Dan 
Senor as saying that "IMN is not supposed to be the dominant media in Iraq, 
but one of many voices. We never viewed our goals to be built around a 
propaganda war.” Ahmed Al-Rikaby, the first Director of IMN, stated that the 
“US overseers considered IMN the occupation authority's outlet, and not an 
independent entity.”457 
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4.5. Al-Iraqiyah under the Rule of Provisional Prime Minister, Iyad Allawi. 
The sudden handover of power to the US-installed government on 30th June 
transferred the IMN into a new phase. The interim government’s Prime 
Minister, Iyad Allawi, gave an order to form his own “Higher media 
commission” to establish acceptable media practice. This body was an 
agency that would determine operating regulations for Iraq's newly emerging 
media, but it was believed that it reduced the amount of freedom for Iraqi and 
Arab channels. In addition, Allawi handed responsibility for the National 
Communication and Media Commission to his friend Ibrahim Al-Janabi, 
previously an Intelligence Officer under Saddam Hussein.458 The body 
imposed a number of content restrictions on media coverage, known as ‘red 
lines’, that could eventually prohibit any criticism of the Prime Minister and 
other government officials. This was the starting point of control and use of 
the media by Iraqi politicians.459 As a sign of good will, the first step of the new 
agency was to revoke the order shutting down Al-Hawza newspaper. The 
action was considered to be cosmetic and was never understood among Iraqi 
journalists to be a transparent measure. “The action was very similar to the 
steps taken by Saddam Hussein to ban media reporting in certain political 
fields. When he gave partial space of reporting, he considered it as a practice 
of press freedom.”460 
The following August, the Prime Minister used the new regulations to close 
the Baghdad office of the Al-Jazeera television network for thirty days. The 
ban was decried by international journalistic bodies, and considered to be a 
backwards move towards the old regime’s activity of censorship. Aidan White, 
the General Secretary of the International Federation of Journalists said that, 
“Democracy in Iraq will be won by defending human rights and the people's 
right to know, not by returning to the bad old days of censorship and 
intimidation of journalists.”461 “There has been a loose resolution of the issue 
of a Higher media and its relationship to the Commission, and National 
Communication and Media commission, and the Iraqi Media Network. The 
reconstituted Council will serve, and is serving, as a senior advisory group 
that assists in developing policy for the government, which evaluates and 
assesses performance, charting new directions and identifying opportunities. 
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How this will work out in practice depends on the strength of the NCMC and 
the IMN. The NCMC, with Siyamend Othman as CEO, has recruited a deputy, 
held training sessions for journalists in preparation of the election”.462 
The International Federation of Journalists accused the Iraqi authorities of 
being intolerant of professional journalism. The IFJ added, “Journalists 
already struggle to report freely in dangerous conditions, but the atmosphere 
is made infinitely worse when occupation armies and the authorities try to 
muscle the media through diktat and arbitrary detention.”463 The policy of Iyad 
Allawi had failed to deal with the editorial  concerns of the IMN, which 
included the need to keep a space in the news coverage for the actions of the 
Iraqi government, especially those that affected the lives of most Iraqis. Their 
frustration drove them to impose more restrictions on the IMN, which resulted 
in the resignation of the IMN Director, General Jalal al-Mashta, in November 
2004.464 Al-Mashta, who had been appointed as the General Director of Al-
Iraqiyah in May 2004, was a former editor of Al-Nahda newspaper, and an 
experienced radio and television journalist at an international level during his 
work at the London-based Al-Hayat Daily.465 
At a press conference held in Baghdad, Al-Mashta said that he had no control 
over the channel's management and that the budget was being wasted on 
buying costly foreign programmes while salaries were not being paid. He said 
at a Baghdad press conference that, “The Iraqi side still has no idea of how 
money is being spent. When we ask, the only answer we get is that Harris is 
dealing only with the US Defence Department, while it is all Iraqi money." He 
criticised the American and Iraqi Governments’ policies, saying that “the 
network's budget was being wasted on costly foreign programmes and that 
the sub-contracting process had left no room for local know-how.” Al-Mashta 
gave the example of LBCI’s Al-Mumayazun (The Outstanding Ones) game 
show, which was costing the IMN 28,000 US dollars per show, despite the 
fact that the estimated cost of producing a similar programme in Iraq would be 
approximately 3,000 US dollars.466 Al-Mashta went on to say that the irony of 
the situation lay in the fact that, “the government is not paying a penny to the 
network despite the fact that I talked to officials about that more than once. I 
haven't received my salary for five consecutive months.” He added that, “this 
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means more Iraqi money will be spent in vain instead of being spent on 
building the country. It also means that Iraqi skills are being treated with 
contempt.”467 In contrast to Al-Mashta’s situation, the US firm, Harris 
Corporation, announced on 20th January 2005, that it had received a three-
month, $22 million contract from the Iraqi Media Network for training, 
programming support, systems integration and deployment work for the 
IMN.468 
Seeking a new chief suitable for the task, the government’s Prime Minister, 
Iyad Allawi, appointed Habib al-Sadr as the new director of IMN in a bid to 
deploy the media for delivering propaganda launched by the fledgling 
authority. Al-Sadr is the brother of Hussein al-Sadr, a London-based cleric 
from the famous Shiite Al-Sadr family who was an opponent of Saddam. The 
cleric, who stood by the side of the secular Prime minister during his conflict 
with strong Shiite factions, received a number of privileges, one of which was 
providing the top London-based post to his brother.469 Unlike his predecessor, 
Jalal al-Mashta, Al-Sadr had zero experience in journalism. He had a career 
as a spare parts trader for cars. He had resorted to the trading job after being 
pensioned off from his post as a lieutenant colonel in the former Iraqi army. 
His dismissal from the army was attributed to his family and his late brother-
in-law, Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, a famous Iran-based opposition figure and the 
current chief of the strong Shiite party, the Iraqi Islamic Council (IISC).470 
The Iraqi Government faced big challenges after the Americans handed 
authority to them. They tried to use the IMN to show the power of their newly 
formed security forces, and their capability to hold the ground and maintain 
stability for the Iraqis; they deployed the channel to be a part of the battle 
against insurgents.471 
As part of the information battle to defeat the insurgency in Iraq, the interim 
Iraqi authorities used all types of psychological operations, including 
programmes to damage the morale of insurgents and destroy their reputation 
among Iraqis, especially amongst those who respected them. The show, 
‘Terrorism in the Hands of Justice’ was a good example of this, and featured 
debate over the use of the media to serve the government’s goals. Launched 
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in January 2004, the hour-long evening programme featured captured 
insurgents confessing to a variety of alleged crimes and vices, including 
pornography and alcohol, which are forbidden in Islam. The insurgents 
appeared on the show displaying obvious signs of suffering from torture, and 
admitted to attacking the security forces, and raping and beheading 
civilians.472 “The televised confessions were the brainchild of a commander of 
the Wolf Commando Brigade, a branch of the Iraqi interior ministry. Known 
only by his nom de guerre, Abu Al-Waleed, the brigade commander phoned 
the Al-Iraqiyah bureau in Mosul [and requested for them] to send a camera 
crew to his police station, where there was a fresh batch of prisoners ready to 
be filmed”.473 
The broadcasts had raised mixed reactions amongst the Iraqis. Both 
supporters and opponents switched on their televisions at midday or 9pm, to 
watch the latest confessions, which in turn became discussed issues 
throughout homes, offices, taxis and cafes. The programme, which was 
similar to the US show Jerry Springer, was regarded by journalists and 
researchers as the Iraqi government's most effective propaganda against the 
insurgents.474 But still, there is a big issue from an ethical point of view, 
especially if we look at the practical side of this programme.475 
As Colonel Ziad Al-Sheikly, an Iraqi commander in the Ministry of Interior from 
2004 to 2009, explains, regarding the practice of programming from inside the 
events, “The Ministry of Interior (MOI) filmed and produced the show, 
‘Terrorism in the Hands of Justice’, and the IMN just aired it. We had our 
cameramen inside the MOI, we filmed the interviews and then we sent the 
tape to the IMN to air it.  I have to confess that the policemen were forcing 
many of the prisoners to confess about crimes that they had never 
committed.”476 Abu Tabarak, a Sunni Cleric in the City of Mosul, was one of 
the first and most famous victims of this show as he appeared, admitting that 
he had killed tens of innocent Iraqis, and that he had indulged in drunkenness, 
gay orgies and pornography.477 The big surprise came when the 
governmental forces released Abu Tabarak a few weeks later. This practice 
raised the question of whether he was guilty or not. There was no doubt that 
something questionable was going on.478 
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Abu Tabarak described the situation to Mazin Al-Khashab, a lawyer and the 
publisher of Al-Rabita Al-Iraqiyah (The Iraqi Rabita) blog, in detail, saying that, 
“The governmental security forces tortured me with a group of prisoners very 
heavily,” which explained why there were scars on his face when he appeared 
in the show. He proceeded, stating, “Then they brought a woman in the room 
next door and they started torturing her. I was hearing her screaming, and 
they told me that this lady was my wife, and if I would not confess of 
‘drunkenness, gay orgies and pornography’ they would rape her. Then I told 
them I would sign on a blank paper and they could write whatever satisfies 
them, to protect my wife. After that I confessed that I killed tens of people. 
When they asked me about names, I gave them names of live people or 
names of people who died years before. This was the only option I had, 
because I did not kill anyone to give his name, and was not [involved in] 
drunkenness or gay orgies. But they forced me to say that on camera. The big 
surprise for me was that they gave me a few written lines to read carefully and 
then say the same thing on camera. So sometimes, [if] I confused or forgot 
some words, they started beating me and the cameraman was beating me 
with them as well, [solely] because I was not able to memorise it very well 
while he was recording, as he seemed interested in a nice shoot, but he [did] 
not care if it was [a] dishonest shoot.479 
Al-Iraqiyah, became a widely unattractive channel for being the Iraqi 
government’s mouthpiece, but when its Mosul relaying branch started feeding 
its main studio in Baghdad with the confessions, it became more popular as it 
gave the channel a national primetime hit. Many Iraqis had gotten used to the 
same ways adopted by the former regime for three decades. Therefore, such 
televised confessions were normal. The viewers paid a lot of attention to the 
show, even when the “confession criminals” appeared to have obvious signs 
of torture on their faces.480 The American officials said they were not involved 
in the production of ‘Terrorism in the Hands of Justice’, however, they felt 
happy with its impact.481 US officials got involved later, when they realised 
that the programmes had been a source of concern to human rights 
organisations, which regarded them as obvious violations of human rights in 
Iraq.482 
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Simon Haselock talked about the echo of the programmes in an interview with 
the BBC, saying that they raised the issues with Iraqi officials. “We have to 
understand where they're coming from here,” he pointed out, “and of course, 
to draw the right balance between the independent, professional public 
approach that we would be familiar with, and the understandable urge by 
people here to see retribution for things that have been done to them. I think 
this is something that's going to take some time to put right. It's all very well 
for us [to cast] a frowning eye at it, but I think it's very understandable at this 
stage, and we have to be careful about how we approach it.”483 
International human rights groups have also drawn attention to the violent 
treatment and torture carried out by the Iraqi authorities to detainees in 
prisons. “Part of our job is to encourage the Iraqis to reach the international 
standards to which we all aspire, but it will obviously be a lengthy process.”484 
The show has also caused uncertainty among the Iraqi viewers, according to 
western media reports, as they felt that they were being manipulated by such 
programmes. For the media, it was also hard to confirm the authenticity of the 
confessions. As a Reuters report noted, “the interrogator's face does not 
appear on camera, and the men interrogated are shown sitting in office chairs 
across from a desk in a white-walled room.”485 
The interior ministry officials defended the show and justified its shortcomings 
as being part of an emergency measure. The Minister of Interior, Falah Naqib, 
told the Washington Post that, “it has shown the Iraqi people the reality of 
those insurgents. [That] they are criminals, killers, murderers, thieves.” 
Meanwhile, the spokesman of the MOI, Sabah Kadhim, told the media in a 
press conference that, “the last few weeks have been incredible in terms of 
tips coming in from the public.”486 
The show also raised anger among Sunnis as they believed that they were 
targeted in the programme by Shiite dominated politicians, in order to destroy 
the image of Sunnis as a part of the sectarian conflict in Iraq, and to win more 
power. They marked the Wolf Brigade and its Shiite commander as 
committing crimes against humanity and humiliating Sunni prisoners under 
the umbrella of protection provided by the international community. The 
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Americans’ claim that the reason for their occupation of Iraq was to protect the 
Iraqi’s human rights seemed questionable when they were keeping silent 
about these practices while the country was under their power.487 Al-Iraqiyah 
also played its role as state television, by broadcasting information regarding 
the curfews and restrictions that had been imposed across the country in the 
period before and during the election. More to the point, Al-Iraqiyah carried 
out a wide campaign to counter the threats made against the Iraqi politicians 
who participated in the election by Iraq’s various terrorist and insurgent 
groups.488 
In moves that did not fit with the standard of most Western state media, Al-
Iraqiyah also broadcast a weekly phone-in program hosted by the Iraqi Prime 
Minister of the time, Iyad Allawi, who, as part of his election campaign, was 
patiently answering the unscreened calls from Iraqis who were keen to raise 
and discuss various issues with their leader.489 However this show, as a part 
of Allawi’s election campaign, raised criticism among his rivals, suggesting 
that he was employing his political position and his close relations with the 
occupying forces to use the station as leverage for his own political ambition, 
not for the interest of the public.490 
4.6. Al-Iraqiyah during Islamist Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s 
Tenure. 
The winning of the Shiite Coalition in the 2005 elections flipped the fate of the 
IMN into the hands of the Shiite religious political parties, who were waiting for 
a chance to make extreme changes to the political process, utilising the IMN 
and other media outlets. The first thing the new Prime Minister, Ibrahim al-
Jaafari, tried to do was impose his own point of view, through appointing 
figures from his Al-Dawa Islamic Party, to positions within the channel’s 
administration. The Al-Dawa Party members then pressured Al-Iraqiyah to 
show certain interviews and to rerun programmes that served Jaafari's 
interests.491 One of the more high-profile critics of Al-Iraqiyah is Jalal 
Talibani's media adviser, Hiwa Osman, who said, “It's supposed to be a public 
service broadcaster. They should be providing a service for all the people, but 
they are providing a service only for certain people in government.”492 
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The Christian Science Monitor also cited Mohammed Abdul Jabbar, the 
editor-in-chief of Al-Sabbah, who was temporarily fired two months into Mr. 
Jaafari's term as Prime Minister. Abdul Jabbar had said that “Jaafari's media 
adviser sent me instructions on how to run the paper, including an order to 
stop my daily column. They wanted me to pay special attention to the news of 
the prime minister and got angry when we published something about him on 
the inside pages.”493 
Al-Jaafari’s control of the network ended in September when Abdel Aziz 
Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq 
(SCIRI), publicly criticised Al-Jaafari's policy to control the IMN. That strong 
speech encouraged the IMN’s board of governors to stand and defend their 
independence. The speech ended Al-Jaafari’s control and initiated a new era 
of control by the SCIRI, who competed with Al-Jaafari for influence within the 
Shiite Alliance.494 
The new changes aided the beneficiary of IMN, Director Habib al Sadr, who 
had links with many media professionals, and would always look after his own 
interests, jumping from one official to another. Al-Sadr’s policy affected media 
practice throughout the network, because the staff in Iraq always followed 
their bosses, since they would otherwise lose their jobs. Thus if we look at the 
history of the channel, we can see that it was always serving the agenda of 
someone, starting with the Americans, followed by Allawi, then Al-Jaffari and 
lastly Al-Hakim.495 During Al-Jaffari’s tenure, the fight between the big political 
parties to control Al-Iraqiyah reached its peak, and became very heated. 
Besides that, sectarian violence was about to reach the point of becoming a 
civil war. So, political leaders tried to reduce that tension by using Al-Iraqiyah 
to air some programmes to help enhance the security of the situation, and to 
develop the Iraqis’ faith in their government.496 
The network started airing new programmes based on meetings between 
Prime Minister Al-Jaafari and ministers, to show that the government was very 
determined to make the Iraqi people happy, if only the security situation would 
improve. Shows such as ‘The Iraqi Podium’ gave people the chance to make 
live telephone calls into the show and ask direct questions about political 
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affairs to the guests, who ranged from various civil society leaders to 
journalists, academics and intellectuals. Another programme entitled ‘Open 
Encounter’ hosted Iraqi officials and political leaders to discuss various 
issues, such as elections, military operations and agendas of various Iraqi 
political parties, with the inclusion of studio audience participation. It seemed 
that Al-Iraqiyah was moving towards becoming a public service broadcaster, 
rather than an official state channel owned by the Ministry of Information, like 
that of most Arab states.497 
The bombing of the Shiite golden dome of Al-Imameen Al-Askareen shrine, in 
Samarra town, broke the short period of united discourse shown by the 
channel. The blast caused a wave of sectarian attacks and revenge killings. 
The sectarian violence drove the country to the edge of an open civil war. Al-
Iraqiyah announced curfews and restrictions to be placed upon 
neighbourhoods in an attempt to stem the ongoing violence. It also showed 
televised meetings of key leaders agreeing to stop the embarrassing situation 
and calling for the unity of Iraqis against terrorism.498 
Iraqi journalists were never far away from the sectarian clashes.  A 
memorable incident was the murder of the Iraqi female journalist, Atwar 
Bahjat, a thirty-year-old reporter with Al-Arabiyah. She was killed while 
covering the February 2006 bombing of a shrine in Samarra. To this day, it is 
not clear who committed the murder, as the government accused the 
insurgents of her killing, and the insurgents accused the Iraqi Interior ministry. 
The sectarian conflict closed off access to many neighbourhoods held by 
certain sects to journalists, preventing them from giving objective reports of 
the incidents. A Sunni reporter could not go to a Shiite dominated 
neighbourhood, as any mistake made by the reporter while in the territory 
would lead to imprisonment, maybe death, or at least the accusation that the 
journalist was linked with terrorists. The Shiite journalists would be associated 
with the suspicious activities of militia, or even death squads; these were 
ready made accusations used by Sunni militant groups.499 
The fact that certain names were recognised as Sunni or Shiite complicated 
reporting in many parts of Iraq. A reporter with a name ‘Ali’ could not go to a 
 131 
Sunni neighbourhood, while a Sunni reporter with the name ‘Omar’ would 
commit a grave mistake by entering a Shiite neighbourhood. Ahmed Al-Rikabi 
stated that the Iraqi journalist’s professionalism does not mean anything to a 
lot of the people in the streets: “Whether the journalist is objective or whether 
he is normal, neutral or unbiased, he cannot help it that he has got a certain 
name, and that name might get him killed...that will influence his way of 
thinking, or of approaching the subject.”500 
Another stand-out example of Al-Iraqiyah’s pro-Shiite tendencies took place in 
March 2006, when the US raided a Shiite mosque called Al-Mustafa, leaving a 
number of worshippers dead or wounded, and classified them as enemy 
fighters causing sectarian havoc in Baghdad. The Iraqi Government strongly 
expressed its deep concerns about the incident. Al-Iraqiyah covered the event 
very heavily, expressing the concerns of the Iraqi government, while it did not 
cover many of the American attacks on Sunni mosques, except where if it did, 
it would present the victims as terrorists, in spirit with the programme, 
‘Terrorism in the Hand of Justice’.501 
The channel cited statements by Iraq’s Interior Minister of the time, who 
denounced the United States’ account of the incident and called for an 
investigation of the details.502 In its coverage, Al-Iraqiyah took reports from 
eyewitnesses, who told the local media that the soldiers locked the 
worshippers in one room, lined them up against a wall and shot them dead.503 
Of course, the website of the American troops bore a different story. It 
reported of the operation: “Iraqi Special Operations Forces conducted a 
twilight raid in the Adhamiyah neighbourhood in northeast Baghdad, to disrupt 
a terrorist cell responsible for conducting attacks on Iraqi security and 
Coalition Forces, and kidnapping Iraqi civilians in the local area.” 
As elements of the 1st Iraqi Special Operations Forces Brigade approached 
their objective, they came under fire. In the ensuing exchange of fire, Iraqi 
Special Operations Forces killed 16 insurgents. As they secured their 
objective, they detained 15 more individuals.”504 The incident manifested 
clearly the pro-government view of the channel and intensified the image that 
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it was used by key Shiite factions in their power struggle with their sectarian 
and ethnic opponents.505 
4.7. Changes made within Al-Iraqiyah under Prime Minister Nouri Al-
Malaki. 
The election of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, in April 2006, took the channel 
into a new reality. The new premier, who knew well the impact of media on 
the political scene and the security situation in Iraq, dedicated special efforts 
to control the official channel. He did not, however, change IMN’s structure or 
directorship outright, unlike previous Prime Ministers. He had taken a number 
of steps that restricted its coverage and ways of broadcasting, so as to 
organise it in a way which suited his agenda. He also assigned his media 
advisor Yasin Majid, a former BBC correspondent in Tehran, to be the head of 
the overseeing committee that controlled its activities.506 
In an interview with Simon Heslock, he stated that “Al-Maliki’s inauguration 
saw a turning point in his attitude towards the future of Iraqi media. 
Previously, as a member of parliament (MP), he was very helpful, and he 
wanted to have an independent media organisation. Once he became Prime 
Minister (PM) he tried to control the media for his own agenda. The problem in 
Iraq is that the people need to learn how the mechanisms of the media work.” 
We see clearly here that Al-Maliki’s concern for previous Prime Ministers 
controlling the media was not for the well-being of the Iraqi people and 
journalism, but rather the advantage it gave to his political rivals.507 
Al-Iraqiyah’s broadcasts centred on portraying Iraq as a nation recuperating 
from violence, fighting corruption, improving public services and restoring its 
position in the regional, Arab and international circles. The channel tended to 
show the Prime Minister as powerful, seeking a national reconciliation and 
encouraging ethnic solidity in the war-ravaged country. It tried to represent 
him as the defender of the Iraqis from the American forces’ bloody mistakes, 
and it conducted a campaign against sceptics and opposition, who were 
attempting to reveal and disclose the realities of the Prime Minister.508 
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On 20th February 2007, another incident revealed how the channel sided with 
the government against the claim raised by the 20 year old Sunni girl, Sabrin 
al-Janabi, that members of the Shiite dominated security forces had raped 
her. The claim was broadcast by Al-Jazeera.509 The incident ocurred when the 
Interior Ministry forces detained her for several hours in Baghdad on 19th 
February on suspicion of her supporting the insurgency.510 Al-Janabi told Al-
Jazeera that four police officers raped her over a four-hour period. She 
claimed the officers threatened to kill her if she spoke out about the incident, 
and that they had no sense of humanity, so they took her picture in order to 
remember her. She also denied any links to militants. Al-Janabi was freed by 
US forces after they arrived on the scene.511 In response, the Sunni 
parliament speaker Mahmud al-Mashhadani, told Al-Jazeera on 19th 
February: “Yesterday we were suffering at Abu Ghraib...Today, what can I 
say? Shall I say we [Iraqis] are violating our own honour?”512 He urged Prime 
Minister Nouri al-Maliki to punish those responsible for the crime and not to go 
ahead with the security plan in such a mistaken way. “What is the value of the 
security plan if our honour is violated?”. he added.513 The Iraqi government 
initially promised to launch an immediate investigation. A few hours later they 
announced that al-Janabi's claim was fabricated. Government spokesman 
Yassin Majid told state-run Al-Iraqiyah television that the woman “was not 
subject to any sexual harassment at all.”514 
On top of this, the government announced that it would reward the officers 
accused in the alleged incident, and decided to take legal action against Al-
Jazeera for spreading fabricated information. The incident fuelled both 
sectarian and tribal feelings of revenge among Sunni sects. At least one 
Sunni insurgent group had said it would take revenge for the attack. On 20th 
February in an internet statement, the Islamic Army in Iraq, a Sunni militant 
group, vowed to avenge “every free woman whose purity and honour was 
robbed.”515 
The Al-Iraqiyah coverage of Al-Janabi’s incident shows us that Al-Iraqiyah 
stood side by side with the governing political parties and security forces, 
ignoring the feelings of the Iraqi people who felt insulted by the police officers 
who had raped Al-Janabi. The editorial staff did not try to practise even 
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minimum objectivity in its coverage of the incident. This case suggests that Al-
Iraqiyah, as a governmental channel, tries to propagate for the Iraqi 
government. It is the mouthpiece of the Prime Minister; no more, no less.516 
The sectarian leaning of Al-Iraqiyah was displayed clearly in August 2007 
when the Accordance Front, the biggest Sunni bloc, announced its withdrawal 
from government, citing the government’s monopolisation of power and lack 
of cooperation over releasing un-convicted prisoners. The channel launched 
interviews with political analysts and politicians who considered the 
withdrawal as pointless and serving a foreign agenda. It stood on the 
government’s side and showed coverage with the intention of putting the 
withdrawn bloc down. The unbalanced stance of the public channel deepened 
the opposition’s feeling that it sounded like a Shiite channel, or at least pro-
government.517 
In early 2008, Al-Iraqiyah took a new turn when the Iraqi government’s forces, 
backed by American troops, launched an offensive against Shiite militias in 
Basra, which subsequently extended into Baghdad and other major cities. The 
channel represented the operation as enforcing law in Basra in a war against 
lawless gangs. However, they tended to describe the opposing militia as 
breakaway factions that broke with the commands of Shiite cleric Muqtada al-
Sadr.518 Facing an unexpected situation, Habib al-Sadr, the director of Al-
Iraqiyah, took a precautionary approach which met the demand of the 
government and cleared him from the ire of the Shiite cleric and his militias.519 
Yet the government and its supporting parties were angry with the lukewarm 
approach adopted by the channel’s director, and considered it to be a 
collaboration with the opposition militants. Once the government managed to 
stabilise the security of the country’s major cities, Al-Maliki gave his order for 
the sacking of Al-Sadr in April 2008, and appointed Hassan Al-Musawi, an ally 
of the Shiite Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), as Al-Iraqiyah’s new 
director. Like his predecessor, the new manager had no previous media 
career. His only previous media job was as a commentator on Shiite 
processions for Al-Anwar channel, which belongs to Kuwaiti Shiite 
businessmen.520 
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The new director tried to introduce a new spirit into the channel, to shape it to 
his own style. Yet he faced fierce opposition from journalists and heads of 
department, who either worked according to their supporters’ agendas, or 
wanted to hide the rampant corruption hitting the institution’s finances, which 
could clearly be seen within the channel’s transactions.521 “The director tried 
to make changes to some posts and management, yet he faced strong 
opposition from workers and, subsequently, held the new orders. Politicians 
from the Dawa Party exerted pressure to keep the same order and to promote 
programmes painting the situation in Iraq as safe, calm and also encouraging 
profitable investment.”522 Yet, the new director was unable to mobilise the 
channel according to the new strategy adopted by the Shiite Dawa Party, 
headed by the Prime Minister, who broke away from the Iraqi Alliance Bloc 
and decided to participate in a separate slate, entitled the Law Abiding List, in 
provincial polls. While Iraqi officials were debating the details of the US plan to 
withdraw troops from Iraq, Dawa Party officials pushed to demonstrate that 
the Iraqi people were standing by the Government, in order to encourage the 
pullout of foreign troops from major cities. These efforts were successful in 
propagating the Party’s agenda.523 They pushed forward, in order to bask in 
the international appraisal once the final draft of the agreement was released. 
Being an ally to SIIC, the director could not bend to the new directions taken 
by the Prime Minister’s list. When the Prime Minister signed the agreement 
and received praise from international and domestic circles, Al-Musawi, along 
with the board of channel governors, was dismissed. The government cited 
administrative reasons for such a decision.524 
Citing bad performance and management as reasons for sacking al-Musawi 
complicated the process of selecting a substitute. The Prime Minister was 
forced to look for a qualified and respected director, who would also obey his 
policies. Lengthy debates and detailed discussions led the Prime Minister to 
sift through profiles of many journalist and media specialists. One of the 
figures was Faisal Al-Yasiri, a journalist who graduated from the Austrian 
University, and director of Al-Iraq TV during the 1990’s under the rule of 
Saddam Hussein.525 
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The irony of the situation was that Prime Minister Maliki, a staunch opponent 
to the return of Baathist figures into government posts, requested that Al-
Yasiri be a director for Al-Iraqiyah. The latter rejected the offer, citing potential 
threats from pressure groups. “I cannot work in such an institution for fear of 
being killed with a silenced pistol. This institution has been built on factional 
bases and propagated personal interests, which turned into pressure lobbies, 
so anyone who sets on a collision course with these factions or persons, 
would be marked for killing,” Al-Yasiri said to Al-Maliki in person, when turning 
down the offer made by the Prime Minister. Al-Yasiri also levelled at Al-Maliki 
the accusation that Al-Iraqiyah had been infiltrated by corrupt members, and 
that anyone who tried to root out the corruption from the organisation would 
pay with their life. Al-Maliki displayed no surprise and offered no defence in 
reaction to these comments.526 
Finding a director who combined practical qualifications and political leniency 
made the Prime Minister’s choice difficult, and he subsequently preferred 
candidates based on their political apathy, rather than the ability to deliver 
professional performance. On 1st March 2009, the Prime Minister appointed 
Abdel Karim Al-Sudani, an audio-visual media teacher at the Academy of Fine 
Arts in Baghdad, as the new director. In spite of his high academic 
qualifications, Al-Sudani had no practical broadcasting experience.527 The 
new director pledged to show a new perspective and improve the skills of the 
channel’s staff. Yet he was on a collision course with the same strong lobbies 
who were working within the channel. The Dawa Party set about a new 
strategy by deliberately ignoring the coverage of officials from other blocs or 
parties, and holding interviews with the Prime Minister and members of his 
party as often as possible.528 “Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and his two 
deputies complained and wrote letters about the blackout practised against 
their activities inside and outside Iraq,” Khalid Muhsen, the Media Director for 
the Iraqi Presidential Board said. “The president met Al-Iraqiyah channel and 
asked them directly whether they felt any pressures [from the Prime Minister’s 
lobbies] and offered them legal protection.”529 
The politicians’ concerns and criticism of Al-Maliki’s policy to control the 
channel were raised. Baha Al-Araji, an Iraqi lawmaker and MP from the 
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Sadrist Trend loyal to the Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, called for changing 
the coverage of Al-Iraqiyah. He accused the channel of showing statements of 
Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki and members of his party, while deliberately 
ignoring politicians from other blocs.530 The MP called for shutting down the 
channel, on that grounds that it had used public funds in the interest of the 
ruling party only.531 
The statement came amid heated debate among Iraqi statesmen, ahead of 
elections scheduled in January 2010. Lawmakers from the Shiite United Iraqi 
Alliance and Sunni Accordance Front, called for reviewing the rules and 
bringing the general director to parliament for questioning. But all agreed that 
the Al-Iraqiyah administration must be subject to parliament and not the 
government, citing articles from the constitution stating that the channel is 
funded by state money, and is meant to be a neutral, non-sectarian and non-
partisan media outlet. The struggle over the channel had escalated ahead of 
decisive elections scheduled to be held in January 2010. Yet successive 
governments have kept the channel as a fixture of their electoral politics, 
always ensuring that the directing staff were at least sympathetic to the 
governments’ agendas.532 “If there ever was hope for [Al-Iraqiya] to become 
another BBC or NCBS, it has not yet been fulfilled. [Al-Iraqiyah] went from 
being viewed as a mouthpiece for the Coalition Provisional Authority to being 
tightly under the control of the Iraqi Government. Some have even criticised it 
for serving as a propaganda tool for Iraq’s Shiite politicians. Interestingly, a 
survey commissioned by IREX, released in April 2010, found that only 21 
percent of Iraqis trust the IMN TV station, Al-Iraqiyah, as a news source. In 
Kurdish northern Iraq fewer than 5 percent find it trustworthy. In Sunni-
inhabited central Iraq 15 percent trust it, but in Shiite-dominated southern Iraq 
viewers’ trust of Al-Iraqiyah rises to 44 percent.”533 
“The problem with Al-Iraqiyah was that the Americans had tactical objectives 
rather than strategic ones. They wanted a media machine that could help 
them propagate their version of the Coalition’s activity on the ground in Iraq. 
Their need for the channel would grow even more at a later stage to 
counteract the propaganda of the insurgency. The Iraqi Government used Al-
Iraqiyah to the same ends. So, frankly speaking, Al-Iraqiyah is state-run TV 
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masquerading as a public service broadcaster. The reason why the Coalition 
and the Government used the channel to promote their spin was simply 
because they were not abiding by the Athens Framework law. The Athens 
Framework was the best media law in the Middle East, but for politically 
strategic reasons, the politicians did not follow its guidelines.”534 
Conclusion. 
Over half a century after the American occupation of Germany and Japan, the 
US  applied policies in Iraq which had many parallels to those of the previous 
occupations. This reflects a fatal lack of understanding of the stark cultural, 
socio-political and geographical differences between the different nations. 
Consequently, the US army dissolved the Iraqi media as the first step in a 
plan to launch a new ‘custom made’ media landscape. They promised that 
they would build a media institution that would match the independence and 
professionalism of the BBC. These promises seemed to usher in a new era of 
professionalism in the history of Iraqi media. However, US policies quickly 
lifted the veil on their claims, exposing the strategic and tactical intentions 
behind their creation and supervision of the new Iraqi media organisations. 
This came as a big disappointment for Iraqis, as they had been promised a 
new era in freedom of speech. 
A group of exiled Iraqis were selected by the US to work at the centre of the 
new Iraqi media. These people were used during the war as part of the 
American psychological warfare that coincided with military operations. The 
exiled Iraqis also played a central role within the US’s task of ensuring that the 
Iraqi Media Network (IMN) served its purpose as a mouthpiece for the 
occupying forces. But their contribution did not enrich the quality of the 
organisation’s performance, and allowed unethical and gravely unprofessional 
practices. This left the institution vulnerable to hard criticism, affecting its 
stability and credibility. 
The US army awarded the central contract for the establishment of the new 
large-scale organisation to US companies, including the Science Applications 
International Corporation SAIC company; all of these companies had 
 139 
absolutely no experience within professional media. This step made the 
situation even worse, and left the new Iraqi media with far from professional 
standards. 
The Americans used the IMN as one of their tools of psychological warfare. 
They used the channel massively, until the IMN became the mouthpiece of 
the US army and the CPA. They used the channel for tactical purposes to win 
the war, regardless of their promises made before the war to create an 
independent media in Iraq. The result was that the IMN lost its credibility as a 
professional and impartial deliverer of news. 
In spite of being the beneficiary of contracts worth tens of millions of US 
dollars, the performance of the channel fell far short of international standards 
of quality and professionalism. This was due to the fact that the controllers of 
the organisation saw the role of the channel as a tool to be used to achieve 
the goals of the Iraqi and American authorities. This fundamental view 
overlooked the fact that the role of such a channel is to act as a public 
service, with the fulfilment of its duties to deliver uncoloured, impartial and 
professional information to the public. 
There was, therefore, an urgent need for new media legislation to establish 
rules and regulations that ensured the relationship between the media and the 
government consisted of sound ethics, that employees of media institutions 
were allowed to report objectively without fear, and that there was integrity in 
the reports that were broadcast to the public. 
But the US and Iraqi governments failed to establish the necessary new 
legislation as, although they saw the need, they were also aware that the laws 
would protect the IMN from their influence, preventing them from using it as a 
propaganda tool. 
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5. Chapter Five: Special Cases. 
Introduction. 
As explained in the previous chapter, the Aliraqiyah TV Channel was a central 
project for the Americans, and they tried to use it to reach and influence 
Iraqis. However, they felt that the TV station was not enough, so they tried 
different techniques. News scoops and WikiLeaks have revealed new 
episodes in the saga of the Bush administration’s manipulation of media in 
Iraq, in which it attempts to bolster its status in Iraq and to continue its ‘War on 
Terror’ spin.535 A Pentagon report to Congress identified reports that the US 
military’s public relations officers were systematically trying to influence local 
Iraqi media to provide a pro-US spin on news events.536 
Documents released by WikiLeaks showed that these efforts were part of a 
campaign to control local Iraqi media which, in turn, was the first stage of 
“Information Dominance” as part of the US doctrine designed to win the battle 
for hearts and minds.537 The resulting need for positive news became a 
priority, and a new team of specialists, called public affairs officers (PAOs), 
were then trained in military public relations.538 
The US army opted to use a newspaper to take its initial step into the Iraqi 
media landscape. To achieve this end, the US army organised a training 
course and selected five out of a hundred and twenty journalists, to participate 
in a training course according to a document issued by the Department of the 
US army.539 The document showed that the First Division Public Affairs office 
organised the course from July 2003 to 28th August 2003.540 The classes ran 
for six hours a day, six days a week, covering the following lessons: 
1) “Fundamentals of US news writing and news writing style. 
2) Press in free society. 
3) The Associated Press style book. 
4) Defining news and its sources. 
5) Defining the journalist’s role. 
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6)  Ethics for reporters. 
7) News beats such as small town, government, police, politics and US 
Army”. 
The American First Division certified the candidates after successful 
completion of the ‘introduction to journalism’ course.541 
Audai Lutfi praised the training course organised by the US army, stating that 
it was very ‘useful’: “The best thing I learned was accuracy. The Army raised 
the idea that there were no ‘red lines’ imparted upon our reporting. All 
subjects and stories were to be covered, but accuracy in our reporting was 
always stressed above and beyond all things. More importantly, they taught 
us ethical reporting skills and, additionally, how to avoid being under the 
influence of the politicians. I enjoyed these lessons of ethics in journalism and 
valued their advice on how to remain neutral and impartial.”542 The first 
assignment given to the selected Iraqi journalists by the US Army was the 
establishment of an Arabic-English newspaper in Baghdad called Baghdad 
Now.543 The Public Affairs department of the American Army was the 
newspaper’s publisher. US soldiers distributed the newspaper across 
“Baghdad for free”.544 The newspaper’s coverage was centred on the Iraqi 
and US militaries. The content of the newspaper varied with each weekly or 
bi-weekly publication, and circulated between 70,000 and 75,000 copies per 
edition.545 
The newspaper highlighted “the accomplishments of US-led coalition and Iraqi 
community members in the rebuilding of the country. The aim of the 
newspaper is to inform the Iraqi people of the coalition forces’ intentions.”546 
5.1.1. The Baghdad Club Scandal. 
The revelation of the Baghdad Club’s practices has been attributed to a report 
by Times staff writers Mark Mazzetti and Borzu Daraghi. The report found that 
the story was disclosed first by formerly known Knight Ridder’s reporter, 
Nancy Youssef, and her interpreter, Alaa Majid. However, the latter delayed 
their announcement after receiving death threats from two of the club’s Iraqi 
members, Nasir al-Awam and Husham Muhammad. The two men worked for 
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the Iraqi Al-Mada newspaper.547 Nevertheless, both the Knight Ridder and 
Los Angeles Times agreed that the body which the US military established to 
secretly pay Iraqi reporters in return for publishing stories, portrayed the 
efforts exerted by the US army accurately and tarnished its image among Iraqi 
locals. These claims were made according to a number of documents and 
interviews conducted with reporters and the body liaison officer.548 
Iraqi reporters were asked to write articles in Arabic, as well as reports on 
information translated from English to Arabic, dealing with projects and 
actions taken by US troops.549 Abbas al-Salihi, an Iraqi reporter who worked 
as coordinator for the Baghdad Club, said that “the US troops asked us to 
report on projects carried out by US-Iraqi troops in Baghdad. The club officers 
paid $25 for any report on these projects.”550 The Iraqi reporters who were 
involved sent the reports in question as independent journalistic assignments 
with tacit approval, or even without the knowledge of their organisations. Their 
reports dealt with US efforts to rebuild the country, deliver services for Iraqis 
and denounce the insurgents who opposed US-Iraqi forces.551 
Al-Salihi pointed out that “the US troops did not compel any reporter to write 
positively on these projects. However, reporters felt that the US officials would 
not accept any article reporting negatively on US actions in Iraq. Journalists 
were concerned about losing the money they were receiving from the club, 
especially if we consider [that] their salaries were around $150 month.”552 
Dhurgham Muhammad Ali, an Iraqi reporter working with Al-Mashriq 
newspaper and now a sub-editor for Al-Iraqiyah, said he rejected the bonus 
offered by the club because, in return for the bonuses, journalists were 
expected to submit reports with positive slants towards the US and Iraqi 
governments, and conceal any information that might show them in a negative 
light. He added that they even requested certain headlines such as ‘Iraqis 
defy terrorism’ and ‘Iraqis living despite violence odds’.553 
Uday Lutfi, an Iraqi liaison officer, agreed with Al-Salihi’s statement, saying 
that the Baghdad Club was established to serve and help Iraqi reporters face 
both financial and professional challenges.554 
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The US army assigned tasks related to the Baghdad Club to a small 
Washington-based company called Lincoln, formerly known as Iraqex. These 
contracts held a potential value of $100,000,000 and included activity in 
media approach planning; prototype product development; commercial quality 
product development; product distribution and dissemination; and media 
effects analysis, for the joint psychological Operation Support element and 
other government agencies.555 According to the website of the Lincoln 
Alliance Corporation, the company was in charge of providing a unique 
service for the private sector of the Iraqi media: drawing professional and 
legal strategies for the sake of fledgling Iraqi journalism.556 The company has 
four Iraqi based offices located in Baghdad and Basra. The Lincoln contract 
involved developing video and print publications, purchasing of TV and radio 
time, and overseeing public affairs and advertising for MNC-I. The primary 
goal of these tasks was to ensure “that the Coalition gains widespread Iraqi 
acceptance of its core themes and messages.”557 The US company had 
recruited five Iraqi journalists from Baghdad Now into the Baghdad Press 
Club. Military spokesman Lt. Col. Barry Johnson maintained that “The 
Baghdad Press Club was created in 2004 by the US military as a way to 
promote progress amid the violence and chaos of Iraq.”558 
The Army acknowledges the funding of the club and offers “reporter 
compensation” as part of their package, but insists that officers did not 
demand favourable coverage and that the military exercised no editorial 
control over coverage. “Members are not required, nor asked, to write 
favourably,” said Lt. Col. Robert Whetstone, “they are simply invited to report 
on events.”559 
5.1.2. The “Work Statement” of the Baghdad Club. 
The Work Statement of the Baghdad Club indicated in paragraph 3, that “the 
Baghdad Press Club was formed in order to get local Arab media to cover US 
military commanders’ press conferences and special media events. The 
Baghdad Club consists of just over forty of the most prominent journalists in 
Baghdad. These veteran journalists must be the best reporters they can be in 
Iraq, and represent print media as well as radio and television reporters in 
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Baghdad.”560 “The reporters must cover major events and projects that the US 
Army is engaged in throughout Baghdad, without controlling content. On any 
given day, we will use between 6 and 20 of these reporters. Also, for special 
events such as the commander’s press conferences, we are able to have as 
many as forty of these reporters show up. This ad hoc group of reporters will 
play a crucial role in our ability to get our side of the story out to the 
Iraqi populace in Baghdad.”561 Paragraph 4 points out that, “the Public Affairs 
Office (PAO) section requires the service of local Iraqi journalists, in order to 
facilitate Arab media coverage of commanders’ conferences and military 
operations in and around the Baghdad area.”562 Paragraph 5 indicates that, 
“the director must work with the Public Affairs Office to help determine media 
events to be covered and how they will be covered. The contractor will have 
to provide daily bus and taxi transportation for the media during week days, 
including Fridays. The media director must pay the costs for all Iraqi media 
members attending media events.”563 “The media director uses his or her 
extensive contacts in the Arab media profession, both in and out of Iraq, to 
provide important media advice and media strategies to the division [of] PAO. 
The media director will provide a timely analysis of all Arab media articles and 
broadcast products. The media director will ensure [that] members of the 
Baghdad Press Club are available to cover press conferences for the 1st 
Cavalry Division.”564 
In an effort to maintain ethical journalistic accountability, the US military 
launched an investigation in 2004 into accusations of violations of ethical 
guidelines. Led by Rear Adm. Scott Van Buskirk, the investigation gave 
consideration to corruption as many claimed to have been paid off by the 
government to publish or air stories that showed only positive views of the 
American presence. Paying reporters to write one-sided stories directly 
violates clear ethical guidelines within the journalistic realm.565 
The administration has taken these allegations quite seriously. National 
Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley, has expressed concerns over reporting: 
“it's got to be done in a way that reinforces a free media, not undermines it.”566 
However, the Club’s Work Statement in Task 3 indicates that “the contractor 
 145 
shall pay for all expenses the media incurred during coverage of US military 
events.”567 
“The contractor shall have a translator dedicated to quickly translate all print 
stories and broadcasts, for analysis by the leadership of the 1st Cavalry 
Division to assess what Baghdad media is focusing on.”568 
“The contractor must maintain a ledger of expenses, receipts and invoices for 
Arab media expenses. He or she must provide a record of expenditures and a 
record of bookkeeping upon request of the 1st Cavalry Division.” 
Task 5 in the work statement confirms that “the contractor shall assist the 
Public Affairs Officer in assessing the overall effectiveness of the local media 
coverage.”569 
“The contractor must observe the local news media of all types in the 
Baghdad area, from the articles and video coverage of US military press 
conferences [to] media events such as construction sites in order to determine 
how well the desired information is being put on.”570 
“The contractor must be prepared to adjust the invited members and 
organisations of media pools accordingly, in order to help achieve the desired 
media coverage.”571 
“The media’s coverage of desired events must result in factual articles 
appearing in the local newspapers and reports produced on Arab radio and 
television stations.”572 
Task 6 of the work statement mentions that, “the contractor must provide 
and/or subcontract reliable bus and taxi transportation (including fuel and 
maintenance) for Baghdad Press Club members to attend all scheduled 
events, including multiple or simultaneous events on the same day.”573 
Task 9 of the work statement confirms “the contractor must not attempt to 
control content decisions by the participating members of the media in any 
way.” 
Finally, task 7 of the work statement indicates that one of the responsibilities 
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of the contractor is that “summaries of the published and broadcast reports 
must be provided to the Public Affairs Officer of the 1st Cavalry Division.”574 
5.1.3. The Baghdad Club’s Techniques. 
Interestingly enough, the Liaison officer of the Baghdad Club, Uday Lufti, 
asserts; “We were regularly informed by the American Army about their 
activities and operations in an attempt to gain coverage. We wrote about the 
positive and negative things in the American soldiers’ behaviour. The 
Americans were keen to have us covering their military operations, as 
documented coverage would allow them to be free of accusations of 
mistreatment towards the Iraqi people and other forms of law breaking.”575 
“One of our ‘achievements’ was that we distributed leaflets in English to the 
American soldiers to inform them of the Iraqi culture and traditions. For 
example, the demanding of a woman to remove her veil during military checks 
is a major insult in Iraq; the consequences of insults such as this would lead 
to further retaliation against the US forces. Also, we balanced out these 
leaflets with information in Arabic distributed to the Iraqis regarding advice on 
how to deal with the American soldiers.”576 
“The journalists of The Baghdad Press club were provided with cameras, 
laptops, mobile phones and expenses, and the [overall] budget for Baghdad 
Club [expenses] was $15,000 a month. Additional claims were made that 
insisted that journalists attending American Press Conferences were paid 
anywhere from $25-$35 for print or radio stories aired, and $50 for TV 
stories.”577 Lufti maintains that “the stories of the US military operations and 
press conferences were a priority of the Baghdad Club, and little attention was 
paid to the assortment of media organisations covering these issues.”578 
Eight US officials agreed to discuss the situation of payments to Iraqi 
reporters. They feared that the unethical journalistic efforts of the Baghdad 
Club were promoting practices that were unacceptable for the progress of a 
democratising country. "We are teaching [Iraqi journalists] the wrong things," 
said one military officer, “ironically, these officials requested anonymity to 
avoid retaliation.”579 “The senior military leaders were working with us in a 
good manner and they worked in the interest of a free Iraqi media, yet some 
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of the junior officers were mistreating us. One of our duties was to minimize 
the gap between the American Army and the Iraqi community, but it was so 
hard to do because there were many problems among the American Army 
and the Iraqis.”580 “How could we persuade those who had their wives raped 
and houses stolen by the American troops to conform to these ideas of 
cooperation? It was a very hard environment [in which] to instigate 
progress.”581 The American embassy supported the Baghdad Press Club by 
establishing the Round Table, where exclusive interviews were held every 
Wednesday using the best eight journalists in the Baghdad Press Club. Iraqi 
and American Senior officials, such as the Iraqi President Ajeel Alyawar, the 
Prime Minister Ayad Alawi and US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld, were 
among the interviewees.582 
Haithm Hadi, an Iraqi Journalist and the head of Asharq Research Centre, 
said, “I worked for a while at the Baghdad Club, and then decided to leave 
because I felt [the initiative] had failed [to achieve its stated objectives] and 
represented the lack of the Americans’ understanding of the Iraqi community. 
Failing to influence the minds of the Iraqi people was a major consequence of 
the Baghdad Club; they tried to [appeal to] the Iraqis’ hearts and minds 
through their tactics, [but] the Americans worked with unprofessional Iraqi 
people and the price was flagrant propaganda.”583 
The Baghdad Club was using Iraqi journalists to cover the American army’s 
reconstruction projects in order to persuade the Iraqi community and the Arab 
communities that they were useful ventures. But the Iraqis did not respect 
these messages and projects because the implemented work was minimal. 
There was a big gap between the Iraqis expectations and the harsh reality 
following the occupation. The Baghdad Club was a business project for the 
Iraqi journalists and a propaganda project for the Americans.584 
Emad Jaber pointed out the ups and downs he experienced during his work 
for the Baghdad Club. Jaber said that he was happy with his work and 
progress in the Baghdad Club: “The Americans did not try to control the 
editorial aspects of our stories and they did not pressure us. We were free to 
write what we would like to write. Even when we criticised the American 
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army’s corruption in the reconstruction projects and disclosed information…no 
one charged us. One day, I had an argument with an American military officer, 
Captain Minchick, when he said to me, “why are you criticising the American 
Army when you (the Iraqi journalists) get paid money from us?” I answered 
that the Baghdad Club works without red-lines.”585 
Uday Lutfi agreed with Jaber’s statement and cited a US military 
spokesperson as saying, “members are not required or asked to write 
favourably” about the United States.586 He highlighted that the US forces were 
concerned that the payments to Iraqi journalists had become so extensive that 
they were destroying efforts to build democracy, while undermining US 
credibility. They also worried that information planted in the Iraqi press could 
‘blow back’ to the American public.587 Moreover, defence and military officials 
claimed the US public to be at risk in the instance that these planted stories 
should be published in the international press. Finally, military and defence 
officials said “the more extensive the information operations, the more likely 
they'll be discovered, thereby undermining the credibility of the US armed 
forces and the American government.”588 Uday Lutfi said that the turning point 
of America’s handling of the club took place when an American officer, Major 
Latmer, ordered journalists to write positively about the American Army 
operations. In a meeting with the Baghdad Club he announced, “we are 
paying you US Dollars”, and explained that they did not like criticism of the US 
in the stories.589 “I found that the American Army wanted to change the deal. 
Then the Baghdad Club standards were changed and the American forces 
turned our duties upside down. We started our work by disclosing the 
American Army’s mistakes, but they wanted to prevent us from doing our job 
in a professional way.”590 
Abbas Al-Salihi pointed out that, “the US army gave [journalists] new editorial 
demands, asking Iraqi club members to write positively about its actions.”591 
“They asked us to cover irrelevant issues such as the American soldiers’ 
attempts at charity in distributing used clothes and shoes to Iraqi children in 
schools. We had to report [these stories] as achievements of the American 
Army.”592 
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The US army did not only make editorial changes, but it also reshuffled the 
management of the Baghdad Club. Uday Lutfi said, “While I was in Amman, 
the Americans contacted me to tell me that they were going to hold elections 
to appoint a director to Baghdad Club. They asked me to participate in the 
election, yet also informed me of changes that were to be made to my 
previous contract. The main changes were that the American Army was going 
to pay money to the reporters for their coverage, and that the news would be 
classified into two types; positive and negative. Only positive coverage would 
receive compensation.”593 
Abbas al-Salihi disagreed with the reasons given by Uday Lutfi. He said that, 
“the US army and the office responsible for the Baghdad Club discovered 
irregularities in payments for journalists made through Uday Lutfi, and 
accused him of stealing the bonuses of journalists.”594 Al-Salihi added, “The 
US army asked us whether we received the laptops or bonuses and we told 
them about the unpaid fees.”595 However, Al-Salihi agreed with Lutfi about the 
new order asking journalists for positive coverage only, and that the new fees 
scale was dedicated to favourable reports.596 
Lutfi pointed out that the new payment plan was set to range from $15 to $45, 
depending on how positive the written report was.597 He added, “The US army 
contacted me about electing a new director for the club, and that I have to 
accept him and cooperate with him.”598 “The US army appointed a new 
director who worked as a policeman under [the] Saddam regime. As a result, 
168 journalists left the club, while only 20 chose to stay. This was the 
Baghdad Club’s endgame.”599 
An LA Times article drew the attention of reporters in Washington, who 
brought it up at press briefings at the White House, the State Department and 
the Pentagon, where official spokesmen insisted that they needed more facts 
before they could respond to journalists' questions.600 Knight Ridder writer 
Jonathan Landay said that the revelation of the Baghdad Club highlighted that 
the US military in Iraq turned from telling the truth to telling propaganda: 
“Public affairs staff at the American-run multinational headquarters in 
Baghdad have been combined with information operations experts in an 
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organisation known as the Information Task Force. The unit’s public officers 
are subservient to the information operations experts, military and defence 
officials said. The result is a ‘fuzzing up’ of what’s supposed to be a strict 
division between public affairs, which provides factual information about US 
military operations, and information operations, which can [be] used [as] 
propaganda and doctored [with] false information to influence enemy actions, 
perceptions and behaviour.”601 
In 2006 the US Defence Department investigation resulted in the closure of 
the Pentagon financed Baghdad Club, for fear that the body was causing 
damage to American credibility.602 
5.2. Yathrib Newspaper. 
As well as the TV stations, the Americans targeted communities by financing 
the publication of local newspapers, such as the weekly Yathrib. The 
newspaper was named after the small town of Yathrib where it was published, 
in Sallahdin Province, 80km north of Baghdad. The first issue was published 
in August 2003 and the issue number was marked ‘bism Allah’ (By the name 
of God).603 
Yathrib hosts the largest military airbase in the Middle East, built by the former 
Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, and now used by American troops 
(renamed ‘Anaconda’).604 After the Iraqis took up arms against the American 
troops, in the wake of Paul Bremer’s decision to dissolve the Iraq's army, 
security forces and its media establishment, the Americans launched a media 
operation aimed at winning the Iraqi people’s hearts and minds, preferring to 
use the media rather than deliver good policies on the ground.605 
The editor-in-chief of Yathrib, Aziz Almoslih, made clear why the Americans 
were supporting media organisations in Iraq at that time: “The Americans 
were supporting us financially for many reasons. First of all, they want[ed] us 
to represent them in a good way; to purify their image inside our community 
by presenting their effort to develop the area. They asked us to write against 
the violence, denounce the insurgents, promote the people’s participation in 
the Iraqi election and democratic process, and they asked me personally not 
 151 
to criticise the Iraqi government, because the Iraqi high officials were still new 
to their jobs and in the very beginning of their [posts].”606 
The newspaper was headed by the mayor of Yathrib, Shaoket Abdulrahman. 
He was appointed as a chairman of the board of directors. He had been a 
colonel in the Iraqi army under Saddam, and after the invasion he worked as 
a translator for the American Army who appointed him as a mayor. The editor-
in-chief, Aziz Almuslih, had trained at AlJomhoriah (The Republic) newspaper, 
one of the state newspapers in Iraq under Saddam. He and two club reporters 
constituted the paper's entire staff.607 
The Americans dismissed Iraq's media organisations, believing that Iraqi 
journalists were merely unqualified propagandists. They seemed unaware of 
the irony that by appointing a former military officer as the town's mayor and 
chairman of the board of directors of Yathrib, they were simply continuing 
Saddam's policies of installing loyalists in prominent positions. 
Turning to Yathrib itself, the newspaper consisted of eight pages. Page 1 
contained local news, and it always had a piece covering the achievements of 
the Americans, such as the building of a school or the fixing of a road. Its 
appreciation of the American role was obvious. Next to that, there was always 
an article from the chairman of the board of directors himself, in which he 
wrote about democracy, human rights and criticised Saddam’s regime. In his 
article it was clear that these things were in harmony with the American 
troops’ agendas and policies. Page 2 delivered international and national 
reports, the text of which was always copied straight from the internet. Page 3 
featured local and national Iraqi issues, such as the lack of fuel. Page 4 
covered Islamic issues. Page 5, a cultural page which contained new poems, 
book reviews, theatre news, etc. targeted the educated who were interested in 
cultural items. Page 6 was for entertainment and contained light hearted 
stories, jokes and such like. Page 7 was the sports page, the contents of 
which were almost always copied from the internet, and which never covered 
local sports or activities. Most bizarrely though, page 8 was reserved for 
pictures of women in sexy dresses, which did not fit with the traditions of the 
conservative tribal community. These materials too were taken from the 
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internet without accrediting any sources.608 All this suggests that the 
Americans dissolved Iraq’s media organisations to create their own, with little 
regard for professionalism or standards of journalism. 
“Two thousand copies of Yathrib were published, but although the paper was 
designated a weekly, its publishing was unstable. If the American army made 
the payment, then the newspaper would be published. If they did not make it, 
then we would not publish the newspaper. Because the Americans financed 
the newspaper to improve their image in the area, if we published something 
they did not like then they would stop the payments.”609 
Editor-in-chief Azziz Almuslih, was clear about the American role, saying: 
“The Iraqi officials, the Americans and some journalists held a meeting in 
Salah Ad Din Province to discuss the difficulties which the media faced in the 
area. The Americans asked why some of the newspapers stopped publishing 
their papers. We answered them, [stating] that we stopped because we do not 
have the financial support and the security situation does not help us work. 
Since then, they started paying us a monthly payment of $5,000 and provided 
us with computers and three digital cameras.”610 
The editor-in-chief and his staff have different points of view about whether 
the Americans wanted to sponsor and control their newspaper, or not. 
Almuslih said that the Americans were not annoyed when the paper published 
stories about their military operations, and that if they demolished or burnt a 
house “they asked us to [enquire] why they did such and such.”611 
But the editor, Amer Wahab, has a totally different point of view. He said that 
there were two kinds of control on the newspaper. The first filter was before 
publication, as the board of directors and the editor-in-chief used to go 
through the material and delete anything they didn’t seem to fit with the 
American view. The second control was directly from the Americans, as every 
issue of the newspaper was subject to the approval of an American officer, via 
the editor-in-chief and the board of directors, before it would ever reach the 
hands of the readers. “For example, the Americans withheld issue number 
three because we wrote about one of their military operations in which they 
killed six civilians and burnt them in their vehicle on their way back from the 
 153 
mosque after nights of prayers in the holy month of Ramadan. This story quite 
annoyed the Americans, so they shut down the newspaper for three months 
and then [allowed] it back again on 12th January 2004.”612 When I challenged 
editor-in-chief Almuslih about these actions of the American Army, he could 
not deny that they had occurred. He even added that the Americans had 
attempted to arrest him because of a story, and that he had fled from the area 
to Baghdad for nearly three weeks before returning home.613 
After that, the policies of the editor-in-chief and the board of directors became 
even harsher. The editor-in-chief started to reject any story that criticised the 
Americans, cast aspersions on their image and policies, or documented any 
negative American behaviour.614 Still, the publication carried a big title in the 
middle of the first page, saying: “A Weekly Independent Newspaper.”615 
These words show the dishonesty of the media operations planned and led by 
the US, which the Iraqi community faced following the 2003 invasion. The 
goal of the newly formed media landscape was to heavily influence Iraqis’ 
favourable opinions of the Americans and the occupation. The monthly 
payment for the editors was $150 each.616 
The newspaper was distributed for free by the Iraqi security forces, even 
though a price of 250 Iraqi dinars was printed on the top of the first page.617 
The paper was finally shut down when the Americans stopped their financial 
support without notifiying the staff. “It was a very big surprise when I 
discovered that the American guy who was in charge had left the country 
without telling me. And after his leaving, the financial support stopped, so we 
stopped publishing the newspaper. The last issue was [number] 54, on 20th 
December 2006.”618 
This raises another point regarding the American failure to establish a 
functioning media organisation in the tribal communities, either as a 
professional operation or as a propaganda tool. 
The staff of Yathrib also suffered from the lack of security, especially where it 
involved the political process. Almuslih said: “The insurgents also tried to 
force us and control the newspaper for their own interests by telling us what to 
write and what to avoid, but I did not obey them so they attacked me on 17th 
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June 2004 with a car bomb. It left 72 injuries on my body. The surprising thing 
was that Almanar TV, the Hizbu Allah station, filmed the attack and they were 
there before it happened, which very obviously means that they had 
information about it in advance.”619 
Almuslih summed up his experiences with Yathrib and the Americans: “I think 
that the Americans tried to support media projects [via] TV, newspapers and 
radio, but we did not deal with this opportunity as we should have. And from 
the American side, it was run by the military and [was] unprofessional. A good 
example of that was Salah Ad Din TV, the contract for which was given to a 
shepherd.”620 
Conclusion. 
The Baghdad Club was a very good example of the real intentions of the US 
towards the media in Iraq, and illustrates how they used the press club to 
polish their image. The US’s involvement in the Baghdad Club was 
considered a fatal mistake as their activities broke the ethical rules. And 
obviously they tried to pay for positive coverage from Iraqi journalists without 
informing their organisations. This new technique made it clear that the 
psychological warfare continued even after the toppling of Saddam’s regime. 
The Pentagon tried to justify their mistake and deny the allegation, but the 
secret documents and the in-depth interviews with staff and members of the 
Baghdad Club could prove their attempt to buy positive coverage and break 
ethical rules. 
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6. Chapter Six: Salah Ad Din Satellite Channel. 
Introduction. 
Salah Ad Din is a city north of Baghdad and is the hometown of the former 
Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein. Before the US invasion in 2003, the city 
had no television station or newspaper and did not feature in the history of 
Iraq's media. The Tigris River runs through this tribal province, providing its 
1.25 million inhabitants with their main source of income: agriculture. There 
are no factories or any local industries to speak of. When Saddam Hussein 
came to power in 1979, a lack of alternatives encouraged most of the city's 
youth to join Saddam's security and intelligence services.621 
Saddam felt confident that the people of Salah Ad Din would best protect his 
safety and he cultivated a strong alliance with his hometown. As a result, the 
province was badly affected by the US purge of Saddam loyalists from the 
Iraqi Army, security forces and the ministry of information. Tens of thousands 
of the province’s residents suddenly found themselves unemployed and on 
the street. The province soon became one of the most dangerous areas in 
Iraq and formed the epicentre of anti-American violence.  As the number and 
ferocity of attacks escalated, the US military focused their efforts on pacifying 
the province. However, local people began to feel unjustly targeted by the 
invaders. The US commanders were facing a growing problem: they lacked 
the means by which to communicate with local Iraqis, and any military action 
they took became a recruiting tool for insurgents. Without a way to justify their 
activities, the gap between coalition forces and the Iraqi citizens widened as 
the years passed.622 
 
6.2. The Establishment of Salah Ad Din TV. 
Raad Khatab was a military officer under Saddam and after the invasion 
became a political advisor for the US headquarters in Salah Ad Din. He 
described how the idea for a regional TV station was suggested at the end of 
2005: “The Americans decided to launch a TV station when they felt the need 
for a way to encourage dialogue instead of violence. So we started 
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negotiating the idea of establishing a TV station based in Tikrit, the centre of 
Salah Ad Din province. We held a meeting with Gen. Josef Toliteo, the 
commander of the 42nd American Division, where he promised that this project 
would become a reality. We then held several meetings between US military 
media professionals and local Iraqi people interested in the media sector. The 
project was approved and agreed with the American military leaders, and 
Sheik Kanaan Hawas Al-Sudaid, a tribal advisor for the American 
headquarters in Tikrit, was posted as the director of the new station. They 
decided to call it Salah Ad Din TV, named after the province in which it was 
based.”623 
Mr. Saad Alsalihi, a military doctor of Brigadier rank under Saddam, was the 
Coalition Arabic Spokesman for northern and central Iraq from 2003 to 2008. 
Like the US military, Mr Alsalihi saw the media as a weapon to be used during 
wartime. “I insisted that we have to build up a TV station in Salah Ad Din 
province; I told them that the media is a battleground to fight terrorism by 
deploying the Iraqi people through the screen. If we compare the cost, in both 
money and the lives of American soldiers and Iraqi people, between using the 
media to fight terrorism with using armed troops, we will find that it costs 10 
percent less. [The case was presented that] the media is much better and 
more effective, so the Americans agreed to finance the project of the TV 
station and paid all operating costs.” A delegation of American Forces, Iraqi 
staff and journalists then negotiated a deal with the Egyptian satellite 
company Nilesat, for a space to broadcast the channel.624 
The Americans selected tribal leader Sheik Kanaan Hawas Al-Sudaid as both 
the main contractor and the channel's new director. According to Alsalihi, the 
US picked Sheik Al-Sudaid because of the protection afforded by his tribe's 
power in the area. Al-Sudaid was also a wealthy and educated man, having 
graduated from business college, with extensive contacts and good relations 
with Arab tribes in the area. This gave him a high social and political status in 
Salah Ad Din province.625 
The project failed to attract media professionals from the start, as there was 
little harmony between journalistic standards and the operations within the 
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new channel. 
Dr. Salam Khatab is a professional Iraqi journalist and a lecturer at the 
College of Media in Salah Din University. He was involved in the project from 
the very beginning and described it from a professional point of view as a “bad 
experience”. “We [had] been invited to launch the channel as a project which 
would be run by the Governorate of Salah Ad Din. We had been told that the 
channel will be [situated] in one of Saddam Hussein's presidency palaces. 
Then they asked us to write up the channel’s structure and to build it 
accordingly. We travelled to Egypt and the Americans financed the expenses 
of the trip. We met professionals from the Lebanese Sat Production Company 
and asked them to form the structure. We met processing companies and got 
their offers to supply us with the equipment.  After that, we visited the 
Egyptian satellite company NileSat to get a quote for a signal on their system 
and they offered us a booking with a price of $75,000 per year. We agreed to 
rent a studio in the Media City in Cairo, and then headed to Iraq with the 
offers and the structure, but a surprise was waiting for us in Iraq. When we got 
back, we found out that the Americans had given the contract for the channel 
to Sheik Al-Sudaid and appointed him as director. They then appointed a 
Board Council to the channel. I was one of its members, alongside Mohanad 
Jasim, a historian, and Ali Gazi, an engineer. The Americans asked us to work 
with Al-Sudaid for the interest of the governorate and its people. Very soon, 
we discovered that Sheik Al-Sudaid knew nothing about the media world. He 
imagined that television is produced with just a microphone and satellite dish. 
Suddenly, Sheik Al-Sudaid went off to Cairo and booked a signal with NileSat 
before we had even finished selecting our staff. The big surprise for me was 
that the Americans insisted we had to start airing before the General Election 
of December 2005. That was illogical at the time, because we did not have 
enough staff, nor did we have any archive footage. I asked them to give us a 
chance for a three-month experimental airing to test our abilities, but they did 
not agree. For me, that does not make any professional sense. Then we as a 
Board discovered that there were political and tactical aims behind the project. 
The Americans were trying to reflect the success of their “Democratic project” 
in Iraq. From my own experience, I could say that the Americans established 
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the channel for their own agendas and not to create a professional TV station 
in the province.”626 
The contractor, Sheik Al-Sudaid, denies the claims that the Americans 
financed the project, and that they intended to use it as a political and military 
tool. “Before the Salah Ad Din TV Channel, we did not have a free media to 
deliver our people’s opinion. So when we established the channel, it was a 
great chance to support our democratic rights in this country. The Americans 
did not provide us with any support; most of the station's equipment was 
available in the province before 2003. All we did was develop it into a TV 
channel and all the Americans did was supply us with some needed 
equipment. If the Americans really did support us in the project, you would see 
a different channel with a much better performance.”627 
However, a US military document obtained by me tells a different story. It 
details a transfer of $880,000 to Sheik Al-Sudaid on 12th August 2006 for his 
services as a contractor for the Salah Ad Din TV project. The details of this 
transaction are as follows: 
“Depositor Account Title: 
RAWAFED ALSUDAID FOR COMMERCE & GENERAL 
CONTRACTING 
Name of Corresponding Bank: 
Warka Bank For Investment & Finance 
Address: Warka Investment Bank – main branch SULAIMANIA/IRAQ 
Email:warkabank@hotmail.com 
SWIFT (BIC) Number: 
808 
Account Number of Bank Listed above: 
402242 
Signature of Payee: 
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Kanaan Hawas Al-Sudaid 
Date: 
Aug.12th.2006.”628 
 
The statement of work in the contract order states that the contractor must 
“provide one year of services to the satellite station to be used toward 
developing quality programming, broadcasting news, educational and 
entertainment shows [suited to] the interests of local audiences, and [present] 
information with an accurate and truthful perspective.”629 In the same section 
of the contract order, it states that the contractor must broadcast at least thirty 
minutes to every three television hours about the Iraqi governmental 
development, democracy (meaning the American political process or project 
in Iraq) and educational programming.630 
There is an inevitable conflict between giving an “accurate and truthful 
perspective” while, at the same time, requiring the broadcaster to devote up to 
three hours a day reporting on the democratic development of Iraq. Perhaps 
this answers the question of why the Americans chose Sheik Al-Sudaid, a 
tribal leader with no professional media experience, to run the channel. His 
lack of experience meant he would accept such interference in the editorial 
decision-making of the station. A media professional would see the 
contradiction between what America wanted the station to say and what was 
actually happening in the Iraqi streets. Anyone in Iraq at that time would have 
found it difficult to speak positively about democracy and the political process 
in Iraq. 
Raad Khatab confirmed that the American forces paid Sheik Al-Sudaid 
$880,000 to establish the channel. He claims they also paid him the salaries 
of the staff and all the other expenses as an operating cost:631 “As a matter of 
fact, the American forces financed the channel for two years and they were 
paying the whole operating cost, regardless of any financial return.”632 
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6.3. The “Statement of purpose”. 
The Americans wrote the statement of purpose for the channel's charter. It 
outlined the purpose of establishing Salah Ad Din TV, including specification 
of what its priorities were. 
“Salah Ad Din TV was established as a public and private partnership for the 
benefit of Salah Ad Din Citizens with the following purposes: 
1) To provide independent, comprehensive, impartial and in-depth coverage 
and analysis of news and current affairs in Salah Ad Din province, Iraq and 
the world (including the activities of public and private institutions). 
2) To provide feature programming that contributes towards intellectual, 
scientific and cultural developments, promotes informed and many sided 
debate, and stimulates critical thought, thereby enhancing opportunities for 
citizens to participate in local, national and international life. 
3) To promote the education of the Iraqi people on the functioning of 
democracy and the sovereign Government of Iraq. 
4) To provide programming and program planning that includes the views of 
all citizens of Iraq, regardless of ethnicity or religious preference. 
5) To assist the sovereign Government of Iraq in maintaining domestic order 
throughout Iraq by providing public service announcements. 
6) To provide a forum to discuss the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Iraq 
and to denounce all violence against Iraqi citizens, Iraqi security forces and 
coalition forces.”633 
Professor Salam Khatab, an Iraqi journalist and lecturer at the College of 
Media, Tikrit University, was one of the first members of the Board. He was 
unequivocal about the source of the broadcaster's finance and the purpose of 
it. He said, “the channel is financed by the Americans to serve the American 
project in Iraq.”634 “From the very beginning, the channel was a failure and it 
seemed unpromising for many reasons: first of all, we tried to attract 
professionals to be members of our staff, but the contractor, Sheik Al-Sudaid, 
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interrupted our work and did not care about that. All he wanted to do was to 
go to air despite of the station's lack of professionalism. We as members of 
the Board had no authority in the channel: we were just a formality and did not 
have an active role in the channel’s performance. Besides that, not all the 
board members were professionals and they had no experience in the media 
at all. All the power was in the hands of Sheik Al-Sudaid, so I struggled a lot 
and I had to fight with him. I spoke to the Governor and the Governing Council 
about the difficulties and I told them that the channel is an American project to 
serve their agenda in Iraq, and this is why they were financing it. The 
Governor, Ahmed Alshagti, asked me to stay at the channel and told me that 
‘it does not matter who finances it, it matters how we use it’. But it was 
impossible to work with someone with no experience of the media and who 
suddenly finds themselves running a media organisation. For instance, Sheik 
Al-Sudaid visited a music video TV Station in Jordan, Amman, and he found 
three members of staff running the station. That kind of station just needs 
technicians, because all the material has been recorded, so they were just 
changing items. When he got back to Iraq, Khatab fired thirty employees from 
the staff and he told us, ‘I want it to be like that TV station which was run by 
three people.’ This is when I decided to leave the channel; I felt that it was 
impossible to work in such a farce.635 In accordance with US employment 
laws, Sheik Al-Sudaid was required to give written contracts to all his 
employees to protect them against such mass firings.”636 
In spite of the station's poor performance, and complaints from its employees 
and Board of Directors, when the contract entered its second year, the 
Americans insisted on no changes to the channel's operation. Professor 
Khatab described a tense meeting about the channel’s future: “When the 
contract's first year came to an end, the governor and the Governing Council 
held a meeting with about ten professional journalists, and they told us that 
the channel would be handed to Governorate. They wanted to fix the 
problems in the channel and asked us to form the new Board, to lead changes 
to improve the channel's performance. We discussed the mechanism and the 
policy which we should follow, but during the meeting we were surprised when 
American military representatives entered the room and took part in the 
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discussion. They told us that the mechanism will stay the same and the whole 
project of the channel would carry on as a contract. They said that anyone 
who could give a lower price would win the contract. I asked them, 'even if the 
contractor was a vegetable dealer?' Their answer was 'yes'. Of course they 
did not like media professionals, because they would not follow their rules and 
agenda.”637 
Jamal Asker, an Iraqi journalist and a lecturer at the College of Media, Tikrit 
University, attended the same meeting, and was surprised by the American 
attitude. “I asked them to give the station's budget to the Governorate Council 
and then the Council could choose the right people to run the channel, but 
they refused and told us that American law prevents them from doing that, 
and that the contract should be a tender. Any bidder could go to their website 
(www.baghdadbusinesscenter.org) or send an email (tikritcco@hotmail.com) 
with an offer. Also, the American representatives said that they [had] the right 
to follow up the programmes and give their point of view; this right extended to 
drawing up the channel policy. Besides that, they made it very clear and told 
us that the contractor has the first and final word of drawing up the channel 
policy. So we all left the meeting and decided that there was no way to 
participate in this project.”638 
 
6.4. The Establishment of the Board of Directors. 
The orders from the American officials directly contradict their charter for the 
channel. In Article 2 of the contract, it gives guidelines covering the 
performance and duties of the Board of Directors: 
1) “Purpose: The Board of Directors (or “Board”) are the primary enforcers of 
the service contract and performance for Salah Ad Din Television. Members 
should be prominent members of the community or media experts. 
Members of the military and government employees may not serve in the 
Board. No more than three members will be appointed from Salah Ad Din 
provincial council. 
2) Membership: a seven member Board of Directors will be appointed. The 
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initial Board will be appointed on agreement by the Governor and the 
Deputy Governor of Salah Ad Din province, in consultation with prominent 
provisional-level business and government leaders. Vacancies on the 
Board will be filled upon selection and unanimous vote by the entire Board. 
Appointments to the Board will be done in writing. 
3) Powers and Duties of the Board: the Board’s primary authority is to report 
to the Salah Ad Din TV funding authority and the citizens of Salah Ad Din 
province, on the service provider’s performance adherence to contract 
requirements for the service: 
a) The Board is responsible for reporting to the funding authority on the 
performance of the service provider’s adherence to the contract, 
from both the service’s requirements and financial accounting of 
funds. 
b) The Board of Directors will meet quarterly with the funding authority. 
c) If the Board finds that the service provider is not in compliance with 
at minimum one provision of the contract, the Board may suggest 
the cancellation of the contract with the service provider and 
recommended a new contract service provider be selected via a 
competitive process. 
d) The Board also serves as the approval authority for the service 
provider’s selections for each of the key positions: 
i) General Manager 
ii) Programming Director 
iii) News Director 
iv) Chief Engineer 
v) Business Manager 
vi) Accounting Director 
e) All other hiring is done at the discretion of the service provider. All 
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employees of Salah Ad Din Television will be qualified for the 
position that they fill. 
f) The Board receives the quarterly financial statement of the service 
provider. 
g) The Board may periodically review the quality of the programming 
and station operations, and make recommendations for 
improvements to the contractor or funding authority. 
h) The Board may amend this charter upon unanimous vote and with 
approval from the funding authority. 
4) Terms of the Board, including compensation: Board members shall serve a 
term of two years. After two years, Board members may be re-nominated 
by agreement of the then serving Governor and Deputy Governor. While 
away from their homes or regular places of business, Board members shall 
be allowed travel, and actual, reasonable and necessary expenses will be 
subsidised from a general expenses fund set aside for that purpose. 
5) Officers: The officers of the Board of Directors will be selected by a simple 
majority vote. The Board will select a Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and 
Secretary/Treasurer who will account for travel and other actual, 
reasonable and necessary expenses, and pay these to Board members out 
of the dedicated funds. 
6) Meetings and administration: The Board will meet quarterly (once every 
three months) at a minimum. A quorum of five members is required to hold 
a meeting and vote. Decisions by the Board require a minimum of five 
affirmative votes. Meetings and decisions of the Board will be recorded by 
the Secretary/Treasurer. 
7) Termination of the Board of Directors: Members[hip] of the Board may be 
terminated for non-participation, malfeasance or criminal activity and a 
replacement will be named. Board members may also resign for personal 
reasons. The Governor and Deputy Governor, in consultation with 
provincial-level business and government leaders, must agree on a 
 165 
nomination for replacement Board members, and the remaining Board 
members will then vote on that nomination.”639 
But looking at how the Board actually operated, it seems that the rules in 
Article 2 were nothing more than ink on paper. I travelled to Iraq and went to 
the American military base named Speicher, based in Tikrit. I requested an 
interview with Major Roger Henderson, the man in charge of the Salah Ad Din 
TV project, but received no response. I also tried to contact Major Henderson 
by email, but again received no response. Jamal Asker was one of the first 
people invited onto the Board. He confirmed that “the first Board members 
were appointed by the Americans, there was no election; it was a 
selection.”640 
According to Dr. Amer Ayash, the Board Director of Salah Ad Din TV and the 
Dean of the College of Law at Tikrit University, “there is a big gap between 
what was written in the charter and the practical side of the Board's powers to 
monitor the policy of the channel and its performance.” He continued, stating; 
“We have no authority, the contractor is the most powerful person at the 
channel because the Americans gave him the authorisation to make changes. 
We tried making some changes in the charter of the channel, which was 
written by the Americans, but the Americans refused the idea of taking power 
out of the hands of the contractor. They favoured Sheik Al-Sudaid, as his 
loyalty was guaranteed by the money [they] paid to him.”641 
Jamal Asker described how the Board of Directors operated in practice: “The 
meetings of the Board were 'cup of tea meetings'. The members of the Board 
just go to the channel meeting, drink cups of tea and then leave. That’s the 
reality of the Board, because they do not have any authority in the channel. 
Yes, they could make some recommendations to the contractor or the 
Director, but he can just ignore them.”642 
Article 3, named ‘Channel's Charter’, written by the Americans, outlines how 
the broadcaster should operate: 
1. “Operations: Salah Ad Din Television will be managed solely for the 
benefit and education of the citizens of Salah Ad Din province and Iraq, 
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offering an impartial provision of news and programming. Salah Ad Din 
Television will not be managed for the financial benefit of an individual 
or group. Management will be pre-formed by the holder of Salah Ad Din 
contract, with oversight from the Board of Directors. Salah Ad Din 
Television is encouraged to seek independent sources of revenue for 
the purpose of improving the quality of the programming, the purchase 
of news equipment and improvement of the station overall. Equipment 
purchased by Salah Ad Din Television becomes the property of the 
station. Revenue received from independent sources will be reported in 
the quarterly financial reporting. While operating for the benefit of the 
people of Salah Ad Din province and Iraq, in order to maintain that 
independence, Salah Ad Din television will operate without interference 
or influence from any government agency, official, political party, 
individual or group. 
2. Finance: Salah Ad Din Television will provide quarterly financial reports 
to the Board of Directors and the funding authority using International 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).”643 
The Board Director, Dr Ayash, confirmed that the contractor did not provide 
any quarterly financial reports, or any financial reports at all, to the Board of 
Directors. He again described the contract rules as just 'ink on paper'. Another 
issue was a confusion throughout the organisation, and among its sponsors, 
over the intended scope and content of the channel's coverage. 
The American charter defined it as covering news from the Salah Ad Din 
province, Iraq and the rest of the world, as well as educational, entertainment 
and cultural programs.644 But the head of the Board, Dr. Ayash, saw the 
station as a news channel: “Its focus should be on the Iraqi audience inside 
and outside Iraq, so it is a local news channel. It covers the news in Salah Ad 
Din; the issues of the local people and the official side.”645 
On the other hand, the News Editor, Mohammed Al-Azawi, insisted it is more 
than a news channel, claiming that Salad Ad Din TV should provide political, 
cultural, social, music and entertainment coverage: “Our news coverage is 
limited because our abilities are not strong enough. For example, we do not 
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have SNGs (portable satellite dishes) to do live coverage; we have to record 
onto tapes and send them by car to the studio. The channel has only one 
reporter in Tikrit. So we get most of our news coverage from Reuters. Still, Al-
Azawi believes that 'the channel is an International channel’.”646 
 
I spoke twice to Dr. Dawlat Aldahash, the current contractor and the owner of 
the channel, attempting to interview him. He refused to answer the questions 
and instead asked me, “why don't you make the study about another TV 
station, not Salah Ad Din, as there are a lot.”647 
The channel started transmission on 1st October 2005 for three hours a day. 
The channel is now available in 26 major cities and towns across Iraq, and 
broadcasts on NileSat frequency 11747. Since 1st June 2006, it started 
broadcasting 24 hours a day.648 The fact that it is the only Iraqi channel 
without a website address in either Arabic or English, is a strong testament to 
the low levels of professional performance. 
6.5. Main Programmes. 
The channel’s schedule is determined by the main contractor and owner, Dr 
Aldahash. It features a mix of political discussion programs and light 
entertainment, some of which are detailed below: 
Political Programmes: 
Discussion of a Case: a weekly program presented by Kameran Salah 
Ad Din, 20:15 Baghdad time on Saturdays. A government official, a 
professional or a politician takes part in a studio discussion with the 
presenter about a specific issue. 
The Council: a weekly program presented by Ahmed Adnan, 19:00 
Baghdad time on Sundays. This programme focuses on the issues 
relating to the Province Governing Council. A member or two from the 
local Governing Council are present in the studio, who discuss a 
selected major issue and its possible resolutions. 
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A Special Interview: Occasional interview with a political, economical, 
religious or social figure by Kameran Salah Ad Din. Aired at night and 
follows the same format as 'Discussion of a Case'. 
Cultural and art programmes: 
A Creative’s Biography: An occasional interview with a creative figure 
by Waleed Almadani in the studio. The presenter discusses the lives 
and works of the interviewees. 
The Most Important Cultural Stations: A weekly programme at 19:30, 
that presents a report taken from Reuters about a specific cultural idea, 
city or establishment. 
Family Programmes: 
The Family Studio: A weekly programme presented by Dr. Samer 
Maolood, at 20:15 on Wednesdays. A guest in the studio, who is almost 
invariably female, will take part in a discussion during which the 
presenter takes phone calls from the viewing public. 
Sports Programmes: 
The Weekly Sport Bulletin: Weekly sports news, giving the most 
important sports coverage in the world, presented by Adeeb Aljuburi, at 
21:00 on Friday. There are no guests in this programme as all the news 
is taken directly from Reuters.649 
News: 
10:00  News Summary.  (10min) 
15:00  News Summary.  (10min) 
20:00  Main Newscast.   (20min) 
24:00 News Summary.   (10min) 
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6.6. Salah Ad Din TV’s Ownership. 
The Government's influence on the channel continues to the present day. Dr 
Alsalihi described the limitations this imposed on the channel's journalistic 
coverage: “The local Governorate manipulated the channel, so it could not 
criticise the government or give impartial coverage to the main issues. 
Actually, this influence comes from the circumstances of the channel’s 
establishment and its legal status. Initially, the channel was under the 
American administration, who then gave it to contractors to run. So they gave 
it to the Al-Dahash family to do so, but its legal status is still unsettled. The Al-
Dahash family says that the channel is theirs, but, on the other hand, the 
Governorate insist that they own it.”650 
Dr. Saad Almashahadani, a journalist and lecturer at the College of Media, 
Tikrit University, describes how the station’s unclear ownership status has 
affected its coverage: “The channel's current owner and director, Dr. 
Aldahash, does not like to criticise the Government [as it may result in] fuelling 
the anger of the high officials, which could drive them to put an end to the 
illegal ownership of the channel. There is no doubt that the channel is legally 
owned by the Governorate of Salah Ad Din properties, but the Americans 
decided to make it a private project instead of being owned by the people of 
Salah Ad Din. So I am quite sure that if the channel criticises government 
officials, they will work to take it from [the] Al-Dahash family and give it back to 
the Governorate properties and establishments.”651 
But to observers, the contractors’ fear of speaking out does not come as a 
surprise. In the US contracts ‘Statement of Work’, there is clause stating that 
“the contractor shall not broadcast any material that incites violence, is anti-
government or anti-coalition.”652 This vague paragraph severely restricts the 
station’s coverage, as its interpretation could be used to justify the banning of 
any negative reports about either the Coalition or the Government of Iraq. 
A leaked document from the American army shows that they were so 
confident in their influence over Salah Ad Din TV station, that they expected a 
press release justifying their troops’ wounding of two Iraqis to be broadcast on 
the station without challenge.653 
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Dr. Aldahash signed the contract with NileSat with his own name, and not the 
Governorate of Salah Ad Din. He considers this as proof of his ownership of 
the channel. However, the governorate disagrees, and insists that the 
buildings, most of the equipment and the name of the channel are owned by 
the province of Salah Ad Din.654 
In 2008, Dr. Aldahash’s prediction came true when the Americans decided to 
give the channel to his family as a gift when the contract came to an end.655 
However, the Americans forgot paragraph J – Section C in the Statement of 
Work, which states: “Equipment purchased for Salah Ad Din Television 
becomes the property of the station and does not transfer to the contractor.”656 
But on the ground they handed the whole station, along with its equipment, as 
a gift to Aldahash, to become part of his property. The American decision led 
to a major issue in the province: if the contract states that the station is owned 
by the Governorate, then how could the Americans simply give it away to the 
contractor? 
The American involvement with Salah Ad Din TV created a non-institutional 
form of ownership. It was set up by the American military, owned and run by a 
single contractor, and financed with Iraqi money confiscated from frozen bank 
accounts, which was given by international donors. This policy created a new 
ownership structure without any legal precedence. Legitimate issues and 
complaints could not be resolved due to this confused situation about the real 
ownership of the station. While the Americans did provide some equipment for 
the channel, much of it was equipment left over from Saddam’s era and was 
owned by the Governorate. Dr. Almashahadani sums up the situation in a 
single phrase: “the Americans gifted what they did not own, to those who did 
not deserve it.”657 
6.6.1. Salah Ad Din TV’s Performance. 
In its news coverage, the station relies on a lot of footage from other media 
organisations and does not have the resources to produce enough of its own 
indoor or outdoor reports.658 
Sheik Al-Sudaid, the first contractor and director of the channel, blamed the 
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channel’s poor performance and reputation on two reasons: “Firstly, it has 
weak financial status and, secondly, one of the most complicated difficulties 
which faced the channel was the Governorate administration and the local 
authorities. We could not criticise them as we were airing from inside the 
country, so we were completely under their influence.”659 
There was a financial incentive for the contractor to cut down costs as much 
as possible to achieve interest on its unspent budget. This affected the quality 
and professionalism of the station’s coverage. The channel’s problems are still 
not improving as it does not have a mechanism to systematically review its 
performance and programmes. These weaknesses continue to make it 
impossible to compete with other television channels. As a result, Salah Ad 
Din fails to attract either the global Arabic audience, or the domestic Iraqi 
audience. Besides this, the channel differs from its competitors by not 
providing platforms for its audience to participate in the programmes, resulting 
in a lack of feedback from the viewers they are targeting. There are significant 
gaps in the station's journalistic coverage as well as a lack of entertainment 
programmes, especially for children. A study about the entertainment 
programmes on Salah Ad Din TV by Adhra Ismail Ziadan, a tutor from the 
College of Media, Tikrit University, found that the most successful programme 
was Mazaif Ahalna (The Receptions of our People).660 This programme was 
produced under Saddam for the state satellite channel and featured tribal 
Arab poems that proudly glorified the local tribes. Salah Ad Din TV invited 
Mazaif Ahalna’s producer and presenter to make the programme again for the 
channel.661 
Under Saddam, the poetry was turned into a political tool to attack the Arab 
Gulf leaders after his invasion of Kuwait. This was a very powerful weapon, as 
its target audience was also rooted in tribal communities.662 
The programme is now a weekly show broadcast at 21:00 and repeated at 
22:00 on Fridays. The presenter, Abdulhakeem Zalan, is always filmed 
outside the studio at the reception of a local tribal Sheik.663 This tactical 
location makes the programme feel closer to the local tribal audience from the 
same background, but it also alienates the other communities, especially from 
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the more modern communities. Even the dialects and the accents of the show 
cannot be understood by many other Arab communities. This localisation is 
another example of how the channel fails to understand the basic principles of 
a satellite broadcaster.664 
Dr. Farid Saleh, lecturer at the College of Media, Tikrit University, thinks that 
the channel is ignoring its commitment to developing local communities: 
“There are a lot of local fans, but it is very clear and understandable that the 
channel does not drive the community forward, but instead brings them 
backwards.”665 
The channel’s equipment and services are not of high technical standards, 
and some are even outdated. The channel is also booking a weak bandwidth 
with NileSat which affects the quality of the footage.666 
Like most organisations in Iraq, the channel suffered from the lack of security 
in the country. According to Isa Ayal, an Iraqi journalist and lecturer at Tikrit 
University, the station’s employees were targeted and killed by insurgent 
groups who considered the channel part of the American project in Iraq. 
Hussein Altikriti, head of the technician department, was killed in front of his 
house in 2005.667 The Americans put security procedures in place to protect 
the contractor from the threat of kidnapping. The US military was committed to 
protecting its contractors, as the Salah Ad Din TV contract stated that, “the 
security and safety of our contractors are paramount to the success of Project 
and Contracting Office’s (PCO) Iraq reconstruction mission.”668 However, this 
protection did not extend to the journalists working for the station. It is worth 
noting here that any missing, kidnapped or killed Iraqi journalists would not 
affect the project, but losing a contractor meant they also lost the money they 
had paid out. 
Dr. Alsalihi said, “I supervised the channel for the first three years without 
being a member of the Board for security reasons. After my time there, I 
concluded that the news was almost always local and traditional as well. That 
did not surprise me, because there is a shortage of staff, especially the 
reporters. But when the Americans were financing the channel, there were 
more reporters, as the Americans were paying their salaries regardless of the 
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cost. Yes, it is a satellite channel but there is nothing international about its 
performance. One of the main reasons for this is that the staff are local. They 
could not see past this point and it created a mental barrier that affected the 
work of the station. Staff were open to influence from relationships with local 
contacts, compromising the station's impartiality. This is known as localisation 
sickness. But still the channel achieved the goal that prompted its creation, by 
reducing the violence in the province, and contributing to the defeat of Al-
Qaeda groups. So I think it protected the souls of many of the Iraqis and the 
American soldiers. Besides that, it helped activate the political process in the 
province and the country through its programmes about the election and 
democracy.”669 
Today's Board Director, Amer Ayash, describes the station in a few telling 
words: “The channel is a part of the chaos which covered Iraq after the 
invasion of 2003,”670 the exact same words that Simon Haselock used to 
describe the Al-Iraqiyah project.671 
Conclusion. 
Besides the strategic US plans, there were tactics for the use of the media in 
psychological warfare. In other words, sometimes they fixed their plans in 
response to the challenges they faced on the ground. So they created a plan 
which enabled the military to launch television channels in other provinces, or 
what are called ‘local channels’, the aim being to influence the locals and 
improve their opinions of the US forces. They felt a strong need for such 
projects, especially after their failure to win the hearts and the minds through 
Al-Iraqiyah. And their troops started facing hard resistance on the ground in 
specific provinces or cities. A telling example of one such station is Salah Ad 
Din TV, which was very much a case of challenge and response, as day by 
day the American troops started facing more attacks in the province of Salah 
Ad Din (the hometown of Saddam Hussein), so they had to try all the means 
they had to reduce these attacks. Salah Ad Din Channel was launchd for 
tactical purposes and to serve the US military’s agenda. Also the US used it to 
justify their serious mistakes, for example killing civilians. This is why the US 
army gave the contract to non-professional individuals who were far from the 
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central media, making it easier for their soldiers to use them. It is important to 
highlight that there is a very big gap between what the US army  wrote in their 
secret documents about the purpose of establishing Salah Ad Din Channel 
and their practices and its usage on the ground. Their documents say that it 
should be an independent and free channel, but on the ground they were 
controlling the editorial side of the channel and they used it to promote their 
point of view. 
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7. Chapter Seven: Personal Experience. 
 
7.1. First Impressions. 
I do not exaggerate when I say that it would be as easy as forgetting my own 
name, to forget the day the American forces began their invasion of Iraq. In 
March of 2003, when the invasion began, I was a military officer in the Iraqi 
army. I was in limbo about the situation. As a military officer, I had no choice 
but to defend my country. The problem was that I was defending not simply 
my country, but the regime of Saddam Hussein. The Americans’ promise of 
democracy, free speech and liberty sounded enticing and something much 
needed in Iraq. I believed the American promises and the image in my mind, 
as American forces marched in on Baghdad, was of soldiers who would treat 
the Iraqi people as they would treat their own people. After all, they had 
arrived to share the ideals of America, and most importantly, ideals of 
freedom. I made my choice. I would leave the battlefield without shooting a 
single bullet. It was a difficult decision because I was sure that Baghdad, our 
beautiful capital, would collapse under foreign occupation, but perhaps that 
was the price for getting rid of Saddam. 
I was a military officer with twelve years of hard service in the army, but I 
suddenly found myself out of work, sitting in the street. I felt I had lost my 
dignity. This was an unanticipated feeling, but it was only one of many 
unexpected things in the weeks after the ‘liberation’. On 7th June 2003, at one 
o’clock in the morning, American troops raided my family home in my village 
of Duluhiya, 80 km north of Baghdad. Infantry soldiers swarmed from every 
direction, backed by armed vehicles and tanks on the ground, helicopters 
from the sky and military boats from the river Tigris; the same river where we 
had once sat as a family, enjoying the moonlight, the palm trees and the 
sound of bird song as a gift from heaven. 
After this harrowing experience, the Americans killed two of my uncles in cold 
blood. Four hundred people from my village were arrested, most of whom 
were friends or relatives, including my nephew who was five years old at the 
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time. The operation had been dubbed by American forces, “Peninsula Strike”. 
They gave no reason for their actions and later recorded them as military 
‘mistakes’, according to the American Military Commander in Iraq, General 
Sanchez.672 I asked a very young American soldier what we had done to 
deserve all of this. I asked why they had killed my two elderly uncles. It took 
him a while to respond, and when he did he had tears in his eyes. He told me 
that, after what he had seen, when he finished his time in the army he would 
leave and never re-enlist. The media coverage of the operation in my village 
would later prove to be a huge disappointment. Every newspaper and 
television station reported the story from conflicting angles. Now working as a 
journalist, I too reported the story in my newspaper, Iraq Today, trying to 
record it as it should have been recorded.673 Shortly after, General Sanchez 
asked to see me following a press conference in the Convention Centre in 
Baghdad. He told me that my story was incorrect. I responded that it was true, 
but he insisted that my story on Peninsula Strike had no truth behind it. His 
tone grew angry and he proceeded to call me a liar. My final response to 
General Sanchez was, "It is true. I know it to be true because it happened to 
my own family and I was a direct eyewitness." He gave an odd little smile and 
took his leave.674 I feared for some reprisal following my encounter with 
General Sanchez, but none came. 
 
7.2. The Gap between American Promises and Practices. 
Like many Iraqis living under Saddam Hussein, I dreamed of exercising my 
right to freedoms of speech and expression; but under a totalitarian regime 
that suppresses free speech and seeks to control public opinion to keep itself 
in power, it could only be a dream. Saddam used the media as a means of 
control. The public was fed only information dictated by the regime. The Iraqi 
government at that time was running the media for its own ends and, as a 
result, local media organisations were an unquestioning reflection of the 
government’s policies, views and agenda. Like most governments in the 
Middle East, Iraq’s government saw the media as a means to achieve its own 
goals. For that reason, I couldn’t work as a journalist until Saddam’s 
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government was toppled. Naively, I thought that the right time for me to step 
into journalism had come, along with the invading troops and the values their 
nations stood for. I was lured by the promise of free speech and 
unprecedented media freedoms, as conveyed by top American officials and 
generals before the invasion. 
I had served as a major in the Iraqi army before the invasion, and when 
western powers came to the streets of my hometown, I felt the urge to start 
reporting on the new Iraq, despite the many calls to resist the occupation I 
received from some of my former Iraqi army colleagues. While my colleagues 
thought the only way to regain Iraq’s sovereignty was through armed 
resistance, I firmly believed that the written word would be the way forward. 
Amid the worsening security situation and the declining living conditions in 
post-invasion Iraq, I would be a defender of my country, not by way of the 
gun, but by a notebook, a pen and a rather new contraption to me at the time: 
a digital camera. But my hope of exercising free speech in a free media was 
quickly shattered. It happened while I was reporting a story for Iraq Today, a 
post-Saddam English language newspaper that I joined after the invasion. 
The story detailed the killing of a former Iraqi colonel, Amer Al-Obaidi, who 
was killed in cold blood in front of his family. Colonel Al-Obaidi was killed in 
his house by American forces, who alleged that he was involved in fighting 
American troops in an area in Saladin province. Al-Obaidi was killed without 
any charges or court hearings.675 
Soon after the story came out in Iraq Today, I was threatened by a Lieutenant 
Colonel Sprinman, fourth battalion commander, fourth division of the US 
army. Although I had documents and interviews that supported all the details 
in my story, he accused me of publishing lies. He was speaking to me with 
anger and his right hand was on his pistol. It was another hard lesson for 
me.676 The incident awakened me to a hard truth: Iraq’s occupiers had no 
respect for human rights and little time for a free media. They were using the 
media as another weapon in their war, and any critical material it might put out 
was unwelcome. Until then, I had not given up on the state of the media in 
Iraq, hoping that the new Iraqi officials who had lived in exile in Europe and 
the US, might stand up to any violations. But not long after the formation of 
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the first democratic Iraqi government, I started to realise that the new leaders 
were not so different from Saddam Hussein when it came to controlling the 
media and harnessing it for their own political ends. 
It is true that since the invasion in 2003, a media revolution of sorts has taken 
place in Iraq. The number of new newspapers, news channels and radio 
stations has multiplied significantly, but that plethora of media outlets came at 
great expense. 
Before the war, media organisations were governed by laws and regulations, 
including many of a severely restrictive nature. After the war, our journalists 
and media organisations had to abide by three inadequate legal provisions 
introduced by Paul Bremer, an American and the administrator of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq at the time. These new laws were 
ineffective. They did not protect journalists, nor their organisations, from 
interfering local and foreign authorities, or even individuals. At the same time, 
neither the public nor the authorities were themselves protected from the 
media. As a result, the government adopted a range of punitive measures 
against journalists, starting with criminal and anti-terrorism laws. It is easy to 
imagine the hurdles that local journalists had to try to overcome under these 
circumstances, if they were to have any hope of reporting with integrity. 
After Iraq Today was shut down, I started looking for an independent media 
organisation to work for, but despite the multitude of media outlets, I was 
unable to find one. What I found instead was far from perfect. Instead of 
dealing with a central dictatorship as in the past, I found that journalists now 
had to deal with many different dictatorships; regional, sectarian and partisan. 
It has become so difficult to work in this environment that most journalists 
found they had to be of a certain ethnic or religious group, or have certain 
party affiliations, to hold the ability to report on stories. I therefore considered 
myself very fortunate when Reuters started a new Iraqi news agency, Voices 
of Iraq, and offered me a position from its launch. 
My experience at Iraq Today and the Reuters venture exposed me to British 
journalists with high journalistic values, from whom I sharpened my skills as a 
reporter. This exposure made me keen to find new opportunities, such as 
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studying journalism at British universities to gain a better understanding of the 
profession. I then applied for courses in Britain and held hopes that the 
situation in Iraq might improve by the time I finished any overseas studies. 
 
7.3. Learning Media Practices from the Home of Journalism. 
In 2005 I was admitted to City University in London to do an MA in journalism, 
and I found the experience enriching, although the course was based on 
televised journalism, which I had no experience in. I did not even know the 
term ‘piece to camera’. I therefore found myself climbing an incredibly steep 
learning curve to keep up with the course’s syllabus. In August 2006 I finished 
my degree, which was a great personal conquest, but the real challenge came 
when trying to get a foot-hold in the door of British media. By then, the 
situation in Iraq had turned from bad to worse, delving into utter chaos. 
Sectarian or ethnic cleansing campaigns were under way and some of Iraq’s 
new leaders were involved, using their clout and powerful positions. Iraqi 
security forces, made up predominantly of Shiites, were used to kill people 
from other sects using the so-called ‘War on Terror’ as a pretext. On the other 
side of the conflict, Sunni militias were responsible for killings of both Sunni 
and Shiite civilians. 
The Iraqi media’s position on this conflict was a big disappointment. Instead of 
being independent, the media supported the efforts of the Ministry of the 
Interior (MOI), which was infiltrated by Shiite militias, especially Al-Mahdi 
Army and Bader Brigades; to kidnap, arrest, torture and kill Sunnis. Every day 
there was a massacre, with the situation particularly severe in Baghdad, as 
the conflict over who would control the capital continued. 
 
7.4. The Death Squads. 
While all this violence was happening in Iraq, I was contacted by Deborah 
Davies, a journalist for Channel 4 in London. She wanted to work with me on 
a Dispatches documentary in Iraq about the death squads in the MOI. We met 
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at the Channel 4 building where she explained the project to me, and I agreed 
to participate as an associate producer and cameraman, even though I was 
aware of the risks involved. 
I asked myself whether telling the story was worth the personal risks and 
decided that it was. I knew there were thousands of people who would likely 
be tortured, raped or murdered and I found it my responsibility as a journalist 
to tell the story. I was also hoping to expose the reality of the American 
scheme in Iraq and their new ‘democratic’ Iraqi government in Baghdad. I 
wanted to raise awareness in the international community about the crimes 
committed in the name of democracy and human rights, and I hoped that by 
doing so the international community would be involved in helping save 
millions of lives. 
Even for a professional journalist such as Deborah Davies, doing the 
documentary would be a challenge. “My biggest concern was the lack of 
access to people because it’s always about talking to ordinary people. So if 
we went to Baghdad in those bad old days, we would have to stay in the 
Green Zone because for us, as a western TV crew, to go outside the Green 
Zone is suicide,” Deborah Davis said. “So we had to ask someone to do it 
[with] us, and that person was you.” 
“For me, that was the biggest problem. We even considered embedding with 
the US or British Army, which wasn’t ideal, but we thought it might be a way at 
least to go out on the streets. Neither the Americans nor the British allowed it, 
however, leaving us without any support. We finally managed to get some 
footage by contacting local cameramen who agreed to sell us footage they 
had already taken, or that they would shoot for us in dangerous places like 
Sadr City. In Basra, the Americans did not understand what we were doing 
because we were not reporting breaking news, nor were we doing a 
straightforward documentary about their troops, which was what most of the 
other networks had done up to that point. We were also unable to disclose 
what we were exactly doing, since it was critical of them and the Iraqi 
government at the time. So the first couple of days were frightening and 
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challenging. Our first reaction after arriving there was how would we get 
anything at all out of the trip?”677 
I was worried about the future of my family who were all in Iraq at that time. I 
was afraid that doing the documentary would endanger them by making them 
targets for militants seeking revenge. But, despite this, I went ahead with the 
project and started working with the team which consisted of Deborah Davies, 
producer Charlie Haws, and myself. From the beginning, it was easy for us to 
find stories about the victims of the death squads on the internet. The hard 
part was to find the people affected and get in touch with them; a task that 
naturally fell to me as the local journalist in the team. Conducting the research 
with Deborah and Charlie was very beneficial to me, and I learnt many 
lessons about high-standard journalism working with them. 
Deborah Davies relied very much on the research I had done as she tried to 
get to the bottom of story. She told me: “Before I met you I spent a lot of time 
researching who was being killed in Iraq. I wanted to understand who was 
killing who and why, and it was clear to me that it went beyond the casualties 
from suicide bombings. I wanted to understand why so many bodies were 
being found every day, especially in Baghdad. We knew that what was 
needed to tell this story were the painful experiences of ordinary people. So 
we needed you to find at least two strong stories that accurately reflected the 
bigger picture to explain what was going on. We wanted to combine your 
abilities with our way of working, and actually you did incredibly well; we could 
not have made the programme without you.”678 
After the research, the team bought me a camera, taught me how to use it 
and how to get useable footage. I then flew to Baghdad on my own to arrange 
things for the rest of the crew; establishing contacts, arranging footage and 
gathering stories. When I left Heathrow airport, I kept looking from the window 
of the plane because I worried I might not make it back to London. I was going 
to film the death squads in Iraq, so I knew I had to be in close proximity to 
them and their victims to get the right footage to tell the real story. I couldn’t 
help but imagine what they would do if they found out someone was filming an 
exposé on them. 
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Secondly, being Sunni, with a Sunni name, I could be considered a natural 
target of the Shiite death squads. I could have been stopped at any 
checkpoint and killed for no more reason than my ethnic background. Thirdly, 
I was acting as an agent of western media, which to them, made me a traitor 
who deserved to die. Finally, in my hometown, which was controlled by 
radical, Sunni militias, many people knew that I was studying in the UK, 
something that might also get me killed. I was constantly troubled by these 
thoughts. The glimmer of hope that kept pushing me forward, however, 
stemmed from my belief that it was simply a case of doing the right thing. 
I planned to stop by my family, my parents and my nine siblings, the day I 
arrived in Iraq and spend the day with them in Duluhiya. As I landed in 
Baghdad, I had to think immediately about how to get through airport security, 
being one of the places where the death squads identified their victims. I was 
faced with two problems. The first was carrying a camera, which could reveal 
me as a journalist. Journalists were keenly wanted by the death squads in a 
general attempt to quell any reports on their atrocities; especially within 
western media. 
It did not take long for my concerns to be justified. I was stopped by airport 
security, who proceeded to interrogate me about the camera, but, in a turn of 
fate, a passing American patrol ordered that they let me through. I took a cab 
and spent a few hours with my uncle in Baghdad, waiting for nightfall to drive 
to my hometown covertly. I arrived at my family's house after sunset that day 
and was shocked to see cars of Sunni militias patrolling the main street. I 
wondered where the American or Iraqi troops were. I could not even see any 
Iraqi police amongst the streets. My uncle told me to “just keep quiet and no 
one will recognise you." I then felt that I was in very dangerous 
circumstances. I arrived home and spent the first night sitting nervously with 
my family. When I went to sleep, I took a rifle with me to bed just in case of an 
emergency. I spent two days indoors for fear of being seen in the 
neighbourhood. 
I decided I had to tell my father about the story, who encouragingly said, “If 
you can do something for those innocent people who are losing their lives for 
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no reason, without being guilty yourself, then do not hesitate to report on 
them; but always take care, and remember that we love you.” I told my family 
that I could not come back to see them again throughout the visit and, the 
following morning, I set out. 
I travelled to Baghdad with my uncle. We left in the early hours to avoid being 
stopped by the militants at one of their checkpoints. The first thing I had to 
deal with when I got to Baghdad was my accommodation. Channel 4 had 
booked me a place at a western company close to the Green Zone. The place 
was full of bodyguards for Iraq’s top officials, so I decided it was a bad idea 
and that the best thing I could do would be to live as close as possible to 
ordinary Iraqis. By doing so I would be safer, and I would also have better 
access to their stories. I could find out what was really going on. 
I chose to stay in Al-Khadraa district because it was mainly a Sunni district, 
but that was problematic too because I might be captured by Sunni militants 
or Al-Qaeda fighters operating in that area. 
So, the first lesson I learned was how to work in a hostile environment, and it 
was the toughest lesson I have faced. I had to survive, find stories, film them 
and get out with the footage. Time seemed to pass very slowly indeed, and I 
found myself wishing I could be like an ordinary Iraqi and be a target to just 
one group or the other, instead of being a journalist and being targeted by 
both Sunni and Shiite militants. 
I was lucky to find two friends who were willing to look after me, and even join 
me sometimes when I went out to work. They helped me as I fixed a timetable 
for my work and made a list of the places I needed to visit. I started with 
NGOs, such as the Red Crescent, in order to find out what was going on and 
gather any stories they might be able to share. Then I went to the Iraqi 
television stations, including Baghdad TV, but they were of little help because 
they had not covered any relative stories and did not want any involvement in 
my work. Some reluctance to have affiliation with reporting of such a 
dangerous topic was to be expected, and sometimes people asked me to 
come by again instead of a flat refusal, although I never made a return visit to 
any establishments in order to keep my movements from being easily traced. 
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I started to realise that it was my personal contacts who were the most 
helpful, and I asked them to lead me to the families of the death squad 
victims. I knew the stories would be shocking, and the first one I came across 
was just that. It was the story of Sheik Hameed Al-Sarheed and his seven 
sons. The Death Squads had visited his house one night in a military-style 
raid. They murdered him and five of his family members, leaving six widows 
and more than ten orphans behind. As a journalist, I wanted both sides of the 
story, but the death squads were violent and untrustworthy and, after 
speaking with their government representatives, I was still unable to speak to 
any of their members.679 
I was disappointed with the results of the trip, but Deborah believed my role 
was essential, which uplifted me. “The programme without you would not 
have happened,” she told me. “We got a lot of material from Baghdad that you 
shot, like the story of the house of six widows, the man in the mosque, and 
the widow who was living in a school with her children. We did the analysis 
and you brought the stories to illustrate that. So it was a mix between analysis 
and reportage.”680 
In some cases there was considerable risk, such as my visit to the 
Headquarters of the Muslim Scholars Association in Baghdad’s Umm Al-Qura 
mosque. The place was known to be hostile towards western media and was 
suspected of involvement in the violence. My close friends begged me not to 
go, but I knew victims’ families and displeased Sunnis too scared to venture 
into the Green Zone to complain, who visited the place to register their names 
and ask for help. I thought it was important to film it and I went to ask for their 
permission. They granted my request. 
Two weeks later, the English staff arrived in Baghdad, which made me even 
more nervous. The western media were widely considered to be collaborators 
with the coalition forces in Iraq, and all the militant groups were therefore 
hostile towards them. I felt I was responsible for the safety of the crew as I 
knew the country much better than they did, and they put their trust in me. I 
wanted to prove that I was worthy of their trust by delivering them safely to 
their families. The troubles in Iraq had made many people in Baghdad highly 
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partisan, loyal to one or other militant group, and I knew I had to keep the 
crew away from these people as best I could, if everyone was to leave Iraq 
safely with the material to finish the documentary. 
Deborah Davies told me: “I said when we met...[that] leaving the Green Zone 
was suicide, and to ask Iraqis to meet us inside the Green Zone was equally 
dangerous for them. Many people have been spotted coming into the zone 
and then murdered because they were accused of collaborating with the US. 
So we couldn't get out to meet people, and they couldn’t get in to meet us.” 
Despite the difficulties, the team still needed to be in touch with regular people 
if they were to record their pain and suffering. The first trip outside the Green 
Zone that I arranged for the team was to meet Mohammed Al-Daini, an Iraqi 
MP who had documents purporting to show the abuse, torture and murder of 
prisoners at the hands of the Iraqi police, which was infiltrated by the militias 
and their death squads. Al-Daini met us with six cars full of his bodyguards. I 
was wary, even of high officials, because all the militias had representatives in 
the Iraq government. I therefore asked him to let me drive one of the vehicles 
and requested that he travel in it alongside the crew. I felt relieved to see that 
the driver, while I was unaware, had left me a Kalashnikov by the car seat. 
Even though under normal circumstances it wouldn’t be an ethical practice for 
a journalist to be armed, this was, in no uncertain terms, a matter of life and 
death. 
As a note of reassurance in my first television expedition, under difficult 
circumstances, Deborah Davies said to me, “Every day you amaze me...in 
terms of trusting you in a place like Baghdad, in such a serious situation, we 
would not have gone ahead unless we were certain that we could trust you.” 
These words meant a lot to me at that stage of my career. 
When we left Iraq we worried that the mini-cassettes which had all our 
material would be taken at Baghdad airport, so our cameraman hid them 
among his equipment and we left without any problems. To protect myself and 
my family, I decided my involvement should be un-credited. My decision to 
remain anonymous was because the story revealed the involvement of 
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powerful American and Iraqi figures, and I deemed the risks to my family too 
big to take. 
There is no place in the “new democratic Iraq” for the truth. All journalists 
there are expected to do is appreciate the authorities’ nonexistent 
achievements. We are told that we should act like the new Iraqi media 
organisations formed by the US, and never criticise their policies. It would be 
hard for the leaders of the “new democratic Iraq” to be criticised by a 
programme on a British channel. They find it hard to accept that criticism from 
an allied country’s media is acceptable, but this is not how the British media 
operates. 
Deborah Davies told me: “We had no limitation in terms of our brief, only from 
the safety point of view, but nobody told us not to do something; just whether 
we could prove it from a journalistic and legal point of view. We had to satisfy 
the editor and the lawyer. The allegations in our programme were so strong, 
and the harder the allegations, the greater the corroboration you need. And in 
our case, all our sources - Iraqi , British and American – all fitted together.” 
I never expected the Iraqi media to report this story, but what surprised me 
most was the reaction from America’s CNN. The American network bought 
our footage to make a version for CNN, but their version was nothing like 
ours. CNN's bureau chief was very concerned, for good reason, that 
broadcasting the film on CNN would make the channel appear to be anti-
Shiite and biased towards the Sunnis. In Baghdad, that would be a death 
warrant for their own staff who were already risking their lives. 
It was a subject of huge debate at the channel. I spoke to a senior CNN 
executive in the UK who saw our version. She said she thought it was 
fantastic, and that her first reaction was that “we should put this out totally 
unchanged. But back in the US, the people at CNN decided it would be 
unwise to do that because it also showed the Americans as deserving some 
of the blame. So they put it through what they call their ‘filters’ to add in more 
US voices, and they also did an embed with US soldiers and used their own 
correspondent. The end result was a much less edgy programme.”681 
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Our film won a Royal Television Award (2005-2006) and, at a large ceremony 
in London attended by some of the most famous people in the media world, I 
stood alongside the crew to collect the trophy. Everyone asked me not to go 
up on stage with the crew because they were concerned about my safety, but 
I told them that we should not hide from those who might wish us ill; instead, 
we should show ourselves and they should be the ones to hide. I stood on the 
stage proudly as our film was described as the best documentary aired in the 
UK that year. On my way back to our table someone stopped me and asked 
me how long I had worked on documentary films. I told him this was the first 
TV work for me after finishing my course at City University. He said, “Do you 
know that I have been working in the TV world for twenty years and I did not 
get this award?” “There is no story in Hyde Park,” I told him, “The stories are 
in the nations where there is conflict and danger, so we have to go there to 
make a strong one.” 
I still believe that. If we want to tell a good story we have to brave hostile 
environments and find the untold stories. That was one of the lessons I 
learned from making the death squads film. 
The last important lesson I learnt was in London, and it was a hard one. At the 
ceremony they gave us a trophy. The Managing Director of Quicksilver Media, 
Eamonn Matthews, told us that we would each receive our trophy, which 
would be mailed to our addresses. Everyone in the crew received their 
trophies except me. 
I called him to ask about it and he told me that he would send it, but it never 
arrived. It was hard for me because I compared his attitude towards me in his 
country with my attitude towards his crew in Iraq. I risked my life and in return 
he simply discriminated against me. 
This hurt me a lot because I am quite sure that he did not send me the trophy 
because I am Iraqi. This was the last lesson: that there are some people in 
the media who think it is acceptable to use others for financial gain, while 
failing to display appreciation for their work. It should be an ongoing goal to 
show such individuals within the industry that we must live and work together 
as equals. 
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7.5. Working within an Iraqi-Exiled Channel 
Following the documentary, I worked for two and a half years as a TV reporter 
for Al-Sharqiyah TV, an Iraqi station based in London. 
I enjoyed my experience with Al-Sharqiyah, where I ran talk shows with 
selected figures and produced and presented a weekly fifteen minute 
programme called Morasiloon (Reporters). It focused on cultural, historical 
and educational issues. I had a great deal of editorial freedom and tried 
through this programme to give my fellow Iraqis an insight into Britain, ending 
each time with a message to them about the UK: how the British think, how 
they behave, how they respect their history and preserve historic sites. I 
enjoyed making the programme a great deal, especially the autonomy to 
make the programme how I wanted, without restriction. But after two years of 
working within the channel, they recruited a news director, who had no 
experience within the editorial side of media practice. I found working 
underneath such an inexperienced director very difficult, especially 
communicating with him about the day-to-day work of the channel. When I 
finally decided to leave, he asked me why I was leaving, stating that he liked 
my work. My answer to him was frank and honest; that I could not stay 
because the communication between him and myself was not effective. My 
surprise overwhelmed me when he responded with the question, “What does 
‘communication’ mean?” I could not have asked for firmer reassurance that 
my decision to leave was the right one. What is perhaps most amazing, is that 
the comparison between Al Sharqiyah and other Iraqi channels, leaves Al 
Sharqiyah standing in a very positive light against the extremely 
unprofessional practices of other stations. 
 
7.6. Back to International Standards. 
Seeking a more professional environment in which to work, I joined a British 
team working for the Bureau of Investigative Journalism based at City 
University. The project was a documentary film for Channel 4 and Al Jazeera 
English, about US documents from the Pentagon that had been leaked by the 
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whistle-blowing website Wikileaks. The aim was to turn these leaked 
documents into a documentary film. 
It was a great experience for me, but it was also very painful. While I was 
reading some of the American documents, I saw how much disrespect the 
Americans paid Iraqis, especially when it came to the lives of innocent people. 
I saw how easy it had been for American soldiers to put an end to the lives of 
tens of thousands of Iraqis. But I took some comfort from the fact that I was 
working with a British media organisation that was determined to tell the true 
story of the war, instead of working to justify the mistakes of the politicians. 
After collecting some strong stories from the leaked files, I did my best to find 
the Iraqis who were a part of these stories; eye witnesses or victims, and then 
compare what happened on the ground with how the Americans had reported 
it. There was often a yawning gap between reality and the American reports. 
Since some of the documents had gone through the public affairs office of the 
American Army in Iraq, it meant that the public had been deceived by the 
official American military statements. I felt that this was an area that would 
benefit from further study, and while going through the documents, I came 
across some that I will use in my academic work. 
As a part of our work, we established iraqwarlogs.com. This allowed us to 
give further exposure to the leaked documents’ contents which exposed 
America’s actions and policies throughout the occupation. The website has 
won the Amnesty International award on 24th May 2011. Amongst the other 
nominees were The Guardian and Channel 4. 
 
7.7. Face-to-Face with Embedded Journalism. 
About two weeks after the film aired on Channel 4 and Al Jazeera, I received 
an email from the American State Department offering me, along with five 
other Arab journalists, a media tour to Afghanistan for six days from 6th-11th 
November 2010. 
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I thought it would be a good opportunity to see the situation first hand, deepen 
my knowledge and add something new to my journalistic career. So I 
accepted the offer and went as a one man team; I was the cameraman and 
the reporter at the same time. It would be hard to do, especially in a country 
like Afghanistan, but I accepted the challenge. In the back of my mind was 
that, in my thesis, I had written about embedded journalism, and I thought this 
would be a good chance to experience it myself and perhaps make a more 
informed judgment. 
I travelled to Kabul where I met a representative from the American embassy, 
a public diplomacy officer named Mattern Daniels. I was surprised when he 
handed me the schedule of our tour, since it consisted mainly of meetings 
with American and British high officials. There were also planned visits to a 
media centre, a seed factory, some traditional industries and a candy factory. 
I asked him how I could make my television story without being in touch with 
the people of Afghanistan; without having a tour of the market? How could I 
do a story from a candy factory?  How can I do a story about the seed 
industry without visiting a single farmer at work on his farm? I told him that the 
basis of television work is that if you do not have the footage, you do not have 
a story. The Americans did not give us a chance to film what we needed of 
normal life in Afghanistan. I found plenty of stories, but I had just the American 
side and nothing about the Afghani people themselves. When I got back to 
London, I realised that the imbalanced nature of the material gathered would 
not be sufficient for me to produce an objective report. This ultimately meant 
that, given the expenditure of time and money, and even the risk to my life, 
the project did not result in any tangible outcomes. My professionalism within 
my journalistic role, therefore, overrode any sense of loss. 
The experience was a fair representation of American techniques when 
dealing with journalists in a post-war environment. Although they did not 
prevent us from filming, nor from criticising their work at all, they did occupy 
us with a very busy schedule, taking us only to the sites that they had planned 
for beforehand. It was a sophisticated form of media manipulation. 
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Throughout my journey, I have realised that a small article could do what 
thousands of fighters could not, and do it peacefully; effectively embedding 
opinions in the minds of the masses. I made a commitment to harness this 
power for good, but I knew that with that choice I would have to be a stranger 
in my own community, because most of my community do not believe in the 
media. They hold what I consider to be a very out-dated belief: that fighting is 
the only way to achieve change. I have truly learnt firsthand how dangerous 
the media can be, how it can be more dangerous than any physical weapon 
known to man. 
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Conclusion: Summing up the Research Outcomes. 
It is clear from the outset that to establish genuine democracy you cannot 
simply export it from overseas countries; the political, military and economic 
agendas will control the scene and influence the plans. The American 
occupation of Iraq is a good example of this: their democratisation projects 
looked good on paper, but on the ground these genuine projects came up 
against the interests of US politicians and the US military, so they weren’t  
followed through on. They promised freedom of speech, but when this 
freedom hurt the US’s image, showed their mistakes or disclosed the hidden 
side of their agendas, they did not want to promote it. 
In approaching the conclusion of this study, I would like to highlight the 
general argument in a few lines. Going back over the history of the USA as a 
dominant global political and military power, one can conclude that 
psychological warfare has been one of the priorities within US tactics and 
strategic operations. It seems to be a part of their military dogma, and it has a 
major influence on their plans and performance. And they always attempt to 
use the media as a tool in their psychological war, especially when they 
occupy countries, and supervise and build up the media organisations in 
these countries. 
For instance, during the American occupation in Germany and Japan, 
American troops used psychological warfare, exploiting the German or 
Japanese media to promote their occupation and political plan as positive to 
the countries’ populations. To enhance US goals, the American army 
dissolved the local media in both countries and created entirely new media 
establishments. They deployed the media in these occupied countries to 
promote their image, and criticism was not allowed at all. Yet still they were 
speaking about freedom of speech and how it was essential to build up a 
democratic country. From the outcomes of the research I cannot see any 
difference between the dictator’s point of view about free media and the US 
point of view. Both speak about freedom of speech, but the voice which they 
give to the media only allows journalists to appreciate them, not to criticise. 
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The surprise came when America invaded Iraq in 2003, over half a century 
after the last conflict with Germany and Japan, and they applied policies in 
Iraq which had many parallels to those of the previous occupations. There 
was a fatal lack of understanding of the stark cultural, socio-political and 
geographical differences between the different nations. Consequently, the US 
army dissolved the Iraqi media as the first step in a plan to launch a new 
‘custom made’ media landscape. They promised that they would build a 
media institution that would match the independence and professionalism of 
the BBC. These promises seemed to usher in a new era of professionalism in 
the history of Iraqi media. However, US policies quickly lifted the veil on their 
claims, exposing the strategic and tactical intentions behind their creation and 
supervision of the new Iraqi media organisations. When the Iraqi TV shift from 
Saddam’s speeches to Paul Bremer media conferences. This came as a big 
disappointment for us, as we had been promised a new era in freedom of 
speech. 
The US had the intention of using the media in Iraq for their own sake so they 
selected a group of exiled Iraqis, who were supposedly journalists and other 
professionals before the war, to assemble a team to work in the body of the 
new Iraqi media. However, the intention behind this recruitment drive was 
thrown into question, when they used these individuals during the war as part 
of the American psychological warfare that coincided with military operations. 
Those selected Iraqis (many of whom were previously exiled) played a central 
role within America’s task of ensuring that the Iraqi Media Network (IMN) 
served its purpose as a mouthpiece for the occupying forces. But from a 
professional point of view, their contribution did not enrich the quality of the 
organisation’s output, and allowed unethical and gravely unprofessional 
practices. This left the institution vulnerable to hard criticism, affecting its 
stability and credibility. 
Instead of judging the existing professional Iraqi journalists on their individual 
merits, the Americans, along with their imported Iraqi exiles, considered them 
all to be Ba’ath sympathisers at best, if not Saddam loyalists. They then 
proceeded to push the journalists out of the organisation, and replaced them 
with staff that did not hold the necessary qualifications and experience to fulfil 
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the roles. Many of the journalists who were fired worked for international 
media organisations, and they were very successful. Because they had the 
skills, all they needed was the right environment.  The lack of experience of 
the staff who were employed by the US resulted in many fatal problems, like 
the weak performance of the media, and the unjustified ethical mistakes. 
The US army awarded the central contract for the establishment of the new 
large-scale organisation to US companies, including the SAIC company; all 
these companies had absolutely no experience within the sphere of 
professional media. This outcome showed that it does not matter who you 
are, but who you know. This is why SAIC won the contract. This step greatly 
contributed to the worsening of the situation, widening the gap between 
professional standards and the performance of the new Iraqi media. The 
Americans awarded the contract to SAIC because it was not a matter of what 
the Iraqi media was going to be, but what the media could do for the American 
politicians and army. It was built up to play a vital role in the psychological 
warfare. 
During that time, the US army started suffering on the ground from the 
insurgents’ pressure on their troops. The number of US casualties rose day by 
day. A valid theory is that they started paying the price for their unfair policies 
in Iraq, such as dissolving the Iraqi army, security forces, media 
establishments and many other entities, as well as the terrible treatment of 
Iraqi civilians, including random killings of innocent people. These events 
created a large gap between the US troops and the Iraqi community, resulting 
in America’s failure to fulfil any sincere intentions that they might have had to 
stabilise and develop the country after their invasion. 
The American Civil Administration in Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA), felt that they had lost their prestige and reputation in Iraq more than 
anywhere else in the world. They therefore decided to launch a new 
psychological operation to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people. 
One of the many tools of the US’s psychological warfare was the IMN. The 
Americans used the channel massively, until the Iraqi Media Network (IMN) 
(Al-Iraqiyah) became the mouthpiece of the US army and the CPA. They used 
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the channel for tactical purposes to win the war in Iraq, regardless of their 
promises made before the war to create an independent media in Iraq. The 
result was that the IMN lost its credibility as a professional and impartial 
deliverer of news, and the subsequent fall in ratings was further proof of the 
fact. 
In spite of being the beneficiary of contracts worth tens of millions of US 
dollars, the performance of the channel was far from international standards 
of quality and professionalism. This was due to the fact that the controllers of 
the organisation saw the role of the channel as that of a tool, to be used as 
necessary to achieve the goals of the Iraqi and American authorities. This 
fundamental misunderstanding overlooked the fact that the role of such a 
channel is to act as a public service, with the fulfilment of its duties to deliver 
uncoloured, impartial and professional information to the public. 
There was, therefore, an urgent need for new media legislation, to establish 
rules and regulations that ensured the relationship between the media and the 
government consisted of sound ethics; that employees of media institutions 
would be allowed to report objectively without fear, and that there was 
integrity in the reports that were broadcasted to the public. 
But the US and Iraqi Governments failed to establish the necessary legislation 
as, although they saw the need, they were also aware that the laws would 
protect the IMN from their influence, tying their hands from using it as a 
propaganda tool. As a result, they ignored the huge effort that was undertaken 
by international professionals and NGOs to help build a framework of new 
media legislation in Iraq. Many of the channels established did indeed have 
charters drawn up by the Americans. The ideals within these pages of policy 
were indeed admirable, but the reality is that they were nothing more than 
protective measures to distance the American authorities from any blame of 
misconduct. The implemented policies of the Americans within the 
organisations contradicted these charters to the degree where a total lack of 
journalistic integrity resulted from them. The violation of the charters’ policies 
was so widespread and far-reaching, that the actual ownership of channels 
 196 
that should be publicly owned was often given to the Iraqi Government, and 
even individual citizens. 
The remarkable development in the number and variety of television 
channels, radio stations and daily papers after the invasion was a natural 
catalyst for the deliverance of more objective reporting, ushering in more 
criticism of the US’s policies and mistakes in Iraq. In reaction to this, the US 
established the Baghdad Club, recruiting and training Iraqis to implement the 
directives of the project. The club’s aim was to buy coverage from Iraqi 
journalists, without the knowledge of the journalists’ broadcasters or 
publishers. In return for payment, the journalists would cover specific events 
chosen by the US army in a specific light, and publish or air the resulting 
stories. This new technique, which to this day America still denies took place, 
enabled the Americans to further spread its control and influence over other 
areas of local media. The American Army broke ethical rules by trying to  
publish biased information through the media which show the real role of the 
media from their perspectve. They also encouraged Iraqi journalists to carry 
out non-ethical practices, regardless of the impact such policies would have 
on the future of the Iraqi media.  
The Americans felt it was not enough to have a central channel in Baghdad, 
so they set about a plan which enabled the military to launch television 
channels in other provinces, a part of their tactical psychological war 
operation, the aim being to influence the locals and improve their opinions of 
the US forces. These local media projects were supposed to help provide 
safety for their troops. They felt a strong need for such projects, especially 
after their failure to influence Arabic channels like Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiah; 
these two channels played a vital role in the coverage of Iraqi issues in a 
notably professional way, or, at least, outside of the American and the Iraqi 
Governments’ influence. A telling example of one such local station was Salah 
Ad Din Channel, which was very much a case of challenge and response, as 
opposed to conducting carefully considered plans in dealing with the 
reconstruction of Iraq after the invasion. The US established this channel in 
the hometown of Saddam Hussein, because it was one of the hot spots from 
a security point of view. The gap between the US and the locals was very 
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wide, so the Americans needed a bridge between them and the local people 
in this province, especially as their troops were under heavy attacks. This was 
the main reason behind the establishing of Salah Ad Din Channel: to reduce 
the attacks by reaching the hearts and the minds of the local people by 
broadcasting positive messages on the channel. So Salah Ad Din Channel 
was part of the psychological warfare strategy to support the military operation 
on the ground. 
Once the US army had finished their military operations they handed the 
Salah Ad Din Channel over to the channel’s contractor, in spite of 
documentation saying that the channel is owned by the people of Salah Ad 
Din. They did this as a reward for the contractor who had served the US 
during the difficult times. The contractor then insisted the channel contract 
was given to  a tribal sheikh who had no link with the media at all and ignored 
all the professionals’ demands to give the contract to someone who has 
experience in journalism. This was done because they needed someone who 
could turn the channel to serve the US agenda in the province; someone who 
would not say ‘no’ or not obey an order. 
Also the US army published local newspapers in small villages, like Yathrib 
newspaper, to secure their forces. They would pay a group of non-
professionals to publish a local newspaper in Yathrib Village near the biggest 
US military base to publish positive news about the Americans’ reconstruction 
projects in the area, to reconcile the people to their presence in the Area in 
the hope of avoiding attacks. They would punish the newspaper staff if they 
criticised the US army by cutting the money. So the staff got paid if they wrote 
positively and the payments got stopped if they criticised the US army or 
wrote negative stories about killing civilians, corruption, or any other wrong 
behaviour of the US army.  So again the staff of Yathrib newspaper had the 
freedom to appreciate the US army policies and practices but they did not 
have the right to criticise them. Here I would like to highlight that similarly, 
Iraqi journalists had the full right to appreciate Saddam’s government under 
Saddam, and similarly there were no limits placed on the appreciation. There 
appears to be no difference between dictatorship and superpowers – they 
both want us to pray for them. 
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After the US handed authority to the Iraqi Government, they continued with 
the same policies, attempting to control the media. The Iraqi Government 
ignored all efforts to establish new media legislation and kept using CPA law 
number 14 to justify their aggressive policies towards other organisations who 
refused to dance to the same tune. They also kept to the same course for Al-
Iraqiyah (IMN) and their other organisations. To this day Iraqis are living with 
the consequences of the establishment and maintenance of a state-run media 
that, instead of serving the people in the deliverance of useful and truthful 
news, continues to manipulate what should be a public service, to ensure the 
privileged at the top of Iraqi society retain their position. The impact of 
ignoring the establishment of media legislation to organise the relationship 
between the media, the government and society continues to be felt up to the 
present day, as the Iraqi Government also followed the same US rules of 
using the media for their political agenda and military purposes. We are 
therefore back to the state-run media again, a free media to serve politicians 
and not to criticise. 
This study shows that the media in Iraq has always been used to serve the 
politicians’ and military’s agendas. And the media cannot perform its genuine 
roles effectively when they are controlled, gagged or suppressed by the  
military force or political leaders in an authoritarian state. Building a true 
healthy society needs a truly free independent media in order to establish a 
stable and safe country. 
Future Research. 
The Iraqi media under the American occupation has experienced tremendous 
changes. It has been expanded from a draconian state-run press into a 
relatively free and open arena. However, the US management of this media 
has performed poorly, as detailed in this thesis, due to cultural 
misunderstandings and dictation by US military and foreign policy managers. 
This mistaken and wrong-headed approach has resulted in a sectarian media 
divided along ethnic and sectarian lines. 
 
Moreover the mismanagement has ushered in fragile institutions which fall 
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short of the standards hoped for in the post occupation Iraq. One suggested 
field of future research would be a study into ways that could improve the 
current media situation in Iraq, and assist in establishing sound, grassroots 
institutions and media regulating boards. Such research could also help 
identify ways to decrease the detrimental effect of media institutions which are 
not independent and most importantly help to ascertain professional means 
through which the Iraqi media might conform to accepted international 
standards. It is important that Iraqi journalists should know the difference 
between being a journalist and being a propagandist. 
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